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ABSTRACT 
Local government elections provide a platform for the people at the grassroots to choose 
those who manage the local government system. Election at this level is also strategically 
important because it providesan opportunity for the people to participate in governance. 
But the conduct of local government elections oftentimes results in electoral violence. 
Electoral violence inseminates insecurities which adversely affect development and 
undermine the sustenance of the democratic project. Despite the significance of local 
elections to grassroots development, this aspect of local governance appears to be a 
neglected theme in the historiography on local government administration. This study 
therefore sets out to bridge this gap as it interrogates the correlation between local 
government elections and electoral violence in selected Local Government Areas in Benue 
state, 1976-2012 using tools of historical research. It examines the incongruities in the 
electoral process that has made local government elections particularly volatile and the 
implications for development and sustenance of democratic governance. This research is 
centrally on the analysis of the historical and theoretical issues coherent in electoral 
violence as a result of fraudulent elections in Benue State. The research also interrogates 
the role of political actors, security agencies and stakeholders in the subversion of credible 
and transparent elections. It adopts an interdisciplinary approach and employs the primary 
and secondary sources of data in interrogating the contradictions that have undermined 
credible, transparent, free and fair elections with resultant electoral violence. The study 
found out that flawed electoral processes instigated protests which soon became violent. 
The study argues that the Benue State Independent Electoral Commission (BSIEC), 
political actors and security agencies in various ways created conditions that made 
violence a persuasive option for the aggrieved to vent their grievances. A reformation of 
the electoral institution (BSIEC) to delink state control of the commission is advocated as a 
strategic necessity for credible elections. Besides BSIEC, a strengthening of all institutions 
involved in elections like the police, judiciary and political parties will diminish the 
incentives for electoral violence.     
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CHAPTER ONE 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the Study 
In all democracies, election is the essential ingredient that allows transition from 
one regime to the other. It is the means and process by which the electorate decide who 
and which group administer the affairs of the country based on their perceived conviction 
on the agenda and programme presented by the group (usually a political party).  Election 
therefore is an indispensable part of any democratic system. However, the conduct of 
elections to foster democracy in Nigeria has remained a thorny issue. In fact, virtually all 
aspects of the electoral process become, at some moment or another, subject of 
disagreement which often times snowball into violence with devastating consequences. 
Thus, “rigging elections has for a long time been as Nigerian as pounded yam or millet
1
”. 
Indeed, the level of financial investment and the incentives derivable from politics in 
Nigeria arguably makes election a fight for life. 
The introduction of the elective principle in the Clifford Constitution of 1922 
heralded Nigeria’s electoral history. This development marked the first time Nigerians 
were afforded the opportunity to participate in an institutionalized electoral process. 
However, much of the electoral history of Nigeria is also a history of electoral violence,the 
pre-independenceconstitutions particularly the Constitution of 1946 fecundated the growth 
of ethnicity and exclusion to maturity. Elite politics has since continued to fan electoral 
exclusion and shape the dynamics of electoral violence in Nigeria. Politics is seen more as 
a business rather than a call to service whereby competing ideas are sold out to the people 
for endorsement. Electoral institutions have also been caught in this web of manipulations 
leading, as it were to flawed electoral processes and violence. The correlation between 
elections and violence is therefore shaped by the nature of elite politics in a particular area. 
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The increased status of local government as a third tier of government, particularly 
as from 1976, coupled with enormous responsibilities and increased financial base, 
provided the required and desired impetus for intensive party politics at that level of 
governance
2
. The control of the local government apparatus was now seen as very crucial 
for electoral success of a political party because it provides the necessary grassroots base 
for effective control of the state and the federal government machineries.
3
 
More so, the possession of the machinery of government, especially at the 
grassroots, guarantees the control of the allocation of scarce economic resources, including 
the spoils of office and patronage. Ruling parties do not often accept open political 
competition, nor are they always willing to relinquish office, even when defeated at the 
polls by the opposition. Similarly, the opposition is always reluctant to tolerate the ruling 
party and will do all it can to gain power. Therefore, the ruthless competition creates a 
vicious circle: oppression by the defenders of the status quo is matched by subversion by 
the opposition groups.
4
 
It is against this background that this study attempts to examine the fundamental 
question of electoral violence in Benue politics especially at the grassroots level. Although 
violence is not peculiar to local government elections, the experience in Benue State has 
shown that the conduct of elections by the State Independent Electoral Commission has 
created incentives for electoral violence. It is also in this context that this study interrogates 
the desirability or otherwise of a State Independent Electoral Commission. It is hoped that 
this study will interest policy makers and contribute to the national dialogue on stemming 
electoral violence especially at the grassroots level. 
 
1.2 The Study Area   
Benue State was created on February 3
rd
, 1976 by the Murtala Mohammed 
Administration. The State was carved out of the defunct Benue – Plateau State. It lies 
within the lower Benue River Basin longitudes 7
o
 47
'
 and 10
o
 0
'
 East, and latitudes 6
o
  
3 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Map of Benue State showing the shaded areas as Local Governments affected by 
Electoral violence within the study period. 
  
4 
 
25
'
and 8
o
 8
'
 North of the Equator.
5
The State has a total land area of 34, 059km and 
is bordered by Nassarawa State to the North, Taraba to the North-East, Cross River to the 
South, Enugu to the South-West and Kogi to the West. It also shares an international 
boundary with the Republic of Cameroon in the Kwande Local Government Area axis.
6
 
The State comprises of twenty three local government areas of Agatu, Ado, Apa, 
Otukpo, Ohimini, Okpokwu, Katsina-Ala, Logo, Gboko, Buruku, Tarka, Makurdi, Gwer, 
Gwer West, Konshisha, Kwande, Guma, Ukum, Ushongo, Vandeikya, Obi, Oju and 
Ogbadibo, The population of the State by 1991 was put at 498,554 households
7
 and by 
2006 census,
8
 it was 2,753,077 (1,368,965 males and 1,384,112females). A striking feature 
of the population is that majority of the people reside in the rural areas where the local 
government is the tier of government closest to them. This also explains the concern of this 
study with the electoral process at the grassroots where majority of the populace reside. 
The State is basically an agricultural state and is endowed with human friendly 
physiographical and climatological attributes. The favourable agro-ecological conditions 
and the central location of the State support massive production of arable and plantation 
crops, livestock and fisheries
9
. The contribution of Benue to the food needs of Nigeria 
bestows on it the status of "The Food Basket of Nigeria”
10
 However, the food catch phrase 
is criticized on the ground that the State has enormous potentials but the potentials are yet 
to be developed.  
The State is also rich in culture. It is home to several ethnic groups namely Tiv, 
Idoma, Igede, Etulo, Abakpa (Abakwariga), Jukun and other settler ethnic groups. The Tiv 
are the dominant group accounting for over half of the entire population. The rich and 
diverse cultural heritages are expressed in languages, arts, artefacts, the mode of dressing, 
music and dances to mention but a few. Popular dances include Ingyough, Ange, 
Anchanakupa and Swange among the Tiv and Aja, Ichahoho, Odumu and Anumawowo 
among the Idoma. The kwagh–hir puppet theatre provides memorable entertainment in its 
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dramatization of Tiv folklore and offers social commentary aimed at social corrections
11
. 
The Alekwu ancestral festival of the Idoma is celebrated as an occasion when the ancestors 
're-incarnate' from the spirit world to 're-establish' contact with the living in form of 
masquerades
12
. The people of the State are also politically conscious. This explains the 
seriousness they attach to electoral issues as illustrated by the incessant violence that has 
characterized elections in the state. 
 
1.3 Statement of the Problem 
Scholars across the disciplines have explored some aspects of Local Government 
Administration such as funding, autonomy, performance as an agent of rural development, 
governance structure, etc. However, not much work has been done on the electoral process 
that recruits leadership at this level of governance particularly in Benue State. It is this gap 
that this study attempts to fill, especially given the dire consequences the phenomenon of 
electoral violence has for the entrenchment of political stability and development.  
More so, the conduct of local government elections in Benue State is riddled with 
electoral violence. The manifestation of this ugly development is an indication of flaws in 
the electoral process.  Indeed, the conduct of local government elections has created 
numerous incidents of violence with devastating consequences for the development of 
Benue State. This development has also called to question the capacity of the State 
Independent Electoral Commission to conduct a violence free election. It is, therefore this 
problematic that has informed the choice of this research topic.  Thus, the conduct of local 
government elections and the violence that it generates elicit the interrogation of the 
following questions: 
a. To what extent did the series of elections conducted since 1976 in Benue State 
resulted to electoral violence? 
b. To what extent were the Electoral Commissions independent?     
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c. How did the status of electoral bodies affect the performance of their core 
responsibility? 
d. What role did political parties play in generating electoral violence? 
e. In what specific ways did the conduct of elections degenerate violence and what 
were the consequences? 
f. What are the consequences of electoral violence for the development of Benue 
State 
 
1.4 Aim and Objectives of the Study 
The principal aim of this study is to reconstruct the history of Local Government 
Elections and the attendant violence that marred the conduct of elections at the local 
government level in Benue State during the period of study. The work also sets out to 
attain the following specific objectives: 
a. To explain how the conduct of Local Government Elections degenerated to 
violence 
b. To explain the extent of BSIEC independence and how it affects the conduct of 
local government elections. 
c. To explain the role of political parties, security agencies and other stakeholders in 
electoral violence 
d. To explain the specific ways in which local government elections degenerated to 
electoral violence 
e. To suggest alternative approaches for the conduct of Local Government Elections 
to stem the tide of electoral violence     
It is hoped that the attainment of these objectives will contribute immensely to a 
better appreciation of the challenges affecting the conduct of free and fair elections. For as 
William succinctly puts it: 
7 
 
...elections are a crucial ensuring popular 
participation...elections are the specific method of realizing 
government of, by and for the people.
13
 
 The conduct of free and fair elections therefore remains the surest and only way of 
ensuring majority rule.   
 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
The significance of this study broadly lies in the contributions it makes towards 
building a democratic culture at the grassroots. The conduct of free and fair elections is 
one of the most important means of establishing a legitimate government and exercising 
popular control over those who govern the people.  To this end, a study that exposes the 
factors that impede the conduct of free and fair elections is important. 
More so, where people are disillusioned and alienated from their authority, the 
resort to extra constitutional means becomes likely. This threatens the stability of society, 
especially when there is open disregard for the people’s wishes, as expressed through the 
ballot box, the immediate hostile climate for violence is created. The need to stem the 
growing tide of political violence lends credence to this study. 
A further justification for this study lies in the fact that Nigerian laws recognise the 
right of every Nigerian to vote according to his/her conscience. For instance, section 1(2) 
of the 1999 Constitution provides that:        
The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall not be governed nor 
shall any person take control of the government of Nigeria or 
any part thereof except in accordance with the provisions of 
this constitution.
14 
 
To ensure compliance with this provision of the constitution, the 1999 Constitution 
established the Free Election Process as the only means of acquiring power democratically 
and constitutionally in Nigeria. 
 The justification for a study that searchlightsthe electoral process at the grassroots 
could also be anchored on the fundamental objective principle of state policy which 
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defines explicitly the nature of the relationship between government and the people of 
Nigeria. For example, section 14 of the 1999 Constitution states as follows; 
1) The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be a state based on the principles of 
democracy and social justice. 
2) It is hereby accordingly, declared that: sovereignty belongs to the people of Nigeria 
from whom government, through this constitution derives all its powers and 
authorities... The participation of the people shall be the primary purpose of 
government and the participation of the people in their government shall be ensured 
in accordance with  the provisions of this constitution.
15
 
The realization of this state policy can only be actualized via the conduct of free, 
fair and transparent elections. The electoral process is therefore important and worth 
studying.The concern with Local Government Election is hinged on the realization that the 
local governments are where majority of the people reside. Therefore, whatever affects this 
majority deserves not just government but intellectual attention. More so, the local 
government areas are the base of political activities and ought to form the foundation for 
political recruitment. The electoral process at this level is strategically important and hence 
qualifies to be given intellectual scrutiny.  
 
1.6 Scope and Limitations 
 The focus of the study is on the electoral process at the grassroots.Local 
Government Elections in Benue Stateappear to have recorded the highest incidentsof 
electoral violence in terms of intensity. This development raised the need to interrogate the 
correlation between Local Government Elections and electoral violence.  The lower time 
set of 1976 coincides with the creation of Benue State and subsequently the Local 
Government Reforms carried out by the Federal Government, and allows room for an 
assessment of the electoral processes at the grassroots. The year 2012 marks the period the 
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last Local Government Elections held and afford the study the opportunity to appraise the 
conduct of elections by the Benue State Independent Electoral Commission. 
 To empirically substantiate the validity of the arguments canvassed in the study, it 
was important to select case studies of electoral violence emanating from the 
unsatisfactory conduct of Local Government Elections from some selected Local 
Government Areas. In this vein, Tarka, Kwande, Otukpo and Agatu Local Government 
Areaswere selected. The selection was based on Local Government Areas where there 
have been high incidences of electoral violence. The evidence for electoral violence is 
therefore limited to the selected Local Government Areas. This limitation became 
necessary because it is practically difficult to provide empirical evidence in all the twenty 
three local governments in the State given the limited time span allowed for the completion 
of this study and the problem of research resources. Suffice it to state that this limitation 
does not undermine the validity of the arguments in the work. The upper time limit of 2012 
further allows room for analysis of contemporary developments in the conduct of Local 
Government Elections.                     
 
1.7 Research Methodology 
The nature of the subject under investigation requires the use of a multi-disciplinary 
approach. Issues relating to elections and political violence have been of interest to 
scholars across the disciplines. A multi-disciplinary approach therefore exposes the 
researcher to a wide range of perspectives. These perspectives are relevant in exploring 
concepts like elections and violence. It is important to emphasise the point that a multi-
disciplinary approach is not without problems. The researcher has, therefore critically 
analysed the different perspectives noting the gaps and attempting to fill them. 
The secondary sources which are a representation of the various strands of views 
reflected in the work were sourced from libraries like Benue State University Library, 
Makurdi, University of Nigeria, Nsukka Library and the Ahmadu Bello University Library, 
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Zaria. Private libraries were also consulted. Given that the study is basically a historical 
study, a great deal of primary sources was used. Official documents and oral interviews 
constitute bulk of the primary sources; I also visited the selected local government areas 
where violence occurred. Respondents were carefully selected from a wide spectrum 
which included the political actors and non-partisan electorates. Electoral staff were also 
interviewed. This enabled the researcher to obtain balanced information and generate data 
from the view points of those who were directly affected by violence resulting from the 
conduct of fraudulent Local Government Elections as well as the political actors. A 
minimum age limit of 25yrs and maximum of 75yrs was used in the selection of 
respondents. 
 Issues bothering on elections and violence are usually controversial; most actors 
are partisan and therefore present views that are largely subjective. The researcher took 
note of this fact and expanded the range of the group of persons interviewed so as to 
achieve objectivity. The facts presented are therefore carefully analysed and are based on 
broad perspectives in line with historical traditions of reconstruction. 
 
1.8 Conclusion 
This chapter establishes the template of the study and sets out the context of 
analysis.  It has been argued that election is the only way by which majority of the 
populace participate in installing a leadership that flows from their collective consent. But 
this is only possible when the electoral process is perceived by the electorates to be 
transparent, free and fair. It is the deficit in this expectation that breeds electoral and 
political violence. The chapter therefore outlines the techniques of the research in terms of 
the focus, research methodology, scope and limitations as well as the intellectual value of 
the study. 
 
 
11 
 
Endnotes 
1. R.A. Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria, (Ibadan: Spectrum 
Books Limited, 1991)p.171 
 
2. Guidelines for Local Government Reform, Federal Government Printer, Kaduna, 
1976. 
 
3. C. Emezi, “Local Government in Historical Perspectives” Nigerian Journal of Public 
Administration and Local Government, 1984, p.50. 
 
4. R. Anifowose, Violence and Politics in Nigeria: The Tiv and Yoruba Experience, 
(Enugu: Nok Publishers, 1982), p.IX. 
 
5. Cited from Black’s Law Dictionary 7
th
 Edition. P.536. 
 
6. J. L. Nyagba, “The Geography of Benue State” in D. I. Denga (ed) Benue State, the 
Land of Great Potentials, (Calabar: Rapid Educational Publishers Limited, 1995), p. 
75 
 
7. J. L Nyagba, “The Geography of Benue State… P. 75. 
 
8. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1991 Population Census. 
 
9. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2006, Population Census. 
 
10. J. L. Nyagba, “The Geography of Benue State… p. 75. 
 
11. D. A Surma, “Agriculture in Benue State” in D. I. Denga, (ed) Benue State, the Land 
of Great Potentials… p.123. 
 
12. S. T. Shaminja, Political Change and Governance in Benue State, (Makurdi: Aboki 
Publishers, 2010), p. 15 
 
13. S. T. Shaminja, Political Change and Government in Benue State… P. 15. 
 
14. The 1999 Constitution, Federal Republic of Nigeria, Abuja. 
 
15. The 1999 Constitution, Federal Republic of Nigeria, Abuja.       
 
 
 
 
  
12 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews studies on Local Government Elections and electoral violence. 
The essence is to espouse what has been done on the subject of investigation and elicit the 
gap that this present study attempts to fill. This endeavour will no doubt provoke a deeper 
understanding and indeed appreciation of the issues relating to Local Government 
Elections and electoral violence. The nexus between elections and electoral violence 
suffices for critical analyses.  
The review of related literature is therefore thematically organised around two main 
themes: local government as a democratic institution, electoral and political violence. The 
chapter also establishes the theoretical framework of the study. 
 
2.2 Perspectives on Local Government as a Democratic Institution 
 Sequel to the 1976 local government reforms, local governments were conceived as 
democratic institutions. The reforms stressed the need for a local government system that 
could serve not only as machinery for even and accelerated development and democratic 
processes at the grassroots, but also as foundation for stability of the national political 
system. The conduct of elections that would give vent to popular participation became a 
necessity and in fact a democratic requirement.Section 7(1) of the 1979 Constitution 
clearly captures this requirement stating inter alia: 
The system of local government by a democratically elected 
Local Government Council is under this constitution 
guaranteed and accordingly, the government of every state 
shall subject to section 8 of this constitution, ensure under a 
law which provides for the establishment, structure, 
composition, finance and function of such councils.
1
 
 
An extrapolation of the above provision indicates that the conduct of elections into 
Local Government Councils is a legal requirement and the only means recognised by law 
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for erecting a democratic structure at the grassroots level. This requirement has ignited 
scholarly interest in local government studies. 
Adeline Idike
2,
 in an incisive article entitled “Constitutional and Legal Basis of 
Local Government Administration in Nigeria,” posits that local government is the linkage 
of the people with the state/central governments. The linkage is predicated on the fact that, 
local government is in a better position to provide services which require intimate local 
knowledge and sensitivity for the benefit of the majority at the grassroots. She analyses the 
constitutional provisions ofLocal Government Administration in terms of the democratic 
character for the Local Government Councils, statutory allocation of funds to the councils 
and functions of Local Government Councils. She contends that in spite of the apparent 
good intentions of the constitutional provisions, it has been ignored and flouted with 
impunity by the other tiers of government.She concludes by stressing the need to 
strengthen local governments and make them viable. 
Adeline Idike’s thoughts are indeed apt. She draws attention to the need for a 
strengthening of constitutional fire walls for grassroots administration given its strategic 
relevance in stimulating development. Thisworkpoints to the constitutional flaws and 
manipulations that characterise Local Government Administration,especially the 
democratic content. The conduct of elections into Local Government Councils has 
remained a daunting national challenge. Indeed, it is this problematic that fecundates an 
intellectual interrogation of the issues involved.  
R.O.F Ola
3
 in a thought provoking article reflects on the core reason for 
establishing local government. He argues that the establishment of local government is 
hinged on the basis that the rural people are better placed to cater for their needs if allowed 
to participate in the government closest to them. But the people can only participate in 
local governance if the electoral process for recruiting leadership is transparent and devoid 
14 
 
of electoral fraud. It is in this connection that this study is concerned with interrogating the 
nexus between elections and violence at the grassroots. 
Ola’s reflections are relevant to this study. He has stressed the need for rural people 
to participate in local governance. Though his reflections are generalized without a specific 
case study, he harps on the significance of a democratic administration at the grassroots. 
This study benefits from these instructive thoughts as it interrogates the electoral process at 
the local government level in Benue State. 
Sorkaa
4
 in an article entitled, “Presidential or Parliamentary System of Local 
Government in Nigeria”, argues for the need to evolve a system of Local Government 
Administration that has the potentials of enlisting popular participation to ignite rural 
development. For Sorkaa, a modified presidential system is better suited for Local 
Government Administration. Though the thrust of Sorkaa’s paper is a comparison of a 
presidential and parliamentary system of local government, he draws attention to the need 
to strengthen the democratic elements in Local Government Administration. It is this 
aspect of the paper that we find most instructive. But the democratic content can only be 
strengthened if the electoral process is transparent and respects the wishes of the people, 
and also protects the sanctity of the ballot box. Thus, credible elections are critical 
variables in erecting democratic structures and ensuring good governance. 
Dennis U. Ekumankama
5
 in his book, The Law and Development of Local 
Government in Nigeria identifies three fundamental reasons that define the philosophy for 
establishing local governments as follows: 
a) People at the grassroots are only able to understand and recognise local government 
because they are able to feel its presence and impact on their day to day activities. 
b) The nearness of local government to the people places them in a position where they 
easily articulate and aggregate the demands of the people. A government operating at 
the grassroots level is more likely to be attuned to the needs of the people.   
15 
 
c) In a society with endemic shortage of skills and technical know-how, the simpler the 
operation for achieving results, the better. This facilitates the recruitment and 
training of available human labour for productive purpose. Local Governments 
Organisations are usually not complex and generally do not really require 
sophisticated and highly effective personnel for effective performance.  
Ekumankama’s articulations stress the very essence for having local governments. 
Indeed, local governments are closer to the people at the grassroots and provide 
opportunities for the people to make demands and participate in governance. But they can 
only do this if the electoral process that recruits leadership at this level is transparent, free 
and fair. To this extent Ekumankama’s work draws attention to the need to take seriously 
the electoral process at this level thereby strengthening the significance of this present 
study. 
A.D. Yahaya corroborates Ekumankama’s views by arguing that the political 
necessity to extend the power of government in order to be felt throughout the political 
system is one primary justification for the establishment of local government in a political 
system. The compulsive need to extend the power and presence of government has 
inevitably compelled the government to accept the need to distribute power and the 
principle of power sharing in the political system.
6
 
 The above reasons advocated by Ekumankama and Yahaya emphasise the need for 
local governments to exist as democratic institutions. Popular participation in local 
governance can best be achieved if the electoral process is such that reflects majority 
opinion. These views give credence to the concern of this study with local government 
elections.   
 Murray Last
7
 in an article titled “Governance and the Public at the Local Level: 
From Revenue-Raising to Benign Neglect, 1960-2010", contends that since independence 
there has been at the grassroots two quite distinct administrations each with its own 
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specific goal and priorities. The first set of administration was relatively centralized with 
considerable authority centred on the four regional capitals and under them were the 
provinces in which the Native Authority was all powerful. The overt agenda he opines was 
development with a degree of personal austerity encouraged. The second set of 
administration he describes as a decentralised polity with 36 states and 774 Local 
Government Authorities allocated by the 1999 constitution a percentage of the federal oil 
account paid directly each month to each political unit in each of the three tiers of 
government, the State governors and the local government chairmen being the formal 
recipients of the allocation each month. In this system, he avers there is an overt discourse 
on “development” but the actual priority seems to be personal consumption by politicians 
with access to the allocation. 
Murray Last’s basic arguments are that the Native Authorities (NA) were primarily 
concerned with raising revenue through taxation,but the methods of its collection were 
contentious thereby raising tensions at the grassroots. He holds the view that the abolition 
of the Native Authorities along with the cessation of all taxes was a policy employed by 
successive military governmentsas a way to win back popular mandate for the military 
regimes. It was this development that necessitated the decentralization of government and 
gave birth to the recognition of local governments as a third tier government in 1976. He 
argues that the marked difference between the two sets of administration was the shift in 
priorities, away from revenue raising and security to personal consumption of the huge 
monetary allocations that initially the LGA chairmen got from the banks each month. He 
concludes that government has effectively withdrawn from the country side and is no 
longer primarily interested in the “people”. 
 Murray Last’s article is indeed a seminal contribution to the understanding of the 
factors that have increasingly made the contest for political leadership at the local 
government level contentious and volatile. The shift to personal consumption of local 
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government resources is a key factor in explaining the win at all cost syndrome that 
characterises Local Government Elections. Although Murray Last’s views are not specific 
to Benue State, theycan be applied in deepening our understanding of why the mere 
conduct of elections and electoral violence in the state.  
Joash Amupitan
8
 reflects on “The Role of the Courts in Strengthening Democracy 
at the Local Government Level”. He avers that the courts have played a commendable role 
in strengthening democracy in Nigeria by making judicial pronouncements on fundamental 
constitutional issues bothering on the conduct of elections, impeachment procedures, 
revenue allocation, and division of powers, fundamental rights, political parties and local 
government. However, he laments that despite the fact that the local government system is 
constitutionally a third tier and autonomous of the other two, the federal and the state 
governments in Nigeria have unwholesomely interfered in the operations of the Local 
Government System such that in some states, the local governments are reduced to 
departments of the state government. He avers further that in most cases, their stationary 
revenue allocations from the Federation Account are withheld unlawfully by the State 
Government or Federal Government. Local Government Councils are arbitrarily dissolved 
without allowing them to serve out their constitutional tenure.  
Amupitan’s views, though scantly presented are research stimulating as he exposes 
how the powerful elite manipulate the rules to serve their personal interest. The violence 
that accompanies the conduct of Local Government Election is also engineered by the elite 
to impose on the gullible public stooges in the garb of local government chairmen. 
K. Azaigba
9
 in a doctoral thesis entitled “A History of Local Government 
Administration and Rural Development in Some Local Governments in Benue State, 1976-
2012” adopts a historical perspective to explain the underperformance of local 
governments as service delivery agents of government in the face of increasing statutory 
allocation from the Federation Account. His thesis is that the operational status of local 
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governments in Nigeria generally and Benue State in particular impinge on its supposed 
existence as a democratic institution. This he blames on elite manipulation of local 
institutions to foster their selfish interests. He contends that since 1976, local governments 
have existed as local administrations which are basically appendages of the state 
government. This appendage relationship, he argues has shifted emphasis away from local 
government being a service delivery agent to a mere political institution for settling party 
chieftains, mobilizing electoral votes, salary payment and maintenance of law and order. 
Azaigba’s views are indeed apt and research stimulating. His work lends credence 
to a study that investigates the electoral process which gives legitimacy to the existence of 
local governments as democratic institutions. Although Azaigba is concerned with the 
performance of local government as a service delivery agent, his views are relevant to this 
present study given the historical insights he provides. It is important to reiterate at this 
juncture that the marked difference between this present study and Azaigba’s thesis lies in 
the fact that, this study attempts to establish the nexus between the conduct of local 
elections and the attendant violence that has characterised the process. It is hoped that this 
present study will make a modest contribution to the search for solutions to the menace of 
electoral violence.                                            
J.I Elaigwu
10
 in a seminal work on political development in Nigeria entitled, 
Nigeria, Yesterday and Today for Tomorrow: Essays in Governance and Society reflects 
on the topic “Local Government and Political Development: The Challenges of 
Participation and Control in Grassroots Government in Nigeria”. He explains that local 
governments play important roles in political development in the third world. However, he 
laments that the participation of local government in the developmental process is plagued 
by a number of daunting challenges namely, the question of what authority to assign local 
governments, the question of participation by the rural folks? He argues further that the 
dilemma posed by these challenges is resolved by the ruling elite at the state level in 
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favour of their greater control of peripheral units. It is equally this development that gives 
rise to the manipulation of the electoral process and the accompanying violence that such 
action necessitates. 
Elaigwu’s thoughts give value to any study that attempts to expose the flaws in the 
electoral process at the local government level considering the centrality of grassroots 
democracy to political development. More so, Elaigwu has raised a number of very critical 
issues that need be deeply interrogated in order to widen the frontiers of knowledge as 
regards grassroots democracy. The concern of this study with local government elections is 
an attempt to expose the contradictions with the electoral process at the local level 
especially given the frequency and magnitude of violence the process ignites. This is 
significant because the entrenchment of grassroots democracy is a strategic requirement for 
political stability and a prerequisite for good governance. 
This study also finds A. Aboyega’s article “Local Autonomy in Federal Politics: 
The Nigerian Local Government System in Historical Perspectives”
11
 relevant. The author 
has attempted a periscope of the changes that have characterised the status of local 
governments in Nigeria since the 1950s. He avers that since the onset of the federal 
system, the local government system has undergone a number of experimentations which 
have affected it in two fundamental ways. Firstly, each of the regions into which the 
country was divided had its separate system of local government which was basically a 
reflection of the regional elites’ perceptions of the appropriate pattern of decentralization 
of political authority. Secondly, the rich cultural diversity of the peoples grouped together 
in a region for administrative convenience by the colonial authorities shaped the local 
government system. This is because the regional governments matched the administrative 
organisation and authority devolved to the units of local government with the differential 
levels of development of the traditional political system in different localities. 
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He contends further that the period of military rule beginning from 1966 witnessed 
extensive experimentations with different theories and patterns of local government with 
mixed results. These experiments gave way in 1976 to a National Local Government 
System. Thus, the Second Republic was a testing period for Local Government Policy with 
the federal and state governments contesting for control of local government policy. 
According to Gboyega, the period 1987-1991 was the most prolific era in the history of 
local government reforms in Nigeria. This is because during the period, the status of local 
government was radically transformed with local governments given greater powers and 
resources. He posits further that it was in 1987 that the Babangida administration 
transferred the power to conduct Local Government Council Elections to a federal agency, 
the National Electoral Commission (NEC). 
However, he notes that the Abacha regime in 1995 restored state competence and 
control over local government. The 1995 Draft Constitution granted states the exclusive 
power to create new local governments. It also provided for the establishment of a State 
Electoral Commission in each state to conduct Local Government Elections. He concludes 
that the 1999 constitution adopted these aspects of the Abacha Draft Constitution. 
The relevance of this paper lies strongly in the historical changes in the Local 
Government System it highlights. Of specific relevance is the attention it draws to the 
developments that led to the establishment of State Electoral Commissions. Although the 
analysis attempted in the book chapter is generalized and brief, it stimulates further 
research such as the one attempted in this study.                             
 
2.2.1 Perspectives on Electoral and Political Violence  
A number of scholars have reflected on the concept, dynamics and manifestations 
of violence. Anifowose in a classic entitled, Violence and Politics in Nigeria: The Tiv and 
Yoruba Experience, explains political violence as:  
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The use or threat of physical act carried out by an individual 
… within a political system against another individual or 
individuals, and or damage or destruction to property and 
whose objective, choice of target of victims, surrounding 
circumstances, implementation and effects have political 
significance, that is tended to modify the behaviour of others 
in existing arrangement of power structure that has some 
consequences for the political systems.
12
 
 
 The above conceptualization of violence is instructive. It brands political violence 
as that which affects the political process (though it may not be immediately apparent 
whether an action has a political component or not).
13
This perspective excludes accidents 
and criminal action for personal gain but includes acts of both representatives of a 
government or dissidents 
14
. This definition also aligns with the context in which political 
violence is implied in this study. This study is concerned with forms of violence that 
include riots, party clashes, political demonstration with violence, looting, arson and 
political assassinations. 
 Anifowose’s
15
 classic is a well-researched exposition on violence and politics in 
Nigeria using the experiences of the Tiv and Yoruba ethnic nationalities. The work which 
is in seven chapters analises the dynamics and manifestations of political violence. He 
justifies his interest in Tiv and Yoruba ethnic groups on the ground thatviolence among the 
two ethnic groups was a means to securing political objectives by contenders for political 
power. He explained that “tribalism” was the fulcrum on which party politics revolved and 
therefore the political class felt obliged to appeal to ethnic loyalties every time their 
position was threatened by their rivals. In the particular case of the Tiv which is a major 
ethnic group within our study area, he reports that the incidences of violence that 
characterized party politics in the area were induced by the NPC. He asserts that:  
The attempt of the NPC to win over the Tiv population met 
with persistent and stubborn resistance of the latter, lawful 
authority was flouted; this in turn led to even more forceful 
methods being used. The end product of the perennial 
conflicts between the competing groups in Tiv Division was 
the escalation of violence in 1960 and 1964
16
. 
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 Anifowose draws attention to the fact that violence in Tiv Division must be related to a 
much more crucial factor. Tiv Division was a political tool exploited by the NPC and the 
AG. It was the rivalry and hostility between these two parties at the national level that 
intensified the Tiv situation. For example, the AG, a Southern Party, was solidly behind 
the UMBC, while the NPC government on the other hand regarded the Southern Political 
Parties as interlopers
17
. 
 The significance of Anifowose’s classic to the present study cannot be 
overemphasized. He has raised a number of pertinent issues germane to the present study. 
His classic is rich in statistics and therefore serves as a reference material. It suffices to 
observe that though the classic is limited to political violence in the First Republic, it is 
relevant in laying the foundation for the appreciation of violence after the First Republic.  
It is also worthy to note that, the manifestation of violence in our study period (1976-2012) 
is also significantly different in terms of causative factors. 
 O. Okpeh
18
 in an article “Explaining why Violence Persists in Nigeria’s Election” 
identifies pertinent issues that are precursors of electoral violence namely, the 
intensification of ethnic consciousness and inexperienced leadership, the type of economy 
as well as the weak leadership structure of colonialism. The author holds colonialism 
responsible for the inequalities that fuel violence. For example, he blames the Richard 
Constitution of 1947 and the McPherson Constitution of 1951 for laying the foundation for 
the emergence of ethnic militias.  
Okpeh appears to have ignored the weak cultural factor that manifests in a faulty 
value system in his analysis. He follows the path of Afrocentric scholars who find it more 
plausible to blame colonialism for their woes ignoring internal and self-induced cultural 
factors. However, the relevance of Okpeh’s paper lies in the strategies he outlines for 
resolving post-election violence such as the empowerment of the nation’s political 
economy and the entrenchment of good governance. But good governance can only be 
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attained if the electoral process is not only free and fair but transparent. It is in this context 
that this present study finds relevance.  
 In a chapter contribution in a book, Communal Relations and Crisis Management, 
A. Bur
19
 reflects on “Communal Crises and its Impact on Community Development”. He 
relies on the theoretical orientation of the State Violence Theory to argue that violence in 
society is necessitated by economic conditions, high level of illiteracy, poverty, bad 
governance and poor distribution of economic and social resources. Bur’s position is that 
beneath the immediate causes of violence is the real cause which is deeply rooted in the 
factors he has highlighted. This postulation is indeed plausible and it explains why the 
Benue area has become a theatre of political violence. However, it is more rewarding to 
study more closely how these factors really manifest into violence. 
 In a similar treatise, “Post-Election Violence and the Failure of Intelligence”, 
O.Sebella
20,
 draws attention to the role of security agencies in generating information that 
would make them proactive in nibbling violence in the bud. He blames Intelligence 
Agencies for the failure to contain violence.  Sebella’s paper introduces an interesting but 
worrying dimension in the escalation of political violence. The ruling elite often times use 
security agencies to undermine the electoral process. The electorates then see the security 
agencies as collaborators and therefore hide sensitive information away from them. 
Intelligence gathering can only be effective when there is active cooperation from the 
people. Sebella’s paper widens the research horizon of this present study by drawing 
attention to the relevance of intelligence gathering in averting electoral violence. 
 This study also benefits from. A.Lyam’s paper “Kwande Crisis: A Community 
Conflict of many Interests"
20
. Lyam blames the post election violence in Kwande Local 
Government in 2004 on a plethora of reasons namely the absence of developmental 
projects, the negligence of the “Ya na Angbian Principle”, youth employment, poverty, etc. 
He draws attention to the need to investigate and solve the real causes of violence rather 
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than simply blaming it on politics. Politics for Lyam was just used as an instrument to vent 
out the deep seated grievances of the people. Lyam has demonstrated that beyond mere 
politics, violence can also be ignited by factors that are not necessarily political. Therefore, 
there is always the need to interrogate in-depth the causes of political violence beyond 
political causes. The article therefore gives credence to the thrust of this present study.   
 R.A. Joseph
21
 in his book, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria dedicates 
Part IV to analyzing the crisis of Nigerian democracy. He avers that the minimum 
requirement of a functioning constitutional democracy is that there be rules of right 
behaviour which are honoured much more in the observance than in the breach. However, 
he regrets that in Nigeria, party politics is a restless struggle to procure individual and 
group benefits via the temporary appropriation of public offices and this eventually 
reduces the electoral process to a Hobbesian state of war. He contends further that Nigerian 
elections are principally a competition for control of the electoral machinery and 
secondarily, a competition for individual votes. Any party which fails to win control of this 
machinery in a particular area or to neutralize the influence of its opponents over the 
personnel operating the machinery, risks losing elections regardless of the actual support it 
enjoys among the electorates.  
 Using the experience of the 1983 general elections as a reference point, he captures 
succinctly the reality of the Nigerian electoral process when the suggested that:  
Political parties are in direct control of the various civil and 
local government services over the country and it is from this 
group that hundreds or thousands of officials are appointed. 
At the polling stations, such local personnel can permit 
voting by under aged persons, multiple voting, deliberately 
misleading voters, regarding voting procedures, inadvertently 
taking wrong voting list to particular polling stations or 
deliberately failing to sign and stamp the envelopes given to 
voters
22
.  
  
 Reflecting further on the crisis of democracy in Nigeria, Richard citing Ifeanyi 
Izuka contends that “It is difficult to identify any political party that does not run an army 
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of thugs … Thuggery has become rapidly enthroned in Nigerian Politics”. Richard’s 
description of politics in Nigeria as “Prebendal Polities” is indeed apt and instructive. His 
articulations have clearly demonstrated why the electoral process in Nigeria is 
characterized by violence. Though the point of reference is the experience in the First and 
SecondRepublics, the postulations summarize the challenges with elections in Nigeria and 
therefore the book is a very important source material for reconstructing the electoral 
history of Nigeria.  
 Y.A.S Bagaji’s
23
 article “Political Thugs and Political Violence: Cause and 
Prevention” explains why thugs are recruited and groups incited for violence. He advances 
a number of reasons to include; politics seen as a means to wealth, the desire of the 
incumbent to hold onto power, unreliability of the electoral process, unemployment, low 
level of political and legal education, colonial legacy and ethnic politics. He therefore 
recommends political education as a panacea to reconstructing Nigeria’s unstable political 
scene. Bagaji’s identification of the reason for political thuggery and violence appear 
plausible but his recommendation of political education as a panacea is too simplistic and 
ignores the complexities that characterize the sort of prebendal politics in Nigeria. There is 
therefore the need to explain more thoroughly why politicians resort to the use of thugs 
during elections. 
 In a contribution to a book, Issues in the Development of Tivland edited,C.N Abul 
and J.N. Abul
25
 write on “Effect of Political Violence and Land Disputes on the 
Development of Tivland”. The paper is founded on three basic assumptions; that violence 
and disputes retard development, that frequent violence and disputes have contributed 
significantly to the backwardness and underdevelopment of both the Northern and 
Southern Tivland, and that there is a deliberate effort to leave the rural areas in Tivland 
underdeveloped for fear of wanton destructions. The authors therefore contend that instead 
of seeing polities as a game of units, numbers, influences, consensus and absence of 
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rancour, the reverse has always been the case in Tivland. Politics of intimidation fear and 
violence is identified as a feature of Tiv politics. The genesis of political violence in 
Tivland is stressed to the struggle between the UMBC and the NPC over the control of 
Tivland. But the escalation of crises is blamed on low level of education and political 
awareness at the time. Tivland became a “slaughter house” of Nigerian politics. The 
authors conclude that political education is necessary for Tiv people especially for the 
ruralities that are sold out through threats and money by self-crowned political demigods.  
 The significance of this paper lies in the attention it draws to the role of Political 
Parties in igniting violence. The perception of politics as “a do or die affair” in Nigeria 
generally elicits the interrogation of the political culture of Nigerians. It is equally this 
erroneous perception that ignites the sort of political violence associated with elections. 
The weakness in the paper is the scanty presentation of analyses. Again the use of the 
phrase ‘Tiv people” is inappropriate because the word Tiv also refers to people. 
 
2.2.2 Perspectives on Elections 
Election is basically the process of selecting a person to occupy a position or office 
usually a public office. However,William D. Graf while writing on what the 1979 elections 
meant to Nigeria wrote inter alia: 
The elections are a crucial process in the Nigerian political 
system. If the Second Republic is to be defined as a 
democracy then elections are the technical means of ensuring 
popular participation.If popular sovereignty is a guiding 
principle, then the elections are the specific method of 
realizing government of, by and for the people. If government 
is to be both responsive and responsible, then again elections 
are the way in which the people can relate to their 
government and government to the people. And finally, if 
majority rule is to prevail in Nigeria, only elections can 
establish what the majority is and register the wishes of the 
people
25
. 
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The above explanation is not only comprehensive, it suites specifically what 
elections entail in the Nigerian situation. F. Iyayi concurs with the above postulations when 
he writes that “election provides the medium, by which the different interest groups within 
the modern nation state can take and resolve their claims to power through peaceful 
means”.
26
 
The Nigerian Constitutions have also given meaning to the centrality of elections in 
the country. For instance,Section 1(2) of the 1979 Constitution 27 and Section 1 (2) of the 
1999 Constitution provide that: 
The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall not be governed nor 
shall any person or group of persons take control of the 
government of Nigeria or any part thereof except in 
accordance with the provisions of this constitution. 
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To ensure compliance with this provision, both constitutions established the free 
election process as the only means of acquiring power democratically and constitutionally. 
The law also guarantees the existence of local governments as democratic institutions inter 
alia: 
The system of local government by democratically elected 
Local Government Councils is under this Constitution 
guaranteed and accordingly, the government of every state 
shall ensure their existence under a law which provides for 
the establishment structure, composition, finance of such 
council. 
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It is therefore the extant provisions of the Constitution that justifies the concern of 
this study with Local Government Elections especially the attendant violence that has 
characterized the process. The conduct of elections is the only means by which leadership 
at the grassroots levels is legitimate. But the fundamental question is the extent to which 
the electoral process at the local level is free, fair and transparent. This study sees the 
associated violence with Local Government Election as protest against the process. It is in 
this context that this study interrogates Local Government Elections. 
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U. Nnadozie
30
 in an article entitled “History of Elections in Nigeria” gives 
historical insights into the conduct of elections in Nigeria since the introduction of the 
elective principle. He contends that the conduct of elections in Nigeria over the years since 
colonial rule have been dotted by rancour, thuggery, boycotts, kidnapping and 
assassination of political opponents, manipulation of electoral bodies and processes as well 
as the use of security personnel and agencies against political opponents. He however 
opines that the introduction of option A4 voting procedure by NEC was responsible for the 
relative success of the 1993 elections.The significance of Nnadozie’s views could be 
inferred from the historical insights it provokes in facilitating a better appreciation of the 
nature of the challenges with conducting elections in Nigeria. Although he is concerned 
with the General Elections, his views can be invoked to explain the challenges with Local 
Government Elections. 
Similarly, D. Garuba
31
 in another paper tagged, “Transition without Change, 
Elections and Political (in) stability in Nigeria” laments on the electoral process in the 
country especially the 2003 General Elections. He argues that the fundamental problem 
with elections in Nigeria is the manipulation of objective electoral rules by politicians. It is 
this phenomenon that he holds responsible for the “win-at-all-cost-syndrome”. He 
contends further that INEC is not truly independent and therefore is compromised on 
several grounds. He calls for the amendment of the Act establishing INEC to accord it 
financial independence instead of the present arrangement where the electoral body is 
appointed and funded by the executive arm controlled by the party in government; an 
interested party in the elections.Garuba’s views give vent to the relevance of studies that 
exposes the contradictions with the electoral process. This intellectual exposition will no 
doubt assist in advancing reforms to sanitise the electoral system and by so doing erect 
durable structures that would guarantee political stability in Nigeria. 
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Lugman Saka
32
 in a paper couched “Electoral Institution and the Management of 
the Democratic Process: The Nigerian Experience” espouses the contradictions in 
Nigeria’s electoral history. He posits that “while a great deal of the problems confronting 
elections and the electoral process in the nations democratic history can be linked to 
behavioural and attitudinal dispositions of the political elite, a substantial portion of the 
blame must also be placed on the door step of institutions that have been saddled with the 
responsibility for the conduct of the elections.  This assertion is a true reflection of the 
electoral experience in Nigeria since the 1959 elections. He argues further that rather than 
being independent of the Executive Arm of Government, transparent in its dealings, 
impartial in the discharge of its functions, accountable and responsible to the stakeholders, 
involved in the process, Electoral Commissions in Nigeria have exhibited the opposite of 
all these virtues. He concludes that the electoral history of Nigeria presents very little hope 
for the sustenance of democracy in Nigeria.   
The work raises the need for a thorough introspection of electoral institution in 
Nigeria. In fact, the work provides some ample justification for a study that interrogates 
why elections ignite political violence. It is in this connection that this present study draws 
intellectual inspiration to investigate and explain the drawbacks that have made Local 
Government Elections in Benue State largely violent. Though Lugman aptly identifies the 
contradictions in the electoral history of Nigeria, his conclusions fail to provide a clear cut 
roadmap out of the quagmire. This study attempts to fill this gap as it makes 
recommendations for credible electoral management. 
Jephias Marupa
33
, reconstructs electoral processes in Africa in a seminal 
contribution entitled “Elections and Electoral Processes in Africa”: A gimmick or Curse? 
He highlights the controversial way elections have been held in some countries, which 
have led to the loss of confidence with the results in some cases, leading to civil wars, re-
run of the electoral process or the formation of coalitions. He avers that election time in 
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Africa have been periods of heightened anxieties to both the contesting political parties and 
the electorate. Thus, in the battle for hegemony, pre-and post-electoral violence has 
become common place. He laments that the most susceptible victims of the battle for 
political power swayed left, right and centre by competing political parties. He submits 
further that the aftermath of most elections have left citizens licking their wounds as they 
take stock of the brunt of supporting whatever political party of their choice. To avoid 
outright defeat, most ruling political parties have been able to manipulate both the vote and 
State Security Machinery to their advantage.  
The relevance of Marupa's views lie in his treatment of the vagaries associated with 
elections in Africa. Whereas elections in the developed world are periods of contest of 
ideas, the scenario in Africa is fraught with all manner of electoral incongruities. This 
work again stresses the relevance of studies on electoral processes in Africa. Unless, 
pragmatic solutions are found to the slide to violence before and immediately after the 
conduct of elections in Africa, the sustenance of democracy will greatly be threatened. The 
search for solutions give credence to a study that investigates the problems that inseminate 
political violence. Popular democracy must create the basis for frequent democratic ways 
of changing the political leadership of a country. The promotion of a democratic culture 
based on tolerance and respect for diverse views and opinions must be ensured and 
sustained.  Though elections form a core component of a democratic society, elections on 
their own do not lead to fundamental change but are part of a process that will lead to the 
strengthening of electoral institutions and democratic processes. Thus, a study of electoral 
institutions that strengthen democratic processes is indeed important. 
I.M. Abbas
34
 in a paper presented at the 27
th
 Annual Conference of the Nigerian 
Political Science Association on “Electoral Reform, Political Succession and 
Democratization in Africa” held at Benue State University, Makurdi, harped on the 
monstrous electoral violence in Nigeria and the challenge it poses in ensuring that the 
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theory and practice of democracy are applicable, “mutatis mutandis”. He argues that there 
is a conflict between the theory and the actual practice of democracy in Nigeria. He avers 
that persistent and endemic electoral violence in Nigeria have constituted a clog in the 
wheels of democratic politics and invariably portends ills for democracy.  For him, politics 
in Nigeria is like a business venture where one acquires wealth and influence 
supersonically.  Thus, the electoral process is often times a fraudulent exercise in futility 
giving rise to structural underdevelopment, exploitative leadership and extreme poverty. 
Abbas’ postulations are apt and highlight clearly the incongruities in Nigeria’s electoral 
history. The paper highlights the dangers of fraudulent elections for democracy thus 
strengthening the thrust of the present study. 
A. Awopeju,
34
identifies factors responsible for flawed elections in Nigeria. These 
factors are; incompetent electoral commissions, do or die syndrome of the political parties, 
widespread procedural irregularities, numerous incidences of violence, intimidation of the 
electorate, stuffing of the electoral box, poverty on the part of the electorate, etc. He argues 
that the objective of electoral fraud is to frustrate the democratic aspirations of citizens 
who have voted or would have voted in offices someone other than the purported victor.  
He identifies fundamental flaws in the electoral acts and sued for their amendments 
through electoral reforms in order to fortify the credibility of the electoral process. Again, 
Awopeju stresses the consequences of flawed elections for the sustenance of democratic 
stability. This study benefits from his analyses of flaws in the electoral process especially 
the refreshing insights he invokes. 
Writing on “The challenges of electoral flaws in Nigeria’s fledgling democracy”, 
J.C. Ebegbulem
35
 enumerates obstacles to the development and consolidation of 
Democracy in Nigeria. He laments that in the quest for political power, Nigerian 
politicians make bogus promises in order to win over the electorate. However, little is done 
to deliver dividends of democracy to the people. Instead, politicians fan the embers of hate 
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and ethnic division, kill and maim one another, loot the treasury, ring elections, engage in 
corruption and suppress the rights of the less privileged. He goes further to argue that the 
kind of democracy practiced in Nigeria is such that the purpose of the government is the 
good and welfare of the ruler and his party members instead of the ruled. Ebegulem’s 
observation is corroborated by Akinboye
36
 who posits that the current trend in the 
democratic agenda of the country seems to be more problematic than the political class 
surreptitiously collaborated with greedy and self-serving politicians to subvert political 
processes and at the same time undermine values and norms. Similarly, Dauda and 
Avidime
37
 argue that the current security situation in the country is a major obstacle to the 
consolidation of democracy. According to them, the tense, security situation in all parts of 
the country makes nonsense of whatever efforts has been made to justify the sustenance of 
our democratic experiment since the environment is un-conducive for foreign investments 
and endangered by bad governance and political instability. They went further to assert 
that the problem of youth unemployment cannot be divorced from security problems in the 
country, although there has not been any reliable data on the country’s unemployment 
profile. 
Essis
38
 in her seminal contribution points out that there is no perfect democracy and 
therefore there cannot be a universal democracy, but she highlights three constraints of 
democracy. These are: (i) Universal Adult Suffrage which sets the basis for the legitimacy 
of power and allows, through free and fair elections for political alternation without which 
there can be no real democracy; (ii) the legal state which protects the citizens by 
guaranteeing individual freedom, defines the necessary equilibrium between the different 
authorities in the state; (iii) the respect for human rights which constitutes a guarantee 
against all despotic powers. 
God-fatherism is also identified as a major obstacle to democratic consolidation in 
Nigeria. The activities of “godfathers” have demeaned the development and consolidation 
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of democracy. It blocks the democratic process by obstructing selection of good and 
qualified candidates for elective posts. The so-called "godfathers" often rely heavily on 
money and force to achieve their goals. They share out money in order to establish a 
network and create political bonding. However, if that fails to support, they unleash 
violence both as deterrence and punishment. Under politics of godfatherism, elections 
cannot be free and fair nor can governance be transparent or people-friendly. Godfatherism 
has created doubts about the legitimacy of the electoral process and the elected. It creates 
an environment that delinks the Nigerian people from the government. Godfatherism as an 
“ideology” promotes exclusion and denial of legitimate entitlements of citizenry. There is 
total absence of culture of accountability and this negates one of the critical attributes of 
democracy which it translates to good governance. Good governance predicated on the rule 
of law, due process, accountability and transparency in the management of public space is 
precariously compromised
39
.  
These postulations are indeed instructive. This explains clearly the plethora of 
challenges that mar the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria as well as the conduct of 
free and fair elections.  Although they do not harp directly on the management of Local 
Government Elections, the useful insights assist the present study in appreciating better 
associated problems with election management. 
The role of security in the conduct of free and fair elections in one that cannot be 
wished away. This is because in a context where security is guaranteed, politicians are 
most likely to abide and play by the rules of the game. Equally important is that the 
perception of the electorate on the state of security before, during and immediately after 
elections is a strong determinant of voter behaviour. If voters are assured that there is 
adequate security, there is likely to be high voter turn all things being equal. Contrariwise, 
fear of outbreak of electoral violence or breach of security is more likely to scare the voters 
away from the polling centres. Thus, the capacity and willingness of security agencies to 
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provide adequate security in a non-partisan and impartial manner contributes immensely to 
the credibility of elections. It is in this connection that the report of CLEEN Foundation on 
the observation of the conduct of security officiates during the 2011 Elections is reviewed.  
The report notes that electoral violence has been one of the key factors influencing the 
evolution of security agencies in the country. Consequently, the return to democratic 
governance in 1999 rekindled fears in the citizenry as regards the role security agencies 
would play. These fears heightened in 2003 when political incumbent were seeking re-
election. For instance, the clamour by State Governors for the decentralization of the 
Nigeria Police Force ignited palpable fears that the police was a ruse. This development 
informed CLEEN Foundation’s interest in the role of security agencies in security 
management. Consequently, the foundation recommended that; 
(a) security agencies needed to institute an enquiry into all reported cases of ballot box 
snatching with a view to sanctioning officials designated for providing security for 
movements in such cases. Future election observation should also entail observation 
of the movement of materials to the collation centres and the conduct of officials at 
such centres.  
(b) press reports and observation reports showed that in several states of the federation, 
some security officials were alleged to have supervised electoral fraud or provided 
security for perpetrators of electoral fraud. That urgent prosecution of offenders 
would serve as a deterrent to other officers in future elections. 
(c) there was the need to debrief security officers involved in election duty. The review 
should be comprehensive and aimed at exposing lessons learned to enhance 
performance in future elections.  
(d) the different security agencies needed to incorporate election duty in their training 
curricula. This is important as the nation’s security agencies would be called upon to 
play important roles in future elections.  
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(e) there was need for continued strengthening of the capacity of Civil Society 
Organizations working with security agencies.Such support would go a long way in 
enhancing the capacity of such organizations to embark on comprehensive 
programmes beyond the electoral cycle
40
. 
The CLEEN Foundation Report is significant to the present study in that it draws 
attention to the critical role security agencies play in election management. This 
presupposes that the management of elections is beyond just the electoral institution. 
Without adequate security, the best plans or initiatives initiated by an electoral institution 
can hardly succeed in delivering credible elections.  The experience since 1999 is such that 
elaborate security arrangements were hardly made in the conduct of Local Government 
Elections in Benue State. The experience as demonstrated in the subsequent chapters is 
such that state officials used security officials in manipulating the electoral process. It is in 
this light that the study finds the recommendations by CLEEN Foundation instructive. 
C.C. Aniekwe and J. Kushie
41
 in a monograph entitled “Electoral Violence 
Situational Analysis: Hotspots in the 2011 General Elections in Nigeria” present critical 
thoughts on the phenomenon of Electoral Violence in Nigeria. The work is divided into 
four chapters. The authors attempt some conceptual clarification on electoral violence. 
They argue that electoral violence is much more than Election Day Violence or overt 
manifestation of violence during election period. Electoral violence is explained to involve 
political parties, their supporters, journalists, agents of the government, election 
administrators and the general population, and includes threats, assault, murder, 
destruction of property and physical or psychological harm. By these definitions, electoral 
violence must involve specific victim(s), perpetrator(s) and occurs within a time frame and 
location. It also connotes that electoral violence also comes with motive(s) and the victims 
can be people, places, things or data. This presupposes that electoral violence cuts across 
different stages of election starting from the registration period to post election period.  
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Similarly, Fisher
42
 highlights four descriptive categories of conflict and violence 
that emerge, suggesting a variety of motives, perpetrators, and victims which include the 
following: 
(i) disgruntledvoters against the state arising from perceived unfairness in the election 
process. 
(ii) the State in conflict with voters who challenge election results or hegemony of the 
State. 
(iii) political rivals in conflict with each other in the quest to attain power and  
(iv) A combination of two or more of the above categories.  
The above thoughts on what constitute electoral violence are no doubt apt and 
explain clearly what constitute electoral violence as well as their dynamics. It goes without 
saying that electoral violence occurs at different stages in the election process starting from 
pre-election, Election Day and Post-election Day violence. Pre-election day violence 
occurs during registration period and can lead to massive disenfranchisement of voters due 
to psychological fear. This can in turn threaten the very target of achieving free and fair 
elections in any political system. Irregularities in voters register, blurred identity, and poor 
technical quality might lead to void registration and subsequently denials of voting right. 
This not only disenfranchises the voters but is also a trigger to bigger scale violence on the 
Election Day. Disenfranchised voters who felt disgruntled about the process might result to 
descriptive category (i) as captured by Fisher as a pay back to the State.  
Aniekwe and Kushie
43
 have also explained that Election Day Violence also 
constitutes electoral violence. Prominent in the list of Election Day Violence include 
burning of election offices and materials including ballot boxes and papers, intimidation of 
voters, snatching of ballot boxes, rigging and diversion of election materials. Post-election 
violence occurs hours and days after elections. This emanates from disputes over election 
results and the inability to settle disputes fairly. It occurs more often in situations where the 
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judiciary is perceived to be partial. This might lead to low level of confidence on the 
judicial system by the candidates and as such would prefer taking laws into their hands 
than wasting time in a corruptible judicial system. The frustration and fear of partial 
judgement then leads them with the hard option of electoral violence. Fisher noted that the 
manner in which election results are announced might also lead to electoral violence and in 
some cases to targeting of a certain group or ethnic organ in a multi-ethnic society.  
Chapter two of Aniekwe and Kushie’s work dwells on the universal context of electoral 
violence. The core argument is that election is an indispensable part of any political 
system; nonetheless, it can also involve explicit or implicit use of violence in the 
contestation either by the political parties contesting the elections themselves or outside 
agents like the military, labour unions or private militias. However, electoral violence and 
the use of force undermine the whole essence of democracy, which rests on freedom, 
expression and choice. They further contend that electoral violence is capable of swinging 
the pendulum of election results and could create political unrest and as a result instil 
instability and slow pace of development.  
A historical narrative of electoral violence in Nigeria is also presented. The 
contention is that since the attainment of independence in October 1, 1960, Nigerian 
political system has been synonymous with political and electoral violence. The first 
election after independence in 1964 was marred by boycotts, malpractices and violence. 
The widespread violence and level of electoral malpractices witnessed in the 1964/5 
election angered some sections of the Nigerian military who felt that the civilians were not 
ready for democratic rule. The circles of coups and counter coups since 1966 highlight the 
history of political violence in Nigerian political life. It is argued that aside the aborted 
1993 elections, Nigeria has never had any other peaceful election devoid of violence and 
other electoral vices, which is the main clog in coming to terms with free and fair elections 
in Nigeria. They conclude that Nigeria’s electoral system is synonymous with violence 
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since electoral violence has formed part of the Nigeria electoral culture. Nigerian 
politicians are habituated to fraud, corruption, intimidation and violence and consider 
violence the necessary weapon for political success.  
Aniekwe and Kushie’s views elicit the consideration of key incentives for electoral 
violence in Nigeria. It is a considered opinion that state institutions through their acts of 
commission or omission promote electoral violence. They include the police, election 
management bodies and the judiciary. The actions and inactions of these institutions in one 
way or the other provide a lot of bed for electoral violence in Nigeria. The Nigerian 
political landscape is also beclouded by a culture of impunity. Despite lip service paid to 
stumping out violence, successive governments in Nigeria have made little efforts to 
ensure that government officials and members of the security forces implicated in 
violations of civil and political rights including election related violence are held to 
account.  For instance, Human Rights Watch reported that the overwhelming majority of 
politically motivated cases of violence have not resulted in prosecution
44
. It attributes this 
to corruption or undue influence of politicians over the police and/or the police inability to 
carry out effective investigations because of inadequate or wasted resources. More so, 
there has been so much foot dragging on the establishment of the Electoral Offences 
Tribunal. The absence of such body has (as expected) resulted in the non-prosecution of 
violators. For example, Section 131 of the Electoral Act 2010 provides that a person who: 
(a) directly or indirectly, by himself or by another person on his behalf makes use of or 
threatens to make use of any force, violence or restrain;  
(b) inflicts or threatens to inflict by himself or by any other person, any minor or serious 
injury, damage, harm or loss on or against a person in order to induce or compel that 
person to vote or refrain from voting or on account of such person having voted or 
refrained from voting; or  
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(c) by abduction, duress, or a fraudulent device or contrivance, impedes or prevents the 
free use of the vote by a voter or thereby compels, induces or prevails on a voter to 
give or refrain from giving his vote; 
(d) bypreventing any political aspirants from free use of the media, designated vehicles, 
mobilization of political support and campaign at an election, commits an offence 
and is liable on conviction to a fine of N1,000,000 or imprisonment for 3years
45
. 
It suffices to observe that the above Electoral Law’s line and clauses are merely 
paper work without adequate machinery in place for enforcing it. In order to deter 
politicians from penetrating electoral violence with impunity, tougher and radical laws 
need to be in place with strong and independent enforcement mechanism. More 
importantly, the common factor in the causes of conflict today is the phenomenon of 
political corruption. As Richards Joseph observes, “Nigeria’s present and future depend 
upon a prior understanding of the nature, extent and persistence of certain mode of political 
behaviour, and of its social and economic ramifications
46
”. This sort of political behaviour 
is wrapped in what could be rightly termed “prebendal culture” which sees politics as the 
clearing house for jobs, contract and official plunder. He describes prebendal politics thus;  
Democratic politics and prebendal politics are two sides of 
the same coin in Nigeria; each can be turned over to reveal 
the other… The system of prebendal politics enables 
divergent groups and constituencies to seek to accommodate 
their interest… The system is often wasteful, unproductive, 
and contributes to the increasing affluence of the relative few, 
petty gains for a larger number, and misery for the great 
majority of people. Since it is a self-justifying system which 
grants legitimacy to a pattern of persistent conflict, and since 
its modus operandi is to politicize ethnic, religious and 
linguistic differences, it serves to make the Nigerian polity a 
simmering cauldron of irresolvable tension over which a lid 
must regularly be clamped, and just as regularly removed
47
. 
Sadly, the Judiciary, which is touted as the hope of the common man, has not lived 
up to its billing. The wheel of justice grinds slowly and with an unsure gait, which 
aggrieved parties find both frustrating and expensive. A breakdown of order in society 
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makes people call for extreme solutions such as “Bakassi Boys” (Vigilantes) and military 
repression. But such “solutions” end up weakening the State and diverting attention from 
the need to improve basic institutions of governance, notably the police. Politics is then 
presented as a battle field in which every weapon and tactics is deployed for political 
victory through all forms of electoral violence.  The above preview has espoused very 
salient issues and provoked a deeper understanding of electoral violence in Nigeria. In fact, 
the preview makes a persuasive case for specific case studies on electoral violence. It is on 
this score that the present study makes a contribution to existing literature on this subject 
matter. 
K. Mohammed
48
 in a paper titled “Counting the Votes and Making the Votes 
Count: Lessons from Adamawa State”,introduces a refreshing perspective to the challenges 
with the electoral process in Nigeria drawing inferences from the practical experience in 
Adamawa State. His major contention is that the problem with the electoral process is the 
desperation on the part of the ruling class to manipulate the electoral process in their 
favour. He cites the experience in Adamawa State Gubernatorial Elections in 2003 
whereby the election tribunal upturned the election of Boni Haruna in favour of Adamu 
Modibo on account of massive rigging. However, Mohammed sees the contrary verdict by 
the Court of Appeal to the effect that the tribunal erred in law to have nullified Boni 
Haruna’s elections as gross manipulation of facts and distortion of evidence by the “power 
elite” using the judiciary as an accomplice.  
It must be observed that the Mohammed’s views appear subjective and sentimental. 
In one breadth, he praises the tribunal for nullifying the election of Boni Haruna, in another 
breath, he lambasts the Court of Appeal for upturning the decision of the tribunal. 
Nevertheless, what is refreshing about his perspective is that he has demonstrated that the 
Judiciary is also involved deeply in subverting the electoral process. Another point of note 
relevant to this study is the fact that electoral violence is not just due to flawed elections 
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but also a function of the mindset of the people to accept only verdicts that are favourable 
to them. The implication of this is that there is always the need for a deeper interrogation 
of electoral issues to underscore the denominators that ignite violence. It is the significance 
of this endeavour that this study finds justification. 
I. Ogundiya and T. K. Baba
49
 reflect on the topic “Electoral Violence and Prospects 
of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria”. These scholars posit that elections are 
instrumental to confirming and reaffirming the legitimacy of governments. However, they 
trek the path of scholars who lament the challenges of the electoral process in Nigeria. In 
their view, elections in Nigeria have become a political liability, a source of instability and 
decay. The manifestation of this ugly development is the attendant political thuggery and 
brigandage, unmediated and unrestrained violence characterized by wanton destruction of 
lives and property. They posit further that democratic sustenance can only be attained if 
there is a positive change in the value orientation of the political elite. They observe that 
the ideological and philosophical bases of political parties in the country are deeply rooted 
in ethnicity and religion. This development gives rise to polities based on primordial 
tendencies. 
The value of this article to the present study lies in the attention it draws to the 
ideological content of party politics in Nigeria as well as the value orientation of the 
political elite. The ideological question and the value system of politicians is critical in 
fostering appreciation of why the conduct of elections easily snowballs into violence. It 
suffices to note that the paper is scantly presented and therefore elicits a huge gap that need 
be filled. 
A. Jega’s
50
 article, “Democracy in Nigeria: Conceptions, Representations and 
Expectations” is an expository work that analyses the problems with the management of 
elections and the implications for democratic sustenance in Nigeria. The author argues that 
the electoral commission depends entirely on the dictates and disposition of the executive 
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Arm of Government. This development often times leads to executive interference. He 
submits further that the Nigerian Constitution lists the electoral body as a Federal 
Executive Body. The implication is that the President is empowered constitutionally to 
appoint members of the commission including the Chairman though in consultation with 
the National Assembly. However, in actual practice, the president appoints whoever he 
wishes. 
Jega’s postulations are instructive and research stimulating. He has raised very 
pertinent issues that are the bane of electoral administration and the implications for 
political stability. Though Jega’s paper is limited to analysing the problems with the 
operational status of electoral bodies in the country, the issues he has raised are relevant in 
furthering research on why the conduct of transparent elections has eluded us as a country 
and the concomitant consequences for political stability.  
J. Elaigwu’s
51
 book, The Nigerian Military and Democracy: An Anatomy of a 
Paradox, is a classic work that is very educating. Elaigwu avers that the attendant 
problems with elections in Nigeria have colonial antecedents. These problems have 
continued unabated because both the military and civilian elites conspire to manipulate 
rules to further their class interest. In his view, the political crises that has characterized the 
electoral process in Nigeria is not because of the lack of capacity by the electoral bodies 
but the deeply entrenched class interest of the ruling elites both in the military and the civil 
class. The work is rich in statistics and therefore, a reference source for studies on electoral 
matters in Nigeria. Even though it is not a historical source, the work has provided useful 
historical insights. 
Other relevant source materials include Y. B. Usman and A. Abba’s Election 
Violence 1952-2002
52
,K. W. J. Post,The Nigerian Federal Elections of 1959
53
,and J. O. 
Odey
54
This Madness called Election. These scholars have all drawn attention to the 
inadequacies in the electoral process in Nigeria.The common characteristic with these 
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works is that electoral fraud is a precursor of violence. Violence is therefore explained as 
protest against the electoral process. The role of the elites, the political parties and 
government agencies are well articulated. But there is the need to isolate these factors and 
explain more deeply how each factor contributes to electoral violence. This present study 
is therefore an attempt to attain to this need. 
C. Ake’s
55
 book, Democracy and Development in Africa is a seminal work on 
electoral management processes in Africa generally. He analyses issues of democratization 
and party politics in Africa. He explains why elections are greeted by violent protests in 
Africa and outlines plausible ways for conducting free and fair elections. The operational 
parameters within which electoral management can be made ideal especially in taking 
democracy beyond governance is well articulated and portrayed as a prerequisite for the 
workability of democracy in Africa. Though Claude Ake’s work takes a general view of 
Africa, it is relevant in reconstructing the history of elections at the Local Government 
level. 
F. N. Fayam
56
 in an article titled “Political Parties and Electoral Conflicts in Post-
Colonial Nigeria, 1960-1983” historicizes the problem of electoral conflicts in Nigeria in 
the era of independence. He argues that the ethnic and regional characters of the political 
parties in the post-independence era played conflictual roles in deciding which party ruled 
and reigned. The tensions and disagreements that marked political activities at time were a 
precursor of tense conflictual situations. He therefore holds cultural pluralism as a key 
factor in explaining electoral conflicts in the post-colonial era and blames colonialism for 
erecting a faulty political structure for the country. The significance of Fayam’s paper lies 
in the analyses of contradictions with the political parties in the First and Second 
Republics. But beyond cultural pluralism which manifested in the outlook or followership 
of the political parties at the time, the manifestation of electoral violence was not 
necessarily due to ethnic differences but the manipulative antics of the politicians. 
44 
 
Therefore to blame electoral conflicts on the ethnic coloration of the political parties is to 
oversimplify the issue. A better approach would be to isolate specific electoral conflicts 
and explain deeply the causative factors. 
C. M. Ngou
57
 examines the 1959 elections and the formation of independence 
government. The paper begins by examining the colonial objectives that saw the transfer of 
power to the indigenous political elite. He laments that colonial administrators were 
interested in state building rather than nation building. This explains the Regionalist 
Foundation that was laid for party politics as the march towards independence gathered 
momentum.  He further appraised the fundamental dilemma of Nigerian political life as 
from 1914 to 1959 laying emphasis on the centralizing symbols of the Imperial State 
accompanying the process of social differentiation, the national power aspiration of 
political parties inspite of their regional biases and the desire of the political leadership for 
cross-cultural governmental arrangements despite the primordial considerations that 
influence the political choice of the electorate. 
Ngou posits further that the electoral behaviour of Nigerians during the 1959 
Elections which gave birth to the First Republic suggests strong influence of the sub-
regions on individual political behaviour; ethnic cleavages became a rallying point for the 
political parties. 
Ngou appears to have followed the path of scholars who find the “loyalties” of 
Nigerians to linguistic, regional and ethnic groups so prevalent, and so demonstrably 
salient to political life, that they make such sentiments the main focus of their analysis. 
However, any analyses that anchors political behaviour solely on the basis of ethnicity is 
fundamentally defective.Though Nigerian political parties of the First Republic had 
become identified with the interests of particular nationality groups, these parties were 
merely instruments used to promote class interests in the acquisition and retention of 
regional power. The point therefore is that Ngou’s perspective of analysis is to narrow and 
45 
 
therefore does adequately explain the nature and particular character of political behaviour 
in the First Republic. The significance of his work, however, is his treatment of the origins 
of political parties in the First Republic. 
 
2.3 Conceptual/TheoreticalFramework 
The need to establish the theoretical orientation of a research work stems from the 
fact that theoretical perspectives usually have a strong capacity for influencing the conduct 
and outcome of the research . The historian is therefore required to see any perspective as 
nothing more than a tentative hypothesis influenced by a possible unstated but specific 
purpose
58
. In addition, contending schools of thought enrich intellectual discourses. It is 
therefore germane to examine prevailing explanations on electoral violence and to adopt 
theoretical explications that best suits the study.  
Electoral violence could be couched as any random or organized act that seeks to 
determine, delay or otherwise influence an electoral process through threat, verbal 
intimidation, hate speech, disinformation, physical assault, forced protection, blackmail, 
and destruction of property or assassination. An elaboration of the above definition is 
worth nothing given that it will assist in providing justification for the choice of the 
Political Economy Theory. The first observation is that electoral violence manifests in 
physical form (kidnapping, killing and destruction of property) and non-physical forms 
(threats, intimidation and blackmail). Secondly, the main goal of electoral violence is to 
influence the electoral process, either by changing the outcome of elections or by 
disruption of the electoral process. 
The theoretical framework of this study is structured around three explanatory 
models identifying the conditions enabling electoral violence. Conceptualizing the causes 
of electoral violence around three models is based on the existing framework articulated by 
Hoglund
59
 but also includes additional insights derived from existing literature.
60
It suffices 
to note that relatively little purely theoretical works exist on electoral violence in general 
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and even less on violence resulting from Local Government Elections. The three 
theoretical models employed in the study are grouped under the headings; Political 
Institutions and Actors, Electoral Processes and Electoral Institutions Models.       
 
Political Institutions and Actors Model 
 This theoretical model points to the characteristics of political structures as 
enabling electoral violence. This theory hinges its arguments on the strengths and 
weaknesses of State institutions, notably in law enforcement and the judiciary.
61
It holds 
that the strengths and weaknesses of these institutions affect the potential for rioting after 
elections. When these institutions are weak, the incentives for individuals to engage in 
violence are altered, making it a more attractive option. However, Wilkinson
62
   has 
suggested that state capacity or lack of it is not enough to explain variation in electoral 
violence. A more convincing state-based argument has honed in on the relationship 
between electoral violence and the type of state. A number of authors point to neo-
patrimonial states as generating conditions which especially favour electoral 
violence.
63
There are a number of mechanisms identified which connect neo-patrimonial 
states with the outcome of electoral violence.   
One of the main mechanisms is that neo-patrimonial systems undermine formal 
democratic institutions of a State.
64
This has a number of implications for electoral 
violence. Weak democratic institutions especially in post-conflict contexts are identified as 
making it easier for groups to use violence during elections or return to- armed conflict 
following electoral defeat. A second consequence of aneo-patrimonial state is that violence 
in the electoral context becomes a more viable and acceptable tool.
65
 Patrimonial elites rely 
on privatized violence, channelled through personal patronage networks, to reinforce 
control. When elites are less constrained by formal legal and institutional checks, they are 
more likely to use violent methods to secure or achieve power.
66
 Patronage-based regimes 
with an electoral system are thus especially vulnerable to electoral violence. With political 
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and economic power tied to patronage networks, electoral competition can seriously 
threaten incumbent elites. In response, elites are more open to resorting to violence. This 
leads to the state losing its monopoly of force, creating a climate of violence and culture of 
impunity for violent acts.
67
In such an environment, actors are constantly faced with 
violence but do not fear punishment for using it. This makes the choice of electoral 
violence more promising and attractive to a variety of actors.
68
 
A third mechanism connecting state type of electoral violence is that in neo-
patrimonial states, the checks on violence, the police and judiciary are “vulnerable” to elite 
manipulation and political pressure.
69 
The second explanatory variable of this theoretical model focuses on political 
actors. It argues that political parties are “The Agents of First Resort” for restraining 
violence or bringing it about. If political parties involved in the election are undeveloped or 
organized around armed groups, party to the previous conflict, they may be more likely to 
see violence as a political tool to influence elections. Extremist parties, through their 
rhetoric of difference and outbidding, also enable electoral violence as they seek to use 
violence to channel their political views against rivals. Opposition parties are also more 
likely to use violence when they reject not the electoral process itself, but the rules which 
an election is being held.
70
 
Although this theoretical model does not exhaustively explain why Local 
Government Elections in Benue state oftentimes spark violence, it does provide useful 
insights as to why violence occurs. For instance, the lack of trust in the Electoral 
Commission, the security agencies and the judiciary played a critical role in making 
violence attractive to all those who felt aggrieved. The political parties in Benue State 
during the study period as the research subsequently demonstrates provided tacit support to 
their followers to resort to violence. This theoretical model is therefore useful in analysing 
electoral violence arising from Local Government Elections.      
48 
 
 
Electoral Processes Model 
 The Electoral Processes Model emphasizes that certain characteristics inherent in 
the electoral process itself enable electoral violence.
71
The most prominent mechanism is 
competition. Competition enables electoral violence through a number of avenues. 
 Competition increases the incentives for violence by threatening to change the 
existing power structures.Truly democratic elections have to allow the transfer of power 
between political groups. Increased competition raises the stakes for political players and 
increases the incentives to use violence. Sisk argues that “an underlying instigator of 
violence is the slipping of an incumbent regime’s grip on power”.
72 
He argues that when 
the competitiveness of election increases, incumbents are more likely to use violence. 
Competitive high-stakes elections also intersect with the potential for ethnic violence.  
It seems likely than an ethnic party expects… to win handily 
or to lose massively a local electoral contest has less or an 
incentive to foment violence in that seat. The incentives for 
ethnic polarization and ethnic riots follow the same general 
logic: the incentives are greatest in those seats where 
electoral races are closest.
73 
  
 Higher stakes generated by more competitive elections can threaten incumbents or 
motivate opposition groups raising the incentive to use extremist rhetoric, activate 
patronage networks and ultimately employ violence. Fear of losing can lead to both pre and 
post-election phase violence as “the marginalization may create incentives for the 
politically weaker side to resort to violence.
74
 
 The electoral processes model is also useful in explaining electoral violence arising 
from Local Government Elections. For instance, Kwande 2004 Election crisis was 
stimulated by contradiction in the electoral process. The election in every respect was a 
competitive one; the party in government at the state level, the People’s Democratic Party 
(PDP) was desperate to win the election at all cost. All manner of intimidation was 
deployed to undermine the opposition. The opposition party, All People’s Party (APP) was 
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bent on resisting intimidation and manipulation of the electoral process. Thus, when the 
electoral process is highly competitive but also produces results marked by fraud and 
irregularities, it opens up conditions required for electoral violence. 
 
Electoral Institutions Model        
  In contrast to the previous models; this model focuses on divided societies and a 
post-conflict environment
75
. The arguments of this model are based on the belief that 
institutional engineering of the electoral system can create or prevent political outcomes, 
the central goal being to manage conflict. This model derives its strength from the insights 
it brings on electoral design and administration. The model provides an institutional 
prescription for creating a political order which manages conflict through peaceful and 
democratic means. The most important insight for this study is the argument regarding 
voting and party systems. It makes a case for consociationalism. It stresses the need for 
power-sharing in a manner that includes all politically relevant groups. Consociationalism 
favours an electoral voting system which utilizes Closed-list System proportional 
representation voting.
76
The core advantage of this model is that it seeks to induce 
modernization in the political system and in the process mitigate violence. The second 
strand of this model is hinged on electoral administration.Hoglund identified that “electoral 
administration can encourage or discourage electoral violence”.
77
 Electoral administrations 
affect issues such as the impartiality, transparency, and efficiency of an election, factors 
which are crucial in every electoral process. Neutral electoral management bodies, 
independent of political interference by parties or the State are more likely to deliver 
credible and legitimate elections. BSIEC would have averted electoral violence in the State 
had it been the commission was impartial.  The presence of international monitoring has 
been argued to motivate elites, both state and non-state to shift strategies of electoral 
violence to the pre-election phase.
78
 The model argues that when Opposition  Partiesare 
included within the electoral management body, they are less likely to violently contest the 
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results of the election, seeing these bodies as channels to express grievances. In these ways, 
electoral institutions can provide a valuable lens for explaining outcomes of electoral 
violence. 
In sum, a synthesis of these three models offer a set of potential causal variables for 
understanding and explaining electoral violence based on the host of different arguments. 
These models are not individually exhaustive but can be correlated to explain electoral 
violence arising from Local Government Elections in Benue state. In fact, current literature 
on electoral violence is sparse and there is yet to be a comprehensive theory. The 
application of these models in the study will determine whether and in what way these 
models interact and intersect in the empirical realm. Perhaps on the basis of these 
interactions, new insightful and relevant categories can be constructed which offer sharper 
analytical insights into the phenomena of electoral violence. This study hopefully makes a 
modest contribution in this regard. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
The review of literature in this chapter has clearly shown the extent of work that 
has been done on the relationship between elections and political violence. But the 
perspectives reviewed have indicated that the causes of electoral violence are complex and 
therefore cross-national hypotheses do not vividly explain causative factors. Therefore, 
there is always the need to isolate specific political environments and analyse violent 
political behaviours. It is in this context that this study finds relevance. The dearth of 
literature on Local Government Elections and violence in Benue State also lends credence 
to this study. This is particularly significant given the frequency of electoral violence 
arising from Local Government Elections in Benue State. The chapter also examined 
theoretical explanations for electoral violence. Though it notes that theories are guides and 
therefore there is always the need to isolate specific events and environments for in-depth 
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analyses. It is on this score that this study attempts to isolate the experience in the Benue 
environment from the larger Nigerian context.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL POLITICS AND ELECTORAL 
VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA, 1922-1966 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter interrogates the historical foundation for electoral politics and 
electoral violence in Nigeria. The objective is to explain specific developments that have 
shaped the particular character of electoral politics that has made violence a disturbing 
phenomenon in Nigeria’s political history. This is necessary because the fact of historical 
causation in historical research is imperative.As Ikimi rightly argues, knowledge of history 
is a basic need in all human societies for that knowledge holds the key to any meaningful 
understanding of how and what has come to be.
1 
Moreover, Nigeria’s experience particularly as from 1922, when the elective 
Principle was institutionalised, illustrates that those who govern put high premium on the 
acquisition and retention of power. This explains political intolerance, unbridled 
partisanship, political and electoral corruption, disregard for constitutionalism, the rule of 
law, transparency and accountability
2
. On the other hand, Nigeria’s pluralistic society has, 
overtime been characterized by deep cleavages cutting across ethnic, religious, socio- 
economic and political lines
3
.Appreciation of these developments sets the tone for 
understanding whyLocal Government Elections often times have bred electoral violence. 
 
3.2 The Introduction of Elective Principles in Nigeria 
The introduction of Elective Principles in the Clifford Constitution of 1922 
heralded Nigeria’s electoral developmental history
4
. This development was significant in a 
number of ways. Firstly, it was the first time in the history of the country that provision 
was made in the constitution for Nigerians to participate in the Legislative Council. The 
Legislative Council was composed of forty–six members. Out of this, twenty- seven were 
official members whereas nineteen were unofficial members. Out of the nineteen unofficial 
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members, four were elected in the municipalities of Lagos and Calabar
5
. These two towns 
enjoyed the Elective Principle because they had the largest concentration of educated elites 
who could use their franchise
6
. Three of the elected members were for Lagos and one for 
Calabar. The other fifteen members were nominated by the Government. In all, there were 
10 Africans in the Legislative Council, four of whom were elected for the first time in 
Colonial British West Africa
7
. It is this crop of educated elite that E.A. Ayandele refers to 
as“deluded hybrids”
8
. Secondly, the 1922 Constitution set the qualification for the election 
to be based on adult male suffrage and those who had resided in the area for at least twelve 
months and had a Cross Annual Income of the equivalent of N200
9
. This constitutional 
stipulation was also significant in that, it began the process of electoral procedures. 
Thirdly, the introduction of the Elective Principle was a milestone in the political 
history of Nigeria. The campaign and publicity that go with elections helped to sensitize 
and mobilize Nigerians in the political process and arouse national consciousness. 
However, it suffices to make the point that though the 1922 Constitution brought 
some measure of political engineering, it also had a number of problems. For instance,  one 
of the provisions of the 1922 Constitution readsin part “Every member in the Legislative 
Council was allowed upon due notice given to propose an ordinance or a resolution 
provided that such ordinance or a resolution had nothing to do with tax or public 
revenue”
10
This provision precluded the Legislature from discharging its function of 
controlling the national purse and of granting money to the Executive and also controlling 
the Executive in the way in which it spent public money. The power for initiating 
monetary bills lay with the Governor alone. In a modern parliamentary practice, it is the 
work of the Legislature to grant money to the Executive but under the 1922 Constitution it 
was the Executive granting money to the Legislature. 
 It is important to also note that the Executive Council was composed entirely of 
British officials responsible to the Governor. By the Royal Instruction of 1922 (colony) the 
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Principal Administrative Officialsof the Government were made ex-officio members of the 
council.
11
 The Governor was also empowered to nominate other officials with the consent 
of the Secretary of State, as members or extraordinary members when he wished to obtain 
specialized advice. Although the Governor was to be advised by the Council, he had 
absolute powers subject only to the supervision and control of the Secretary of State. 
Beyond the obligation to consult, he was not bound by the advice of the Council.
12
 
Another problem with the Legislative Council was that it was merely an advisory 
body and its official majority saw things in the same vein or lens as the Governor. What 
was worse, the few Nigerians elected into the Legislature represented their social class and 
not people. Besides, they lacked the power to influence the course of governmental 
actions
13
. 
The import of this analysis is to draw attention to the significance of the 
introduction of the Elective Principle to the political development of the country especially 
the electoral process. For example, the elective system gave rise to political thought and 
action among the educated Nigerians, particularly in Lagos. Infact, it was the Elective 
System that gave rise to the formation of a number of political parties, the most prominent 
being the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) led by Herbert Macaulay. The 
Nigerian National Democratic Party dominated politics in Lagos, winning the Lagos seats 
in the Legislative Council in 1923 and 1933.
14
 
The Richards Constitution of 1946 retained the Elective Principle introduced in 
1922 with some slight changes. The qualification for voting was reduced to the Naira 
equivalent of N100 per annum
15
. The idea was propelled by the increasing need to 
facilitate political participation by Nigerians especially during elections. For example, the 
Constitution created regions out of the former conglomerate entities. It also gave each 
region a Council or House which served as center for consultation and link between the 
Central Government in Lagos and the Local Authority or Native Authority. The Native 
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Authorities selected members of the Regional Houses and members of the Regional 
Houses selected members of the Legislative Council based in Lagos.
16
 
The Macpherson Constitution of the 1951 equally retained the Elective Principle 
and took steps to encourage political participation by a greater number of people, for 
example, election into the various Houses was by a combination of direct and indirect 
methods
17
. Members of the House of Representatives were elected by the Regional Houses 
of Assembly from among their own members. The members of the Regional Houses of 
Assembly in turn were elected partly by persons entitled to be registered as voters (i.e. 
direct election) and partly by Electoral Colleges, members of which were elected by the 
same person (i.e. indirect elections)
18
. To qualify for registration as a voter, a person was 
required to be an adult tax payer and must either have been born in the Native Authority 
area in which he wished to vote or be voted for or resident in any area for at least twelve 
months, if non-native
19
. What was significant about the Macpherson Constitution in the 
context of the foregoing analysis is the fact that, for the first time ever, both the Central 
and Regional Legislative Houses became composed of not only an elected majority but 
also of elected Nigerians. The regional and central executive became the principle 
instrument of policy thereby substituting the autocratic rule of the Governor and his 
officials in the previous constitutions with a rule of the elected representatives of the 
people.
20
 
The Lyttleton Constitutions of 1954 expanded the political space by increasing the 
members of the House of Representatives to 184 and the members were elected directly 
from single member constituencies based on population. The constituencies when drawn 
were 92 in the North, 42 in the East and 42 in the West, 2 in the Federal Territory and 6 in 
Southern Cameroons. The election of members of this House was made separate from 
elections into the Regional House. There was also a House of Senate consisting of 12 
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members from each region including the Oba of Lagos and four special members 
appointed by governors. The governors were members of the Upper House.
21
 
The foregoing analysis has illustrated that since the introduction of the Elective 
Principle by the 1922 Constitution, all the other constitutional developments made marked 
improvements to the electoral system. But the nature of these improvements was basically 
a function of the sort of pressure brought on the colonial officials by the Nigerian people 
and the realities in the international community. The point also has to be made that even 
though the phenomenon of electoral violence at this stage of political development was not 
prominent, the pre-independence Constitutions nurtured the growth of ethnicity and 
exclusion which had been deliberately introduced and encouraged. The political elite 
which were at the same time the educated elite nurtured these destructive seeds of ethnicity 
and exclusion to maturity. This informed E. A. Ayandele’s comments that, 
For both the British and the educated elite knew only too well 
that neither of them had been working consciously and 
conscientiously towards evolution of a crisis-free Nigerian 
nation-state; both knew that the concept of a Nigerian nation 
being galvanized by them had never entered their thoughts… 
Their errors of omission and commission were the wind they 
sowed.
22 
 
  The whirlwind of fraudulent electoral processes resulting from a faulty electoral 
foundation propelled and is propelling electoral violence as developments in the post-
colonial era demonstrates. In sum, though the introduction of the Elective Principle in 1922 
encouraged political participation in governance, subsequent constitutions, especially the 
Richard Constitution laid the historical foundation for ethnic and elite politics.  
  
3.3 The Electoral Process under the Representative Native Authority System 
 
The period 1950 saw the introduction of a representative Local Government 
System first in the Eastern Region sequel to the enactment of the Local Government 
Ordinance Law of 1950
23
. This law was replicated in the West in 1952 and in the North in 
1954. The Local Government Ordinance meant the transfer of Local Government 
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Authority from traditional rulers to elected representatives. This development created 
space for political participation for local elites, especially western educated elite, who 
hitherto played little or no role in local government.
24
 
 It bears repeating that following regionalization of the country in 1946, the 
Regional Government devised separate systems of Local Government that they felt were 
more attuned to their socio-political institutions and level of development. This marked the 
evolution of plural systems of Local Government in Nigeria and it preceded the formal 
adoption of a full federal structure of government in 1954. The separate regional systems 
of Local Government were sustained by strong regional economies
25
. These enabled the 
Regional Governments to give grants-in-aid to the Local Government as a way of 
encouraging them to provide necessary services to the minimum standards that they 
considered desirable
26
. Some of the larger Local Governments also could derive sufficient 
funds from local taxation to enable them carry out substantial services independently of the 
Regional Government
27
. Thus, the Local Government Systems introduced in the 1950s 
were concerned with how to prevent or minimize abuses in the system such as violation of 
human rights, corruption and mismanagement. For example, Mallam Abubakar Tafawa 
Balewa in 1950 called for an Independent Commission to investigate the system of 
electoral management in the existing Native Administration in the Northern Province and 
to make recommendations for its modernization and reform
28
. 
Balewa sustained his arguments by positing that the system of election in the 
Native administration in the North had outlived its usefulness and had in fact become what 
he called “the chief barrier to progress”.
29
 He contended further that the constitutional 
changes that were being demanded would be of no value unless the system was reformed. 
The system according to him was too autocratic, the opinion of the public was never 
sought, their welfare seldom regarded and their helplessness shockingly abused.
30
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Thus, the thrust of the 1950s reform was to abolish the status of sole Native 
Authority, which the Emirs of the large emirates enjoyed. This conferred on them sole or 
exclusive authority to decide all matters of public importance in their domain save the 
intervention of the British Senior District Officer or Resident in charge of the area. 
Therefore, the sole Native Authority became Native Authority-in-council, a status 
that obliged the Emirs so designated to consult more and carry along other pertinent 
traditional elite in deciding public issues. It is important to recall that before the 1950s, the 
selection of members to the House of Assembly had been done by the Emirs and British 
Officials in keeping with the idea that the Regional Houses were meant to serve as a link 
between the Native Administration and the Central Government. This development 
presupposes that only those personally acceptable to the Emirs and the British were 
selected and that those selected were perceived as agents of the Emirs. 
From 1954, attempts were made to conduct elections using the Electoral College System 
but these elections were stage managed by the Regional Governments
31
. Local 
Governments at this point in time were highly prized allies and instruments for coercing 
political support
32
. With their police and customary courts, Local Government Councils 
controlled by the region’s Ruling Party were used to harass and intimidate political 
opponents
33
. Those that were not so controlled were dissolved and the Councillors replaced 
by Management Committees appointed by the Regional Government
34
. Throughout the 
regions, the Native Authorities were the main instruments through which the Regional 
Government compelled voters to toe its line. This situation pervaded throughout the First 
Republic until 1966 when the military intervened in the politics of the country. To correct 
the abuses prevalent in Local Government Administration, the military rulers embarked on 
measures that appeared appropriate at the time but pointed in the direction of gradual 
centralization of Nigeria’s Federal System. 
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The point of emphasis is that, the electoral process under the representative Local 
Government System in the 1950s left much to the desired. The Regional Governments saw 
Local Authorities as instruments of political mobilization and therefore condoned whatever 
aberration that attended their operations so long as they supported the government. 
 
3.4 The Nature of Electoral Politics and Electoral Violence in the First Republic  
 
 An analysis of the particular character of electoral politics in Nigeria sets the tone 
for a proper appreciation of why the conduct of elections often times breeds electoral and 
political violence. This is understandable, given the fact that the causative factors that have 
ignited electoral violence at local government level are basically not different from those 
of the General Elections except in the dynamics of the violence. The phenomenon of 
electoral violence in Nigeria is basically a function of the raw struggle for power and 
elections are seen as a means to achieving this objective. This situation is, of course, not 
unique to Nigeria; it characterizes early all developing nations where politics is primarily 
concerned with sharing of pitifully small resources among various competing groups.
35
 
 The problem of electoral violence is also pervasive because the possession of the 
machinery of government guarantees control of allocation of scarce economic resources, 
including the spoils of office and patronage, the political elite do not often accept open 
political competition; nor are they always willing to relinquish office, even if deflated at 
the polls by the opposition
36
. On the other hand, the opposition is reluctant to tolerate its 
opponent in office and would do everything possible to subvert its opponent
37
. The reality 
is therefore a clash between oppression by the defenders of the status quo and subversion 
by the opposition groups. The nature of political violence in the First Republic followed 
this pattern of political competition. But before we get into the main discussion on the 
manifestation of this pattern of political competition, it is important to do a historical 
drawback to underscore the nature of the political environment in Nigeria.  
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In attempting to explain the political environment in Nigeria a convenient starting 
points is 1941, for it was this date that marked the beginning of schism in the political 
leadership of the nationalist struggle in Nigeria, whose back-lash produced contradictions 
within the ranks of groups that had collaborated in the past. It was equally this 
development that sowed the seeds of political violence which became and has since 
remained a recurrent theme in Nigeria’s political history. 
During the 1920s, it was only one political party that dominated the politics of 
Lagos and its environs-the NNDP, in which Yoruba, Igbo and other Southern groups were 
in its membership-but no Northerner. It was the emergence of the Nigerian Youth 
Movements (NYM) in the 1930s that challenged the dominance of the NNDP in the 
Legislative Council politics of Lagos
38
. This party, seeing that the NNDP was narrow in its 
geographical spread and in the interests it represented, sought to expand their political 
tentacles across Nigeria. For the first time, political awareness was carried to the North by 
this party with the concomitant result of northern membership and opening of offices.It 
was this party that attempted the creation of a national ideology for Nigeria through its 
charter of 1938-which so-to-say embodied the official programmes of the party
39
. One of 
the most important objectives of the party was the unification of the tribes of Nigeria 
through the encouragement of better understanding and cooperation to the end of creating a 
common ideal; and the education of public opinion to a higher moral and intellectual level 
so that national consciousness could be developed and common ideals realized. 
40
 
 Unfortunately, these clear cut objectives were thwarted by internal strife within its 
membership to the extent that the party became factionalised in 1941. The split followed a 
clash of business interest involving the monopoly and ownership of a nationalist press, 
between prominent members of the party-Ernest Ikoli and Nnamdi Azikiwe, on the one 
hand, and political power-play involving two members Ernest Ikoli and Samuel 
Akinsanya-in which Azikiwe supported the later as against his business rival on the other 
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hand 
41
. The victory of Ikoli, an Ijebu against Akinsanya, an Ijebu Yoruba, was viewed by 
Azikiwe and his supporters as a manifestation of tribal prejudice against Ijebus and the 
Igbo. This event led to Azikiwe and Akinsanya leaving the party with their supporters. 
According to Coleman, 
42
 the Akinsanya Crisis was the first major manifestation of a tribal 
tension that affected the subsequent efforts to achieve unity. Obafemi Awolowo who tried 
to patch up the fractures did not succeed and had to use that platform to build his future 
party 
43
. Azikiwe who set the ball rolling for this epic crisis at a time unity of purpose was 
desired had to agree later that all the other subsequent political developments in Nigeria 
after that Akinsanya episode were conditioned and dominated by it. The hope of national 
unity which the party sought to achieve was abruptly dashed alongside the common 
ideology it could have developed. It suffices to add that the epic crisis in the NYM also 
sowed the seed of “business interest” in party politics above any other consideration. This 
business interest is also instrumental to the win-at-all syndrome in Nigerian politics. The 
interplay of this business interest factor is also significant in explaining why elections turn 
violent. 
Three years after the split in the NYM, the National Council of Nigeria and 
Cameroon (NCNC) was formed by Herbert Macaulay and Nnamdi Azikiwe
44
. The stage 
was therefore set for ethnic rivalry and suspicion within the leaders of the various groups 
in the country. The unguarded statements of some of the leaders during this period also 
fuelled tension in the country. For example, during a Legislative Council debate in 1947, 
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa said, 
45
 “since amalgamation in 1914, Nigeria has existed as one 
country only on paper… it is still far from being united. Nigerian Unity is only a British 
intention of it". His fellow member of the Council and later the Premier of Northern 
Region, Ahmadu Bello, stated that the mistake of 1914 had come to light
46
, apparently 
discussing the amalgamation and the coming together of the North and South. On the side 
of Obafemi Awolowo who later became the Premier of Western Region, he asserted that 
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“Nigeria is a mere geographical expression”.
47
 These statements by the founding fathers of 
modern Nigeria are not only ironic but created the foundation for mutual suspicion among 
the ethnic nationalities thereby presenting politics as a potent mechanism for preserving 
ethnic interest. But this ethnic interest was also beclouded by personal interest or class 
interest. E. A. Ayandele is therefore right to assert that. 
In order to retain and increase their new-found privileges and 
economic power, the educated elite left no stone unturned. 
The result was the introduction of a new form of moral and 
ethical pollution which… have infected a large number of 
Nigerians. It became common belief that politics was 
everything-was the lever to power, the open sesame to 
fantastic wealth, the instrument to gain power over enemies.
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 This moral and ethical pollution manifested significantly as from 1946 when the 
Legislative Council came into being and when Regional Assemblies were granted to the 
various regions. Nigeria witnessed the full-scale manifestation of parochial interests in the 
politics of nationalist interests in the politics of nationalist struggle 
49
. The Constitution 
granted the pedestal for the emergence of unpatriotic and ethnic leaders who did not mean 
well for the nation. Between 1946 and 1951, ethnic and parochial consciousness had been 
well entrenched in the political arena of Nigeria. In 1951,Awolowo formed the Action 
Group (AG). The sole purpose of this political party was to advance the cause of the 
Yoruba ethnic group and to capture power in the Western Region. In a similar way, the 
Northern elite had formed the Jamiyyar Mutanen Arewa, which they disguised first as a 
cultural organization to a political party by 1951 with the name Northern People’s 
Congress (NPC) with its motto as: One North, One People and One Destiny. This political 
party was only meant for the people of Northern origin
50
. With these regional parties in 
place, political calculation began to tax serious ethnic cum regional lines. 
The worst forms of ethnic sentiments were manifested during Regional Elections. 
For example, the NCNC which was led by Azikiwe was a National Party having many 
ethnic groups in its membership. When the Regional Elections in the West took place, and 
68 
 
Azikiwe was tending to emerge from the platform of the NCNC to represent the Western 
Region at the Central Legislature, Awolowo conscientized his kinsmen on the dangers of 
supporting Azikiwe, consequent upon this, all the NCNC members who had emerged on 
the party’s platform in the West quickly carpet-crossed over to the Action Group-
Awolowo’s party, leaving Azikiwe without the necessary support to emerge from the 
Western platform. Azikiwe returned to the East and scuttled the harmonious leadership 
Eyo Ita was enjoying in the Eastern Regional House of Assembly, thus forcing Eyo Ita to 
leave the NCNC and join the opposition
51
. This marked the origin of the strained 
relationship between the Igbo and the Eastern minorities till today. 
Again, the 1954 Constitution as it were, entrenched the federal framework in 
Nigeria. It provided for greater regional autonomy and the powers of intervention by the 
Federal Government. This constitution was believed to be the answer to the problems of 
Nigeria. Ironically it was not Azikiwe who had supported the provisions of the 
Constitution felt that it was going to enable them hold the country together through a 
Federal Government
52
. But the Constitution created structural imbalance and proved as a 
potent instrument for domination of minority groups within the regions. Because of this 
fear of domination, the minorities in the three regions began to agitate for the creation of 
states out of the existing three regions. Thus, the minorities in the East began to agitate for 
the creation of the Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers State; those in the North demanded the creation 
of Middle-Belt State, while those in the Western Region championed the Mid-West State 
all in an attempt to safe-guard their identity and protect their interest from the larger 
groups. The minority fear led to the setting up of the Willink Commission to look into the 
fears of the minority and means of allaying them
53
. 
 The British Colonial Administration on the brink of departure did not want to 
entertain state creation, and submitted that if they embarked on it, the date for 
independence would be altered. This period witnessed intense power struggle between the 
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regional lords in an attempt to protect their personal interests as well as those of their 
regions. Each began to scheme on how to penetrate the other’s region in search of political 
victory. This took varied forms, ranging from support to opposition, to arming of 
opposition, promise of preferment in public offices, threat and intimidation, bribery and 
banning of meetings by rival political organizations in and outside these traditional bases
54
.  
 The striking manifestation and primordalism was seen in the way the Northern 
leaders ran their Regional Government. The “Nothernisation Policy” was a consciously 
articulated programme designed to replace public employees of Southern origin in the 
Public Services of the North.
55
TheNorthern Aristocracy had deeply resented the numerical 
preponderance of people of Southern origin in the technical and clerical posts of the Public 
Service of the North and expressly sought to reverse it. The origin of the Northernisation 
programme followed public clamour and complaints by northerners even during 
Legislative Council debates. They complained that the Southerners had power in the 
North, controlling the Railway stations, the Post Offices, Government Hospitals, Works 
Department, etc
56
 and therefore should be sacked to pave way for the emergence of 
Northern bureaucracy. The utterances of some of the leaders evoked ethnic sentiments as 
well as hatred. For instance, Azikiwe was credited to have said that “it would appear the 
God of Africa has created the Igbo nation to lead the children of Africa from bondage of 
the ages…”
57
Thisremark had the backlash of sparking off ethnic hate on the part of the 
Action Group.They composed a song that was targeted at ridiculing the north. This song 
when interpreted meant that it is “better to die than to pay homage to a Gambari (Hausa 
person)”.
58 
The Northernization Policy between January 1954 and August 1958 relieved 2,148 
Southerners of their appointments from the Northern Public Service
59
. The Northern 
Premier proudly said that the aim of the policy was to make Northerners gain control of 
everything in the country.”
60
 The NPC made it compulsory that any anticipating contractor 
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must be an NPC member to get contract jobs from the government; even to own land in the 
city, the person must be a card carrying member of the NPC
61
. Thus, Nigerian political 
leaders at this time debased all known political principles in the process of wining power 
and leading the people; none exhibited a true pan-Nigerian consciousness. 
 As independence beckoned, it was clear that political leadership was in flux; 
lacking in the ideology of nation building and ensconced in the ideology of ethnics and 
parochialism. The leaders identified themselves first with their respective regions, and last 
with Nigeria. The process leading to independence was marred with fraudulent elections 
all over the polity, that at the end of the day, a coalition government was formed between 
the NPC of the North, and the NCNC of the East. The alliance was aimed principally at 
destroying the opposition which was the AG of the West. This programme of party and 
ethnic-stronghold annihilation produced negative results that impacted badly on the peace 
and tranquillity of the polity. 
The signs of failed leadership started early after independence.First, was the AG 
rift which started from 1961-62, ostensibly caused by power struggle between the Premier 
of Western Region and the Federal Opposition Leader,Awolowo. This struggle eventually 
earned a state of emergency declaration by the Federal Government in the Western Region 
in May, 1962.
62
The next was the census controversy of 1962, where the leading party, the 
NPC was believed to have tinkered with the census results in favour of the North. The 
Southern Parties rejected the results. To destroy the AG, the coalition government of the 
NPC and NCNC created the Mid-Western Region out of the former Western Region; 
thereby reducing the influence of the AG and its territorial control to Yoruba land alone.
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The final straw that broke the camel’s back occurred in 1964, during the Federal 
Election. The election saw the emergence of new alliances aimed principally at destroying 
Southern parties, Fraud, violence, thuggery, ballot stuffing, arson and all manner of 
criminality were manifestly deployed in winning the election.
64
As a result of the crises 
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engendered by the election, there was a stalemate in forming a new government between 
the NPC leadership and the second winning party, the NCNC. However, two years after, 
the army struck in a bloody coup ending the democratic experience.  
The significance of this historical narrative is to foster a deeper understanding of 
how the ruling elite and indeed ruling parties increasingly relied on the instrumentalities of 
force and coercive control to maintain them in office. 
 
3.5 The Role of Electoral Commissions in the Management of the 1959, 1964 and 
1965 Elections 
 
 The electoral history of Nigeria could rightly be traced back to 1922 when the 
Elective Principle was introduced by the Clifford Constitution just as we earlier noted. 
Consequent upon this, the first election for the purpose of filling legislative seats was held 
in October, 1923. However, the electoral process was managed based on limited or 
restricted franchise. Owing to the protests against the electoral procedure, especially the 
limited franchise that defined the process, the Colonial Government in 1958 constituted an 
Electoral Management Body or Commission known as the Electoral Commission of 
Nigeria (ECN) to conduct the 1959 general elections. This was significant in that it was the 
first Electoral Management Body and the development laid the foundation for the 
institutionalization of Electoral Management Bodies. The law establishing the Electoral 
Commission defined the task of the commission as, “the general supervision, the 
preparation of a Register of electors and of the conduct of an election”
65
. Thus, the ECN 
conducted the 1959 General Elections and the results were stated as follows:  
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Table 1: The Result of the 1959 Federal Elections of the Electoral Commission of 
Nigeria into the House of Representatives showing party strength in the regions. 
 
Political 
Party/Independent 
Eastern 
Region 
Northern 
Region 
Western 
Region 
Federal 
Territory 
Total 
AG 14 25 33 1 73 
NCNC 58 - 21 2 81 
NPC - 134 - - 134 
NEPU - 8 - - 8 
NDC 1 - - - 1 
INDEPENDENT - 7 8 - 15 
TOTAL  73 174 62 3 312 
Source: Federal Ministry of information Lagos, 1959 
The above result indicated that out of a total of 312 seats in the Federal House of 
Representatives, the NPC won 134, the NCNC 81, the AG 73, NEPU 8, and the NDC 1 
and Independent 15 seats. An analysis of these results clearly indicates that the political 
parties were Regional Parties with limited national spread. These elections were held with 
marked success perhaps because they were supervised by the Colonial Government but 
more importantly because members of the commission were impartial and not active 
members of any of the political parties. The Commission had the following members: 
1. Mr. R.E. Wraith, a Briton andSenior Lecturer in Public Administration, University 
College, Ibadan as Chairman. 
 
2. Alhaji Bello Maitama Kano, represented the Northern Region as a member. 
 
3. Mr. A. Aniagolu, represented the Eastern Region as a member. 
4. Mr. M.A. Sho-Silva, represented Lagos as a member. 
5. Mr. H. Orishejolomi Thomas,represented the Western Region as a member.  
 
6. Mr. K.A Bohn from Southern Cameroon member.  
Nevertheless, the point need be made that the 1959 Federal Electionsmarked the 
beginning of a bitter political competition in Nigerian politics since it was to decide the 
balance of power between the parties at independence. Awolowo’s hopes to be Federal 
Prime Minister were dashed following his party's defeat at the election. Overtures by the 
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AG to the NCNC to form a Coalition Government proved fruitless. Instead, an 
NPC/NCNC Coalition Government emerged at the centre and Awolowo became the 
Leader of the Opposition
66
.  It was therefore under this ferment of regionalism that Nigeria 
became independent on October 1, 1960. The role of the Electoral Commission in 
managing the tense political atmosphere that characterizes the build up to the 1959 
Elections was commendable. The relative transparency in the elections could be discerned 
from the fact that even though the parties were regionally based, some made limited in-
roads in the other regions outside their traditional base. For example, the AG won 14 seats 
in the Eastern Region and 25 seats in the Northern Region. This is an indication that the 
result of the election was largely a reflection of the wishes of the electorates.  
 After independence, in 1960, the government of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa set 
up the Federal Electoral Commission (FEC) which conducted the 1964 and 1965 General 
Elections. However, the charged political environment in the country made it difficult to 
conduct a free and fair election. For example, by the middle of 1964, two major political 
alliances had emerged. The NPC and NNDP founded the Nigerian National Alliance 
(NNA), the AG and the NCNC constituted themselves into the United Progressive Grand 
Alliance (UPGA). The 1964 Federal Election was contested between these two major 
alliances. The election was marked by thuggery and hooliganism. The instruments of 
power were also misused by those in office to repress and stifle the opposition. 
Accusations and counters-accusations of evil intentions sabotage and fraudulent election 
practices were hallmarks of the campaigns
67
. The President, Nnamdi Azikiwe in his dawn 
broadcast lamented that: 
The way and manner our electioneering campaign is being 
conducted leaves much to be desired. The politicians in 
power have no right to employ the instruments of power in 
order to perpetuate their stay in office 
68
. 
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The Inspector General of Police, Louis Edet in a national broadcast also warned 
that incidents involving violence had reached alarming proportions. He appealed to the 
politicians to protect Nigeria’s enviable reputation as a bastion of democracy in Africa.
69
 
 The Federal Electoral Commission was helpless in the circumstances. The 
Commission had the responsibility of regulating Electoral Campaigns but the unfolding 
events revealed clearly that the Commission lost control of the process
70
. In fact, from the 
speech of the President, it was clear that politicians were already interfering with the 
Commission. The stage was therefore set for turbulent elections as later events 
demonstrate. The UPGA apprehensive of defeat, decided to boycott the elections after 
unsuccessfully requesting the President and the Prime Minister to postpone them
71
.       
 In the North, polling went on normally despite the appeal for boycott by the UPGA 
and in the West voting took place in most Constituencies. In the East where there was a 
threat of secession, and in four of the five Lagos Constituencies, no voting took place. The 
result, not surprisingly, was a tremendous victory for the NNA, with virtually no 
opposition.
72
Generally, the election results were disputed. 
 The most daunting challenge for the Federal Electoral Commission was with the 
conduct of the Western Region Parliamentary Elections in 1965.
73
It was indeed the first 
election since 1962 when the NNDP came into existence in the region. The voting was 
considered an important test for democracy in Africa. The election result gave an 
overwhelming victory to Akintola’s NNDP. However, the UPGA leaders and their 
supporters argued that the Parliamentary Elections had been blatantly rigged by the Ruling 
Party to its advantage. UPGA leaders rejected the results and protest demonstrations broke 
out and were expressed in riots, arson, looting and wanton destruction of property and 
murder.
74
 Anifowose paints the picture more aptly thus: 
Violence and rigging were not new to elections in Nigeria; 
but no previous election had led to total chaos and anarchy as 
did the 1965 Western Region election.
75
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 Thus, the FEC found herself in a difficult political environment in which she lacked 
the capacity to contain. In fact, even the Nigeria Police admitted that the task of 
maintaining law and order was beyond them.
76 
It was under thissituation that the military 
struck in January 15, 1966.   
 It is necessary to reiterate that election management bodies or Electoral 
Commissions are instrumental to the success or failure of a democratic system. Since they 
are charged with the responsibility of organizing elections, their omission or commission 
could make or mar elections. Therefore, independence, impartiality and transparency are 
pre-requisites for the institutionalization of a viable democratic political system. 
Independence implies that an Election Management Body should not come under the 
influence of any government political party or organized groups. The indication or 
independence includes a legal mandate and well defined jurisdiction, composition and 
functions. This implies that an Election Management Body should not be subjected to 
manipulation by politicians as was with the 1964 General Elections in Nigeria. 
 Members of Election Management Bodies are human beings and are likely to have 
their party preferences. Such preferences ought not to interfere with their official duties. 
However, the experience during the 1964/1965 Elections showed clearly that majority of 
the temporary staff were sympathizers of political parties. The recruitment of party 
supporters as ad-hoc staff undermined the credibility of the elections
77
.         
 Transparency is a vital component of generating confidence in the election process. 
However, the FEC had transparency problems which manifested clearly from voter 
registration to the certification and announcement of results. Commenting on the 
1965General Elections,Kurfi asserted that: 
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The campaigns for the elections were characterized in all 
regions with political oppression by agencies of Regional 
Government and denial of permits to hold public meetings or 
processions. Other negative acts are the placing of obstacles 
against free assembly, expression of free speech and conduct 
of violence.
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 Thus, the early Electoral Commissions were deficient in terms of the strong 
correlates for electoral success namely; Independence, Impartiality and Transparency. The 
deficit in these correlates undermined the credibility of the electoral process and ignited 
political violence. 
 On the whole, the performance profile of the Electoral Commissions in the 
management of the 1959, 1964/5elections were largely dictated by the political 
environment they were conditioned to operate under just as the analysis illustrate. It is 
therefore apt to assert that the political environment is a strong correlate of electoral 
performance.     
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The historical exposition attempted in this chapter suggests that the phenomenon of 
electoral violence in Nigeria is not necessarily a product of a struggle for power among 
various groups within society as some scholars tend to argue. Rather electoral and political 
violence in the First Republic were essentially a function of bad leadership. The political 
leadership at the twilight of colonial disengagement was not committed to nation- building 
rather they allowed personal ambition and ethnic/regional persuasions to override national 
commitment and sacrifice. The three major strands that defined the problematic character 
of the political class were lack of ideology, ethnicity and corruption. These three variables 
played significant roles in preventing the political class from setting the right template for 
party politics. This development made violence inevitable and sowed the seeds for future 
crises in the political landscape of the country. It is equally this development that has made 
the conduct of elections by electoral commissions problematic. 
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For as we have demonstrated, there is a correlation between the political 
environment and the performance profile of electoral commissions. Unless the political 
environment aligns with the drive for credible elections by an Electoral Commission, there 
is virtually very little that aCommission can do to entrench free and fair elections devoid of 
violence. Thus, the responsibility for ensuring violent free elections rests on the shoulders 
of all the players in the electoral process. The chapter has therefore argued that a faulty 
foundation was laid for election management in Nigeria. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS AND 
THE ELECTORAL PROCESS, 1967-1999 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter attempts to explain the electoral process at the grassroots level 
particularly as from 1950 when a representative Local Government System was 
introduced. It further analyses the extent to which the 1976 Local Government Reforms 
and the 1979 constitution institutionalized elections as a means for ensuring participatory 
democracy at the third tier of government. This is significant because it was the 1976 
Reforms that gave recognition to local governments as a tier of government for the first 
time in the history of the country. But the conduct of Local Government Elections has 
thrown up a plethora of challenges that are threatening political stability and igniting 
electoral and political violence. The chapter also examines the management of Local 
Government Elections by Federal Electoral Commissions given that before the enactment 
of the 1999 Constitution, it was the responsibility of these electoral bodies to conduct 
Local Government Elections. 
 
4.2  Representation under the Modern Local Government System, 1976-1999 
 
Local Government Administration in Nigeria dates back to the colonial period. 
Under the Colonial Administration, local government was known as Native Authority. It 
was a form of indigenous rule under colonial authorities whereby traditional institutions of 
chiefs and other traditional rulers administered the natives under the supervision of British 
Administrative Officers. However, the basic problem with this system of administration 
was that, the traditional rulers who were appointed had no consent from the people and 
therefore they were perceived as “British Chiefs”. More so, the traditional rulers were 
basically illiterates with no western education and exposure in modern governance
1
. They 
were mere transmission belts for colonial policies. As Ayoade succinctly puts it: 
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The policies were transmitted to the traditional rulers who 
hardly understood the logic and rationale of the policies. 
Nevertheless they transmitted those policies to their people 
and expected compliance.
2
 
 
Aside from the lack of western education necessary for these indigenous rulers to 
understand their superintendents, some roles expected of them to perform by the Native 
Authority system were also repugnant to tradition of the people. For instance, the Native 
Authorities were expected to be able to levy and collect tax for the salaries of the chiefs 
and other officials and services of the authorities. But while some communities were 
already accustomed to this practice, others were not, though they had their own traditional 
ways of carrying out such services. The Aba Riot of 1929 is a very good example to point 
at. The point therefore is that the Native Authority system was not democratic and the 
appointment of the traditional rulers was not based on any electoral process. 
As from the 1950s, attempts were made to introduce a more participatory form of 
local government known as the Representative Local Government System. The 
introduction of this system came at the heels of the realisation that “the key to resolving 
the problems of African administration lay on the development of an efficient and 
democratic system of government”
3
. Following this realisation, regional governments into 
which the whole country had broken into began to reform their Native Authority systems 
to comply with democratic tenants. First was the structure of the new Local Government 
System-Multi Tier System that tended to replace the old one-single tier that had been in 
place since 1914. This multi-tier system was a concentric circle of variety of three local 
government systems e.g. County/district and local council or Provincial Divisional 
Councils. The service types they rendered to the rural people made the distinctions among 
these three layers. The County or Provincial Councils were assigned with services related 
to education, maintenance of roads and bridges. The Districts or Divisional Councils were 
in charge of markets, dispensaries and sanitary services while Local or District Councils, 
the smallest of them all were responsible for the maintenance of streams and footpaths
4
. 
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Regional Governments especially those of the Southern part of the country began 
to pass laws that provided for broad political participation under representative or 
democratic system of local government. The broadened participation included local 
representatives of the people, traditional rulers and chiefs which the law still permitted to 
act as the chairmen of the Local Government Councils. The Local Government Law of 
Western Region of 1952 was more explicit on this when it distinguished between elected 
and traditional members of the councils. The traditional members according to C.E Emezi
5
, 
were either ex-officio members of these councils or to sit on them by and amongst 
themselves. The President of the Council was the traditional ruler of the place but where 
they were more than one, the office rotated amongst them. 
Although the President of the Local Government under this new dispensation had 
purely ceremonial functions like presiding at budget meetings and other important 
occasions, he sometimes attempted to exercise executive authorities that tended to cause 
occasional out breaks of misunderstanding, if not outright fiasco between him and the 
executives of the council. How one expected a peaceful cohabitation of an entirely 
illiterate President of Local Government with educated elite at that time would actually 
encourage and work for the success of their colleagues with both at the council pools and 
administration, so that having formed majority in the council, they could always over turn 
the decisions of plans of their reactionary opponents. alex gboyega alluded to this when he 
said that the 1950 Local Government Reformstended to produce more participation than 
even the government wanted.
6
 
 Thus, the attempts at democratizing the Native Authorities particularly as from 
1954 to 1966 saw the introduction of an indirect system of elections whereby the District 
Councils formed the Electoral College to the Native Authority Council.
7
 This gradual 
introduction of elected members made a significant impact on the administration of some 
Native Authorities especially those in the Middle Belt Area. The larger Emirates, where 
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the chiefs were more powerful also had some elected members in their councils but many 
did not get round to having an elected majority and, where they did, the contribution of the 
elected members were very limited and, in many cases insignificant. Many important 
policy decisions were usually made outside the council meeting but the council was used 
to formalise or ratify such decisions
8
. The period from 1967-75 witnessed a lacuna in local 
government administration following the centralization of administration by the military 
regimes that held sway during the period. Local government areas were administratively 
merged with the State and civil servants were appointed to oversee these councils on 
behalf of the State Governments. No local government elections held within the period. 
Suffice it to state that the introduction of elected membership did not assist the 
development of local government very much; rather it put a strain on the Native Authority 
system. Power tussle not just as to who ran the councils but who was superior in the 
system frequently ensued between traditional rulers and the elected Councilors
9
. Again, 
this period coincided with the time a Ministerial System of Government was beginning to 
gain ground, and because most of the leaders of government came from Local 
Government, election at the local level could not as it were be divorced from Central 
Government politics. 
Perhaps the Regional Government deliberately created this cleavage between the 
traditional rulers as the presidents of the councils and the technocrats so as to have inroad 
into happenings going on at the grassroots. Hence, the Regional Governments held 
tenaciously on to power to create and abolish Local Governments. With this power they 
created, abolished and dissolved erring Local Governments, beside the fact that they had to 
also approve their annual budget before they can be implemented
10
. Through this way, 
Local Governments under this phase were effectively subordinated to the Regional 
Governments. The upshot of this for the Local Government System was lack of autonomy. 
The lack of autonomy concomitantly meant that these Local Governments 
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becamedependent on the Regional Governments in a “horse and the rider” relationship. 
While Local Governments were the horses, Regional Governments were the riders. What 
this also meant in terms of the process for electing councillors was that the Regional 
Governments couldmanipulate the Electoral College System so as to ensure that 
councillors who emerged were those amenable to their manipulations. It was under this 
ferment that the 1976 reforms were couched to correct the problems with the representative 
Local Government System. The thrust of the 1976 Local Government reforms especially as 
it relates to Local Government Elections is the focus of the next section. 
 
4.3 The 1976 Local Government Reforms and the Institutionalization of Elections 
at the Grassroots 
 
The 1976 Local Government Reforms were strategic in that they sought to establish 
local governments as a third tier government.
11
This was the first time in the political 
history of the country that recognition was given to administration at the grassroots level in 
terms of functions, finances and status. This new recognition also meant that the system of 
administration had to be based on participatory democracy. For example, the guidelines on 
the 1976 Reforms stated that “membership of Local Government Councils should be 
predominantly elected either by direct or indirect elections from local communities...”
12
. 
This meant that Local Government Councils had to exist as democratic institutions and 
therefore the conduct of elections to recruit leadership into the councils was 
institutionalized. 
It is imperative to recap historically that before 1976, Local Governments basically 
existed as Local Administration meaning that they were agents of the Regional 
Governments. The administrators were also imposed by the Regional Government with no 
consent from the people. Aside from the democratic character given to Local 
Governments, the separation of traditional rulers from the local government councils was 
informed by the need to block one of the important obstacles hindering the growth of 
87 
 
democratic Local Government System in the country. Before now, traditional rulers had 
always tackled the local government for the resources and the loyalty of the localities. As a 
level of government, the New Local Government System, according to the guidelines for 
the 1976 Local Government Reform, “should do precisely what the word government 
implies i.e. governing at the grassroots level”.
13
 The reform defined a third tier of 
government as “a set of Local Governmentswith their own identity, powers and sources of 
revenue established under State Legislation and with functions for which they are 
responsible to the State”.
14
 
These reforms were intended to entrust political responsibility to where it is most 
crucial and most beneficial, that is to the people
15
. However, the question that agitates this 
research is the extent to which Local Governments have enhanced participatory democracy 
at the grassroots. The interrogation of this research question entails examining the extent to 
which elections have been institutionalized as a means for political recruitment at the 
grassroots level. To provide explanations to this question, elicit, analysing the experience 
in Benue State particularly as from 1976. 
The enactment of the 1976 Reforms coincided with the creation of Benue State 
with Local Government Councils. However, the military philosophy of centralization of 
authority did not give room for the implementation of the reforms. This meant in effect 
that Local Governments in Benue State like in the other states of the Federation as from 
1976-79 were operating as Local Administrations under the supervision of the State 
Governments. The Military Governors of the States also enacted decrees that tended to 
reduce Local Governments to appendages of the State Government. A number of examples 
will suffice in the case of Benue State to buttress this argument. Section 27 of Benue State 
Edict No. 14 (1976) required Local Governments to recommend for the Military 
Governor’s approval, three of their members as proposed chairmen. It was not unusual (as 
in the case of Otukpo) for the Governor to select the candidate with the least votes or to 
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choose a Pliant Officer as Chairman of the Council
16
. A further example is that Section 29 
of Benue State Edict provided that, “every Chairman of a council shall render his services 
to the Council on such basis as the Military Governor may determine”
17
. 
The implication is that Local Governments were administered by persons not 
elected by the people but appointed by the Military Governor. In most cases, these 
administrators were not even members of the communities they were appointed to rule 
over. Though the 1976 Reforms provided that elections should be the legitimate means for 
recruiting political leadership for local governments, the lendable ideals were not 
implemented. This development brought out the dilemma of a military government 
attempting to decentralize power to lower levels of government. 
The basic ideals in the 1976 Reforms were encapsulated in the 1979 Constitution of 
Nigeria. The Constitution ushered in the Second Republic which was to provide a litmus 
test for the reforms. The 1979 Constitution recognisedLocal Government as a third-tier 
government and guaranteed its existence as a democratic institution
18
. However, the 
Constitution left a lot of gaps which the State Governments manipulated and have 
continued to manipulate. The Constitution did not establish the operational modalities for 
Local Government Administration and left it to the interpretation of the various States. In 
fact, the Constitution empowered the State Houses of Assembly to make laws for the 
structure, composition and finances of the Local Governments.
19
TheState Governments 
have since relied on this provision to manipulate Local Governments and reduce them to 
appendages of the State. Generally, the 1979 Constitution in practice created a “two-tier” 
Federation in sharp contrast to the ideas of the 1976 Reforms.
20
 
The point, therefore is that whereas the 1976 Local Government Reforms set out 
parameters for ensuring participatory democracy at the grassroots through the conduct of 
elections, the 1979 Constitution,which was to give legal backing to the reforms gave 
partial legal backing. Local Governments were guaranteed to exist as democratic 
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institutions but under the purview of the State Governments
21
. In Benue State,for instance, 
throughout the period that the Second Republic lasted (1979-1983),no Local Government 
Elections were conducted in the state. Local Governments were administered by State 
Appointed Officials. 
 
4.4 An Overview of Election Commissions 
In the preceding chapter, it was observed that the conduct of General Elections 
during the First Republic was marred by irregularities which snowballed into political 
violence on a scale that led to the collapse of the First Republic. In this section, attempts 
are made to historically chronicle the electoral activities of the different Commissions that 
were established during the period 1977-2012. This approach will provide the basis for the 
appreciation of the problems with election management in Nigeria generally. Though this 
study is particular about Local Government Elections, before 1999 Local Government 
Elections were conducted by Federal Electoral Commissions. Therefore, the understanding 
of the problems with the Commissions is imperative. It sets the tone for the understanding 
of why political violence has remained a recurrent decimal in the political history of the 
country. 
 
Federal Electoral Commission Under Chief Michael Ani, 1976-1979 
The Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) was established by Decree No. 41 
of 1977 by the Olusegun Obasanjo military regime.Its composition was as follows: Chief 
Electoral Commissioner, who was the Chairman and twenty-four Commissioners (one of 
the Electoral Commissioners appointed from each State and four other Commissioners)
22
. 
The Executive Secretary was the administrative head of the Commission. There was a 
Resident Electoral Commissioner and Administrative Secretary who performed similar 
functions to those of the Executive Secretary at the state level. The Executive Secretary 
was a Federal Civil Servant while the Administrative Secretaries were seconded from State 
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Civil Services. While the functions of the Electoral Commission of Nigeria (1958) were 
restricted to registration of voters and the conduct of elections, that of FEDECO specified 
by law were to: 
a. organise and supervise all matters relating to elections. 
b. register political parties and their eligibility to sponsor candidates for election. 
c. carry out functions as may be conferred on it by law. 
d. divide by reference to the 1963 Population Census of the Federation or, as the case 
may be, the area of a State into such number of constituencies as may be prescribed 
by law for the purpose of election. 
e.  conduct registration of voters, the preparation and maintenance of register of voters 
for the purpose of election and 
f. arrangefor the annual examination and auditing of funds and accounts of political 
parties
23
. 
 
The first major function undertaken by FEDECO was the registration of political 
parties. On the whole, 19 Associations applied for registration as political parties. The 
Associations included; National Party of Nigeria (NPN), Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), 
Peoples Redemption Party (PRP), Nigeria Advanced Party (NAP), National Peoples 
Convention (NPC), Whig Party of Nigeria(WPN), People’s Action Party (PAP), 
Movement of the People (MOP), Great Nigerian Peoples Party (GNPP), Nigerian Peoples 
Party (NPP), Nigerian Peoples Welfare Party (NPWP), Nigeria National Congress (NNC),  
Progressive Socialist Workers Party of Nigerian (PSWPN), Common Man’s Party, 
(CMP)etc. out of the 19 political associations which submitted papers, only five were 
registered as political parties. Those registered were: NPN, NPP, GNPP, UPN and the 
PRP.
24
 
The numerous political associations that applied for registration were deficit in 
terms of a defining ideology. Politicians were merely assembling for personal interest 
without any clear cut agenda for national development. Commenting on the registration of 
the five parties, Chief Michael Ani, the Chief Electoral Commissioner said that, “those 
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Associations that are not registered should behave like good crickets – leave the field with 
dignity.
25
 According to Ani, the decision not to register the other Political Associations 
was based on field reports from State Resident Electoral Commissioners; it was discovered 
that some parties were using ordinary dwelling houses or beer parlours as offices.
26
 
The second major controversy in the activities of FEDECO was on the 
disqualification of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the Presidential Candidate of the NPP and Alhaji 
Aminu Kano, the Presidential Candidate of the PRP. The two presidential candidates were 
disqualified because of the problems with their tax clearance. However, the courts cleared 
them of wrong doing
27
. 
The third controversial issue that confronted FEDECO was the issue of 2/3 of 19 
States. According to the 1977 Electoral Decree, the condition for winning the Presidential 
Election was that a candidate must have the highest number of popular votes cast and also 
have not less than one quarter of votes cast at the election in each of, at least, the two thirds 
(2/3) of the States in the Federation. In the Presidential Election, Alhaji Shehu Shagari 
scored more votes than each of the four candidates. For the second condition, Alhaji Shehu 
Shagari scored 25% of votes cast in each of the 12 two third States out of the 19 States. In 
the controversial Kano State, he scored 19.94% (i.e. 5.06% short of 25%). But the Federal 
Electoral Commission declared Alhaji Shehu Shagari winner of the elections.
28
 
This declaration was unacceptable to chief Awolowo who was the Presidential 
Candidate of the Unity Party of Nigeria. He petitioned the Presidential Election Tribunal 
arguing that the elections had no clear winner since in his judgement, 2/3 of 19 States is 
13. However, the courts upheld the decision of the Electoral Commission
29
. A number of 
issues stand out for elaboration here. The Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) was 
meant to be an independent agency and in keeping with an unavoidable feature of 
governmental affair in Nigeria, it was entrusted with implementing the numerous 
regulations devised to prevent every imaginable form of electoral misconduct. However, 
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many of the important decisions of FEDECO reflected a subjective element subsequently 
opened to challenge by those adversely affected by them. For example, hundreds of 
individuals who had hoped to contest the 1979 Elections found themselves barred because 
of prior convictions for abuse of office, or for not satisfying such technical requirements as 
providing proof of Income Tax Payments
30
.  
Another problem was that the actual date on which the elections were to be held 
was not announced promptly, and then the timing seemed inappropriate in the light of the 
country’s climate
31
. Finally when it seemed that Shehu Shagari had failed to win the 
presidency on the first ballot, and thus an Electoral College would be convened to choose 
from among the leading contestants, an interpretation was announced which in effect 
altered the requirement for the national vote spread on the elections, thereby allowing 
Shagari to be declared elected after the first round.
32
 
In a study on the electoral activities of FEDECO, Ahmadu Kurfi
33
, reported that in 
1979, surplus ballot papers had been sold to the highest bidder, that polling agents had 
thumb-printed ballots for those who paid them, that ballot boxes stuffed with pre-marked 
ballots were substituted for the real ones on the way to counting centers and that the 
deliberate invalidation of ballots by polling and counting officials had occurred. This 
assertion and the experience relayed earlier suggest that FEDECO was not truly 
independent and was easily manipulated by those politicians who had the wealth to buy 
over officials of the Commission. Muhammed Buhari summed up the fraud that 
characterised the election in these words: 
The last General Election was anything but free and fair. The 
shameless rigging and the widespread subversion of the 
electoral process could, in all honesty, have been said to have 
produced a government of the people by the people. The only 
political parties that could complain of election rigging are 
those parties that lack resources to rig. There is complete 
evidence that rigging and thuggery were relative to the 
resources available to the parties. This conclusively prove to 
us that the parties have not developed confidence in the 
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presidential system in which the nation invested so much 
material resources.
34 
 
National Electoral Commission Under Prof. Eme Awa, 1987-1989 
The Babangida Administration set up the National Electoral Commission (NEC) 
under the chairmanship of Professor Eme Awa in 1987. The Commission came under 
criticism when it allowed the Armed Forces Ruling Council to draw the guidelines for the 
election and registration exercise. Eme Awa did not last long as the Chairman of NEC as 
he was suddenly removed for reasons not unconnected with his displeasure of interferences 
by the military junta
35
. However, during his time in office, NEC received thirteen 
applications by Political Associations for registration as political parties. These Political 
Associations were: The People’s Front of Nigeria, Nigerian Peoples Welfare Party, 
Nigerian National Congress, Peoples Solidarity Party, Nigerian Labour Party, The 
Republican Party of Nigeria, National Union Party, Liberal Convention, Patriotic Nigerian 
Party, Ideal Peoples Party, All Nigerian Peoples Party and United Nigerian Democratic 
Party. The National Electoral Commission sent the names of 13 Associations and a report 
to the Armed Forces Ruling Council which refused to register any of them and went ahead 
to establish two new political parties – The National Republican Convention (NRC) and 
the Social Democratic Party (SDP).
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 It is clear from the foregoing that the National Electoral Commission (NEC) was 
constituted by the military junta to be subjective to the military establishment and so take 
instructions or directives from them. Thus, the foundation was laid for manipulated 
elections. 
 
National Electoral Commission Under Prof. Humphrey Nwosu, 1989-1993 
Following the sack of Professor Eme Awa, Professor Humphery Nwosu was 
appointed as chairman of NEC. However his appointment did not change the status of the 
Commission especially its subordination to the Armed Forces Ruling Council. NEC was 
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basically an administrative unit of the Executive Arm. Though, Nwosu tried to inject some 
dynamism and reform into the electoral body, his efforts were overshadowed by constant 
interference by the government. 
One of the innovations of the Nwosu Commission was the introduction of the Open 
Ballot System to replace the Secret Ballot System. In an address to media executives in 
Lagos on Monday October 15, 1990, Nwosu explained that: 
...the secret ballot system may remain an enviable choice in a 
truly democratic system, here in Nigeria, because of the 
desire of our politicians to win at all cost, the system has been 
so bastardized that secret ballot has become synonymous 
with rigging, manipulation and other electoral vices. In fact, 
the manipulation of the secret ballot system has so denied out 
electoral process that all Nigerians have lost confidence in it 
and all that entails.
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 Another innovation by Nwosu Commission was option A4 which is a process 
whereby the Presidential Candidate of a political party emerges from a stage by a State 
Contest which involves the principle of elimination. The process recognizes 4 stages – the 
Ward, the Local Government Area, the State and the National Level with a winning 
aspirant proceeding progressively from one stage to the next one until every aspirant 
except one is eliminated. 
In addition to the functions of NEC stipulated in Decree 23 of 1987, a number of 
other decrees, which expanded the responsibilities of NEC were promulgated. These 
include Decree No. 25 of 1987, which prohibited certain persons from contesting elections, 
Decree No. 37 of 1987, which vested the conduct of Local Government Elections in the 
Commission, Decree No. 14 of 1988, which enabled NEC to conduct elections into the 
Constituent Assembly. Decree No. 9 of 1989 transferred the authority to recognise the two 
political parties to the Armed Forces Ruling Council. Commenting on the powers given to 
NEC, Nwosu remarked thus; 
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NEC, as presently set up has been given more powers than 
any other electoral body in Nigerian political history. 
Equally, the Commission as compared with any of its 
predecessors has evolved a much more dynamic conception 
of its duties. Thus, the Commission views its role as going 
beyond the mere conduct of free and fair elections to that of 
being actively involved in the process of creating a political 
environment in which, it is feasible to attain that objective. I 
think it is this social engineering responsibility that has set 
NEC apart from previous electoral bodies.
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Nevertheless, NEC was heavily criticized by stakeholders in the political process 
on the grounds that the Commission irrationally disqualified candidates. For example, 
Professor Fabian Osuji claimed he was disqualified in the Gubernatorial Primary in Imo 
State because Nwosu wanted to pave the way for Ezekiel Izuogu, who was Nwosu’s 
friend
39
. There were several other complaints across the country. But NEC was able to 
conduct elections into Local Government Councils, Houses of Assembly, Gubernatorial 
Seats and the National Assembly. It was the last election – the Presidential Election that 
NEC met her waterloo. Judging from the results that NEC announced earlier, it was clear 
that the SDP Presidential Candidate was Moshood Abiola going to win the elections. The 
military president, General Ibrahim Babangida stopped further announcements and 
annulled the entire results. The fallout of this action had devastating consequences for the 
political system. Professor Nwosu was subsequently removed as Chairman of the 
Commission. On July 2, 1993, Professor Okon Uya was appointed as the new Chairman of 
NEC. However, the unstable political situation in the country rendered the Commission 
redundant and was dissolved in November, 1993. 
The General Sani Abacha Government re-organised the defunct NEC and formed a 
new Electoral Commission called National Electoral Commission (NECON). Chief 
Summer Dagogo Jack was appointed chairman. The main legacy of this Commission was 
the registration of five political parties namely UNCP, DPN, NCP, CNC and GDM. These 
political parties did an usual thing in the political history of Nigeria;they all adopted 
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General Abacha as their Presidential Candidate. But this was not to be as Abacha suddenly 
died on the 8
th
 of June, 1998. This Electoral Commission was then dissolved. 
 
The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) 
The Abubakar administration established the Independent Electoral Commission 
under Decree No. 17 of August 11, 1998. The Commission consisted of the Chairman and 
twelve National Commissioners. Hon. Justice E. O. I. Akpata was appointed the Chairman 
of the Commission. Between August, 1998 and March, 1999, the Commission organised 
all the elections. The end product of all the elections was the handing over to a 
democratically elected government on 29
th
 May, 1999. 
Justice Ephraim Ibukun Akpata died after the election in January 2000. Dr. Abel 
Guobadia was appointed as the new INEC Chairman for a period of five years. He piloted 
the affairs of the Commission until the expiration of his term of office in 2005. The 2003 
Elections conducted by the Guobadia led Commission were criticized by both domestic 
and international observers. For example, the European Union Election Observation 
Mission had this to say about the 2003 Elections: 
...The election process was marked by serious shortcomings 
and delays in the electoral preparation. In particular, voter 
registration has been the main source of difficulties and 
controversy. Candidate nomination, the monitoring of 
campaign finance and media coverage of elections was also 
not implemented in an adequate manner. On election day, the 
main problems include late opening of most of the polling 
stations, lack of secrecy of the votes and in certain areas, 
election did not take place...
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Similarly, the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), a coalition of 170 Human 
Rights and Civil Society Organisation deployed 10,000 trained election monitors during 
the election. Its report covered pre-election period especially Voters Registration Exercise, 
Primaries and Election Day activities. The report noted that the integrity of the electoral 
process was undermined by factors such as shoddy conduct of voters' registration exercise, 
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which resulted in many prospective voters being disenfranchised and the primaries of 
many political parties were hijacked by political godfathers.
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Professor Maurice Iwu was appointed INEC Chairman in May, 2005 for a five year 
term, which ended in May, 2010. Before his appointment, he was one of the twelve 
Commissioners. He became the first Chairman to be appointed from a team of serving 
National commissioners. He conducted the 2007 General Electionswhich was adjudged the 
worst in the history of Nigeria by both local and international observers. In fact, the 2007 
elections recorded the highest number of election petitions. It is therefore important to 
isolate the problems with the 2007 elections for more detail analysis so as to lay the basis 
for the appreciation of the problems with election management in Nigeria generally. The 
analysis will be anchored on the reports of observers on the 2007 Elections. 
The ECOWAS mission led by Dauda Kairaba Jawara, former President of the 
Gambia identified shortcomings associated with the electoral reform process, the voter 
registration exercise, the party primaries and political campaigns, as well as certain actions 
of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and the Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), with regard to the eligibility of candidate. These 
factors challenged the validity of the elections
42
. 
On the part of the European Union Observer group led by Max Den Berg, the 2007 
State and Federal Elections fell far short of basic international and regional standards for 
democratic elections. They noted that the elections were marred by very poor organisation, 
lack of essential transparency, widespread procedural irregularities, substantial evidence of 
fraud, widespread voter disenfranchisement at different stages of the process, lack of equal 
conditions for political parties and candidates and numerous incidents of violence. As a 
result, the report noted, the process cannot be considered to have been credible. Given the 
lack of transparency and evidence of fraud, particularly in the results collation process, 
there can be no confidence in the results of these elections.
43
Furthermore, the report held 
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INEC responsible for the administrative failure on a nationwide scale. Deadlines were 
missed throughout the pre-election period and it lacked transparency in its decisions and 
conduct. INEC was selective and inconsistent in the application and enforcement of 
electoral legislation. 
In sum, INEC under Professor Iwu conducted the most fraudulent elections in the 
political history of Nigeria. Despite the chaotic and fraudulent electoral process, the 
candidates explored legal and political mechanisms to seek redress. This explains why 
there were minimal cases of political violence if compared to the 1964/65 General 
Elections.
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Independent National Electoral Commission of Nigeria under Prof. Attahiru Jega, 
2010-2015 
Professor Attahiru Jega was nominated as the new INEC Chairman on 8
th
 June, 
2011 barely a year to the 2011 General Elections. He took over from Professor Maurice 
Iwu who was sent on terminal leave on the 28
th
 April, 2010.Jega conducted the 2011 
Elections which was described by both domestic and international observers as credible 
but not without problems. For instance, the report of ECOWAS observation Group 2011 
noted that: 
As was the case with the National Assembly Elections, this 
presidential poll represents a step forward from seriously 
flawed elections in the past. Nigerian citizens demonstrated 
commitment and dedication as they turned out to vote in 
elections that hold the promise of setting a new standard for 
integrity in Nigeria’s electoral process... we commend the 
Federal Government of Nigeria, INEC and all stakeholders 
for ensuring a peaceful and orderly election, thus making it a 
historic step for strengthening of democracy and good 
governance in Nigeria...
45
 
 
The factor of an effective and committed leadership as demonstrated by Jega is 
fundamental to electoral success. But democratic elections are not simply a technical 
exercise and their success does not rest with the electoral authority alone. This is why 
inspite of the commendations by the election observer groups, notable lapses in the 2011 
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elections were under-age voting, ballot box snatching, monetary inducement of voters etc. 
This suggests that while the institution (INEC) improved its effectiveness, the ecology of 
the elections were weak. 
The foregoing analysis has indicated that all the Electoral Commissions were 
creations of the Executive arm of the Federal Government. Therefore, they suffered the 
problem of executive interference with the electoral process. This problem often time 
undermined the credibility of the elections. Again, the analysis has also indicated that the 
Commissions suffered great instability in terms of frequent re-organisation and leadership 
changes. This did not create room for consolidation. In fact of all the commissions, only 
INEC lasted for upward of a decade. 
 
4.5 Federal Electoral Commissions and the Management of Local Government 
Elections in Benue State 
 
Before the enactment of the 1999 Constitution, Local Government Elections were 
conducted by Federal Electoral Commissions. Local Government Elections were a 
significant part of the General Elections. In fact, electoral procedures were experimented 
with Local Government Elections. In Benue State, the first Local Government Elections 
were held in 1977 on non-party basis and the elections were organised by FEDECO. The 
results of the elections were a true reflection of the wishes of the people. Only popular 
candidates emerged. The reasons for this could be located in the fact that political parties 
were not platforms for the contest and so the usual tensions and acrimonies that 
characterised party politics were inactive. This point is better appreciated if viewed against 
the backdrop that party politics breeds rancour, violence, antagonism and disunity within 
the Local Government System. The late Aper Aku who later became the first Executive 
Governor of Benue State was first elected as Chairman of Kwande Local Government in 
1977 though on non-party basis. Incidences of political violence were not recorded as the 
elections were free and fair. 
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Although General Elections were held throughout the country in 1979, no Local 
Government Elections were conducted in Benue State throughout the entire period that the 
Second Republic lasted (1979-83). Local Governments were chaired by state appointed 
Sole Administrators.It was in 1989 that local government elections were conducted by the 
Babangida administration. Again, the elections were on non-party basis. In fact, the 
elections were a trial run election in the transition to Civil Rule Programme of the Third 
Republic. The elections faced some major problems which were later to influence 
decisions on subsequent elections. One of such problems was the issue of registration of 
voters. According to Adele Jinadu: 
INEC, using a projected increase of about 12.5% over the 
number of registration cards printed in 1979, about the 
48.6million decided to print 55million registration cards. 
Using the 1979 figures for each state as a baseline, the 
number of cards sent to each state was determined by a 
projection of 12.5% increase over the 1979 figures. Less than 
a week after the registration exercise had begun, there was a 
deluge of demand from all over the country for more 
registration cards.
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In Benue State, the elections were characterised by shortage of cards and therefore 
a large number of eligible voters were disenfranchised. But generally the elections were 
peaceful, free and fair. 
The next set of Local Government Elections was held in 1990. The elections were 
conducted by the National Electoral Commission under the leadership of Professor 
Humphery Nwosu. This time the elections were based on party politics. Two political 
parties contested the elections namely, the National Republican Convention (NRC) and the 
Social Democratic Party (SDP). The general result sheet in the whole country showed that 
SDP won a total of 232 chairmanship seats. In the Councillorship Election,SDP won 2,934 
and the NRC won 2, 558 Councillorship seats. The results indicated that the two political 
parties won in local governments they had relative strength. What was striking about the 
1990 Local Government Elections was that, it provided a litmus test for the Open Ballot 
101 
 
System that was introduced by INEC. The modalities for the Open Ballot System were 
outlined as follows: 
a) Registered voters whose names are on the voters register and who have voters card 
are accredited in their different polling stations between 8:00am and 11:00am. The 
purpose is to ensure that only persons who are eligible to vote are allowed to do so 
and at the right polling station. 
b) Voter’s cards are stamped, signed at the back and such details as the date, type of 
election and code number are recorded. 
c) The right thumbs of the voters are marked. 
d) Accreditation ends at 11:00am and those who come after that time will not be 
accredited. 
e) Between 11:00am and 12noon, voting procedures are explained to the accredited 
voters. 
f) Voting commences at 12noon. The accredited voters are requested to line up in front 
of the posters carrying the portraits of candidates of their choice. 
g) The counting of the number of voters in the queue one by one must be made loudly. 
h) Election of Councillors is conducted first, and then followed by that of Chairman. 
i) In areas of the country where it is proved that the culture does not allow men and 
women mingling in a queue, separate queues are allowed for men and women. 
j) The results of the poll at the polling Stationsare signed by the Presiding Officers and 
endorsed by the Poling Agents representing the candidates.
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In Benue State, the success of the Open Ballot System laid in the fact it helped 
reduce the thuggery and violence that characterised elections. The parties won squarely 
where they were weak. Terwase Aker who was a polling clerk during the 1990 Local 
Government Elections revealed that: 
 
102 
 
The open ballot system made it difficult for rigging to occur. 
The electorates were all there and so at the end of the 
counting everybody knew who and which party had won the 
elections. 
 
 However, the point needed be made that the Open Ballot System under the 
condition of mass election could lead to alienation, corruption and disrespect. This 
problem played out in Wailomayo Council Ward of Makurdi Local Government where 
some money bags used money to induce voters to cue on their lines. But generally, the 
elections were relatively free and fair especially if compared with 1983 General Elections.         
The Abacha Administration introduced a transition which was to be implemented 
1995 and 1998. Elections were conducted into Local Governments. But because the 
transition programme was not meant to transit power to anybody except ensuring that 
Abacha transformed from a Military Head of State to a Civilian President. The five 
registered political parties by NECON had tacit military backing. In Benue State, three out 
of the five political parties were prominent namely Congress for Progressive Change 
(CPC), United Nigeria Congress Party (UNCP) and the National Centre Party (NCP). 
Given the militarised political environment, the 1997 Local Government Elections 
witnessed low voter turnout and the elections were characterised by massive rigging. 
However minimal cases of political violence were recorded. 
The death of Abacha on June 8, 1998 brought to an abrupt end the Abacha 
transition programme. The Abdusalami regime introduced a political programme which 
laid the foundation for the longest democratic experience. The details of the plan were as 
follows: 
 
Political Programme: August – September 1998 
1. Preparation by the commission. 
2. Release of Guidelines for formation and registration of political parties. 
3. Release of Guidelines for registration of voters. 
103 
 
4. Submission of Applications for Registration by Political Associations.    
5. Verification of claims of Political Associations by the Commission. 
 
October – December 1998  
1. Verification of claims of Political Association continues. 
2. Registration of voters. 
3. Release of names of Political Associations provisionally registered by the 
commission. 
4. Release of Guidelines for Local Government Elections.    
5. Local Government Council Elections. 
6. Chairmanship run-off Elections(if any). 
7. Hearing and determination of Election Petitions resulting from Local Government 
Council Elections. 
8. Release of Guidelines for Governorship and State Houses of Assembly Elections. 
 
January – March 1999  
1. Governorship and State Houses of Assembly Elections. 
2. Governorship run-off Elections (if any). 
3. Hearing and determination of Governorship and State Houses of Assembly Elections 
Petitions. 
4. Release of Guidelines for National Assembly and Presidential Elections. 
5. National Assembly Elections. 
6. Presidential Elections. 
7. Presidential run-off Elections (if any). 
8. Hearing and determination of Election Petitions arising from National Assembly and 
Presidential Elections. 
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April – May 1999 
1. Hearing and determination of Election Petitions and Appealsarising there from. 
2. Swearing in of President-elect, Governors-elect.
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The Abdusalami transition programme was the shortest by any military 
administration in Nigeria. But our concern here is how Local Government Elections were 
managed. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was established by 
Decree 17
th
 of 1998. Though it is now an Act of the National Assembly and it is listed in 
Section 153 of  the 1999 Federal Constitution as one of the 14 Federal Executive Bodies
51
. 
The Commission was given the responsibility of conducting Local Government Elections 
in the country.  
However, the short period of the transition programme also had a number of 
implications for the electoral process. For instance, the Voter Registration Exercise of the 
period was hurriedly done and so it had a number of lapses. These lapses included under-
age registration, shortage of registration cards and poor voter education. In spite of the 
glaring lapses, a total of 1, 831, 97 voters were registered.
52 
LocalGovernment Elections were held under a peaceful atmosphere though the 
preparations were inadequate. There were minimal cases of violence. According to Terfa 
Agber
53
, “the 1999 local government elections recorded fewer cases of snatching of ballot 
boxes and ballot box stuffing”. To Gabriel Otakwu, “the elections were relatively free and 
fair because the military that supervised the elections had no vested interest”.
54
 Three 
political parties contested the 1999 Local Government Elections nationwide. There were 
the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), ALL People’s Party (APP) and the Alliance for 
Democracy (AD). However, in Benue State, two political parties were prominent. Just as 
the results of the 1997Local Government Elections show. These parties were People’s 
Democratic Party and All People’s Party. 
  
105 
 
Table 2: Results of Chairmanship Election for 1999 Local Government Elections in 
Benue State 
S/No. Name Local Government Political Party 
1.  Michael Inalegwu Agatu APP 
2.  Godwin A. Udo Apa PDP 
3.  Bunde Denen Buruku APP 
4.  Lydia Ikuma Nyor Gboko PDP 
5.  Torbunde Charles Guma APP 
6.  Nathaniel Alaaga Gwer-East APP 
7.  John Tion Gwer-West APP 
8.  Akiga M. Sai Katsina-Ala PDP 
9.  Emmanuel I. Asue Konshisha PDP 
10.  Dzeka Dennis Kwande PDP 
11.  Sylvester Waakaa  Logo PDP 
12.  Michael Shaaho  Makurdi PDP 
13.  Emmanuel Arubi Obi PDP 
14.  Onoja R. Daniel  Ogbadibo APP 
15.  Godwin Owulo Oju PDP 
16.  Ezekiel Awulu Adaji Ohimini PDP 
17.  Patrick A. Umoro Okpokwu PDP 
18.  Godwin O. Odumu Otukpo PDP 
19.  Baver Dzeremo Tarka PDP 
20.  Veronica Gajir Ushongo APP 
21.  Ajoh Emmanuel Vandeikya APP 
22.  James Tyokosu  Ukum PDP 
23.  Otse Otokpa Ado PDP 
Source: Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) Benue State, 1999   
 
 The above results indicate that the 1999 Local Government Elections met minimal 
standards for a free and fair election. The result was indeed competitive and the two 
prominent political parties won where they had electoral strength. This fact will better be 
appreciated if compared with elections conducted by the Benue State Independent 
Electoral Commission (BSIEC) as demonstrated in the next chapter. The reason for this 
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party spread could be attributed to the fact that INEC demonstrated that the Commission 
was not an interested party and therefore provided a level-field for all contestants. 
 
4.6 Conclusion           
 The institutionalisation of elections at the Local Government level by the 1976 
Local Government Reforms raised the tempo of political electioneering. The increased 
political activity at this level provided challenges for the National Electoral Commissions 
that were formed at various times. In fact, Local Government Elections became a 
laboratory for testing election procedures for General Elections. Though the chapter notes 
that Local Government Elections were sporadically organised owing to the many 
punctuated military transition programmes, the elections were relatively peaceful but not 
free from electoral malpractices. The chapter observes that because the elections were 
organised by Federal Electoral Commissions, political parties won based on their 
respective strength and popularity amongst the people. Unlike the situation after 1999,  
when elections were declared in favour of the party in government at the State level in 
virtually all the Local Governments as demonstrated in the next chapter. The relative 
neutrality of the Federal Electoral Commissions mitigated electoral and political violence 
at the Local Government level. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
BENUE STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION AND 
THECONDUCT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS, 1999-2012 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 Elections in a democratic setting provide an opportunity for citizens to participate 
in the political process of choosing their representatives at any level of government. This 
chapter analyses the conduct of elections into Local Government Councils by BSIEC. It 
espouses the rationale for creating State Independent Electoral Commissions and examines 
the core challenges militating against the conduct of free, transparent and credible 
elections. The strategic role of security agents in ensuring or undermining the credibility of 
the electoral process is also critically examined. The assertions in this chapter are largely 
based on field interviews and primary sources.The contention of this chapter is that the 
2004, 2007 and 2012 Local Government Elections were characterised by rigging, ballot 
stuffing, ballot snatching and outright manipulation of results. The persistence of these 
vices has created credibility problems for BSIEC and this elicits intellectual interrogation. 
5.2  Establishment of BSIEC          
 Benue State Independent Electoral Commission is a creation of the Benue State 
House of Assembly.
1
The1999 Constitution provided for the establishment of State 
Independent Electoral Commission (SIEC) and empowered the State Houses of 
Assemblyto make laws for the establishment, functions and composition of the 
Commissions though in compliance with Section 197 of the Constitution
2
. In line with this 
provision, the Benue State House of Assembly enacted a law for the establishment, 
composition and functions of the Commission. The law is cited as the Benue State 
Independent Electoral Commission Law 2000 and it came into force on the 20
th
 day of 
July, 2000
3
. 
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 The creation of SIEC by the 1999 Constitution was an attempt at decentralising the 
electoral management process. The framers of the 1999 Constitution felt SIEC would 
better organise elections at the grassroots and would serve as a platform for testing 
electoral procedures
4
. However, the attainment of these laudable objectives has left much 
to be desired as exemplified by the numerous crises that such exercises have generated as 
demonstrated in the next chapter. The 1999 Constitution in Section 197 Part II of the Third 
Schedule spelt out the functions of SIEC as follows: 
a.  organise, undertake and supervise all elections to Local Government Councils 
within the state; 
b.  provide rules and regulations which shall govern the political parties and monitor 
political campaigns during Local Government Council Elections; 
c.  ensure that all Electoral and Returning Officers take and subscribe to the Oath of 
Allegiance prescribed by law;  
d. delegate any of its powers to the Electoral Officer of any Local Government Area; 
e. render such advise as it may consider necessary to the Independent National 
Electoral Commission on the compilation of the register of voters in so far as the 
register is applicable to Local Government Elections in the State; 
f.  advise the Independent National Electoral Commission on any other issue relating to 
Local Government Elections in the State; and     
g.  perform such other functions as the Independent National Electoral Commission of 
the Government may from time to time delegate to it.
5
 
 
Clearly, the Constitution gave SIECs jurisdiction over Local Government Elections. 
But as Mark Amaza observes,  
State Independent Electoral Commissions have 
become appendages of not just the government in 
power at the states but also of the Ruling Parties. The 
members of the State Commissions are poorly 
organised and brazenly rigged, and the term 
“Independent” is completely rubbished.
6
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 This instructive observation calls to question the desirability of SIECs of which 
BSIEC is a component part. In fact, the above observation is reinforced by the reality that 
almost all Local Government Elections are completely won by the Ruling Parties in the 
various States and in cases where there are electoral petitions; the results are rarely 
overturned; no thanks to judicial manipulations. In fact, Local Government Elections are 
irregularly held as most States hold them any time they deem fit, without any consistency 
or adherence to the idea of organising elections at the expiration of tenures. Thus, the 
management of Local Government Elections by BSIEC throws up for interrogation critical 
issues bothering on the legal framework and structures of BSIEC. This is imperative 
because the examination will expose attendant problems with managing Local Government 
Elections by a State Electoral Commission.  
 
5.3 The Legal Framework and Structures of BSIEC     
 The Benue State Independent Electoral Commission just as earlier stated is saddled 
with the responsibilities of organising, undertaking and supervising all elections into 
elective offices of the Chairman, Vice-chairman and the Councillors of Local Government 
Councils in the States
7
. The structures of the Commission are also regulated by law. For 
instance, Section 3(a)(b) of the Third Schedule of the 1999 Constitution provides as 
follows:   
(3) A State Independent Electoral Commission shall comprise the following members.  
a. A chairman; and  
b. Not less than five but not more than seven persons.
8
 
The Constitution also requires that the Chairman and members of the SIEC are 
appointed by the Governor of the State and their appointment is subject to confirmation by 
a resolution of the House of Assembly of the State. In Benue State, the following members 
were appointed by the Governor for a five year term.   
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1. Audu Ikye  - Chairman 
2. Emmanuel Haaga - Member 
3. Lawrence Alaki  - Member 
4. Adzer Abya  - Member 
5. Donald Agida  - Member 
6.  David Salifu - Member 
7. Ada Mark  - Member 
8. John Chen  - Secretary.
10
 
At the expiration of the five year term, BSIEC was reconstituted in 2007 with the 
following members: 
1. Major General Gabriel Kpamber (rtd)  - Chairman 
2. Hon. Ben Omepa Ikwue   - Member 
3. Hon. Dr. Moses T. Utor   - Member  
4. Hon. Adzer Abya    - Member 
5. Hon. Jato Ianna     - Member 
6.  Hon. Anthony Agbo    - Member 
7. Hon. Augustine A. Ike    - Member 
8. Mr. John T. Chen    - Secretary.
11
 
These Commissioners served out their tenure and the Commission was again 
reconstituted in 2012 with the following: 
1. Prof. Philip Terdoo Ahire  - Chairman 
2. Boniface C. Hia    - Member 
3. Stephen Shaier Amenger  - Member 
4. Alexander Nyoonkyegh  - Member 
5. Ben Omepa Ikwue   - Member 
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6. Anthony Agbo    - Member 
7. Alexander Igwe    - Member 
8. Peter Hwembe    - Secretary.
12
 
The 1999 constitution has also stipulated the tenure of members of SIEC in Section 
(1) (a-c), 2. The Section provides as follows: 
(1) A person who is a member of any of the bodies established as aforementioned shall, 
subject to the provisions of this part, remain a member thereof: 
a. In the case of an ex-officio member, whilst he holds the office by virtue of 
which he is a member of the body. 
b. In the case of a person who is a member by virtue of his having previously held 
an office, for the duration of his life; and  
c. In the case of a person who is a member otherwise than by virtue of having 
previously held an office for a period of  five years from date of his 
appointment.
13
 
(2) A member of any of the bodies shall cease to be a member if any circumstance arises 
that, if he were not a member of the body, would cause him to be disqualified for 
appointment as such a member.  
On the qualification for membership of SIECs, Section 200 (1), (2) and (3) of the 
1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 provides as follows: 
(1) No person shall be qualified for appointment as a member of any of the bodies 
aforesaid if 
a. he is qualified, if he is disqualified for election as a member of a house of 
assembly.  
b. he has within the preceding ten years, been removed as a member of any 
bodies or as the holder of any office on the ground of misconduct. 
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(2) Any person employed in the Public Service of a State shall not be disqualified for 
appointment as Chairman or member of any such bodies provided that such a person 
has been duly appointed, he shall on his appointment be deemed to have resigned his 
former office as from date of appointment.
14
 
(3) No person shall be qualified for appointment to any of the bodies aforesaid, if having 
previously been appointed as a member otherwise than as an ex-officio member of 
that body, he has been re-appointed as member of the same body.
15
 
On the removal of members of the SIEC, Section 201 (1) and (2) of the 
Constitution provides as follows:  
(1) Any person holding any of the offices to which this Section applies shall only be 
removed from that office by the Governor of the State acting on an address supported 
by 
3
2  majority of the House of Assembly of the State praying that he be so 
removed for inability to discharge the functions of the office (whether arising from 
infirmity of mind or body or any other cause) of misconduct.
16
 
On independence of SIECs, section 202 of the 1999 Constitution provides as 
follows: 
In exercising its powers to make appointment or to exercise 
disciplinary control over persons, the State Civil Service 
Commission, the State Independent Electoral Commission 
and the State Judicial Commission shall not be subject to the 
direction and control of any authority or person.
17
 
On quorum and decisions of SIECs,Section 203 (1), (2), (3) and (4) of the 1999 
Constitution provides as follows:  
1. The quorum of a meeting of any of the bodies established by Section 197 of the 
Constitution shall not be less than one-third of the total number of members of that 
body at the date of the meeting.18 
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2. A member of such a body shall be entitled to one vote and a decision of the meeting 
may be taken and any act or thing may be done in the name of that body a majority 
of the members present at a meeting.
19
 
3. Whenever such bodies are assembled for a meeting, the chairman or other person 
presiding shall, in all matters in which a decision is taken by vote (by whatever name 
such voter may be called) having a casting as well as a deliberate vote.
 20
 
4. Subject to its rules or procedures, any such body may act or take decision 
notwithstanding any vacancy in its membership or the absence of any member.
21
 
On the finance, Part 2 of the BSIEC Law 2000 states as follows: 
The funds of the Commission shall consist of: 
a. Grants made to it by the Federal, State of Local Government. 
b. Moneys derived from the operations of the Commission and  
c. Such other moneys as may accrue to the Commission from any other lawful source.
22
 
The Benue State Independent Electoral Commission Law of 2000 (as amended) is 
couched based on the extant provisions of the 1999 Constitution. However, it is pertinent 
to make a number of observations on the legal framework of SIEC which BSIEC derives 
authority from. Firstly, the Constitution confers the power to appoint members of the 
Commission on the Governor. This authority to appoint vested on the Governor who is the 
leader of a political party in government; an interested party in Local Government 
Elections undermines the impartiality of the Commission. This point is better appreciated 
if viewed against the popular adage “he who pays the piper dictates its tune”. This 
provision makes BSIEC vulnerable to manipulations. There is no gain saying the fact that 
the Governor will only appoint members who have loyalty to him. Therefore, members of 
the Commission are bound to do the biddings of the Governor. This again partly explains 
why since the return to party politics in 1999, the opposition political parties in all the 
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States of the Federation have hardly won Local Government Elections organizedby SIEC 
in the country. 
Secondly, State Independent Electoral Commissions including BSIEC are not on 
the first line charge. What this means in effect is that the Commission depends on the State 
Executive for funding. This reality erodes the autonomy of the Commission and creates 
situations whereby the Commission is compromised on several fronts. 
Thirdly, there is no provision barring card carrying members of political parties 
from being appointed as members of the Commission. To this extent, the impartiality of 
the members of the Commission is grossly undermined. 
Lastly, the accounts of BSIEC are subjected to audit by the Auditor- General of the 
State, an official of the State government. This development also undermines the 
autonomy of the Commission. 
In sum therefore, though the 1999 Constitution calls Electoral Commissions in the 
States, “State Independent Electoral Commission”, but the reality is that they are not truly 
independent and this has adverse implications for the conduct of free, fair and transparent 
Local Government Elections
23
.  BSIEC by design is an appendage of the State 
Government. Therefore, the transparency of the electoral process depends in large 
measures on the integrity and disposition of the State Government.             
 
5.4  Local Government Elections in Benue State  
The point had already been made that State Independent Electoral Commissions are 
offspring of the 1999 Constitution. However, the point needed be reiterated that the 
transition programme to democratic rule in 1999 mandated the Independent National 
Electoral Commission (INEC) to conduct General Elections in the country including that 
of Local Government Councils. This is understandable because the military was anxious to 
hand over power to a democratic regime with full democratic structures. Thus, INEC 
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conducted the 1999 Local Government Polls in the country and the following results were 
declared in Benue State. 
Table 3: Results of Local Government Elections, 1999 
S/No. Name Political Party Local Government 
1.  Michael U. Inalegwu APP Agatu 
2.  Godwin A. Udo PDP Apa 
3.  Bunde Denen APP Buruku 
4.  Lydia I. Nyor PDP Gboko 
5.  Torbunde Charles APP Guma 
6.  Nathaniel Alaaga APP Gwer-East 
7.  John Tion APP Gwer-West 
8.  Akiga M.I. Sai PDP Katsina-Ala 
9.  Emmanuel I. Asue PDP Konshisha 
10.  Dzeka Dennis PDP Kwande 
11.  Sylvester Waakaa PDP Logo 
12.  Michael Shaaho PDP Makurdi 
13.  Emmanuel Arubi PDP Obi 
14.  Onoja R. Daniel APP Ogbadibo 
15.  Godwin I. Owulo PDP Oju 
16.  Ezekiel A. Adaji PDP Ohimini 
17.  Patrick Abbah  PDP Okpokwu 
18.  Godwin O. Oduma PDP Otukpo 
19.  Baver Dzeremo PDP Tarka 
20.  Veronica Gajir APP Ushongo 
21.  Ajoh Emmanuel APP Vandeikya 
22.  James Tyokosu PDP Ukum 
23.  Otse Otokpa APP Ado 
Source: Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) Benue State, 1999.  
 
The above results demonstrate the strength of the two dominant political parties in 
the State. Although the elections were not free from malpractices, the two dominant 
political parties rigged the elections where they enjoyed relative advantage over the other 
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political party. Field investigations also revealed that the elections were conducted under a 
peaceful atmosphere as there were minimal cases of political skirmishes.
24
 
Following the expiration of the three year term of the elected chairmen and 
councillors, the Benue State Independent Electoral Commission was saddled with the 
responsibility of conducting Local Government Elections in 2004. The elections were the 
first to be conducted by BSIEC in the State. The preparations for the elections were 
characterised by inconsistencies in terms of the date of elections, list of eligible candidates, 
problems with ad-hoc staff and general complains about funding. There were also 
allegations bothering on political interference by influential politicians in the activities of 
the Commission. The elections were held amid allegations of fraud by the Opposition 
Political Parties and BSIEC declared the following results.  
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Table 4: Results of Local Government Elections, 2004 
PARTY AND SCORE NAME OF CANDIDATE  S/NO LGA 
REMARK UNPP PDP ANPP AD    
    NIL FELIX ATTAH 1 ADO 
   NIL  DAVID OCHAI 2  
PDP-ELECTED  59,369   EKPE D. OGBU 3  
 NIL    - 4  
     - 1 AGATU 
     - 2  
PDP-ELECTED  20,834   SULE DANJUMA A. 3  
 1,148    INALEGWU MIKE 4  
      1 APA 
   3,811  SAMUEL ADANU 2  
PDP-ELECTED  12,727   OCHOLI SAMSON 3  
 5,181    PATRICK E. IDOMA 4  
      1 BURUKU 
   NIL  TANGER TERESE 2  
PDP-ELECTED  82,001   TARTULE TIJAH 3  
 NIL    - 4  
     - 1 GBOKO 
   8,441  IEEVE T. CHABO 2  
PDP-ELECTED  93,771   ALVA TERESE 3  
 693    JAMES M. KACHINA 4  
     - 1 GUMA 
   2,159  EDWARD IORKYAA 2  
PDP-ELECTED  61,167   JOHN ENGER 3  
 2,348    IJOH FELIX 4  
     - 1 GWER- EAST  
   8,388  DZER D.D. 2  
PDP-ELECTED  26,947   ANGBANDE PHILIP 3  
 6,409    NYAM FELIX 4  
    NIL - 1 GWER- WEST 
   NIL  - 2  
PDP-ELECTED  30,227   ZAM TITUS 3  
 6,830    NICHOLAS MBAJWA 4  
      1 KATSINA-ALA 
   2,816  ABUR J. TERFA 2  
PDP-ELECTED  79,507   TSENONGU ABANCHA 3  
 6,409    AHULA J. GAFFA 4  
    11,370 CLEMENT C. LABAR 1 KONSHISHA 
   NIL   2  
  18,510   SHANGBUM TYOAKURA 3  
UNPP-
ELECTED 
36,163    AHILE JOSEPH 4  
     - 1 KWANDE 
     - 2  
     - 3  
     1 4  
    4,510 YINA T. RICHARD  1 LOGO 
   6,162  NENGER E.D. TERNA  2  
PDP-ELECTED  48,464   KONDOUN MICHAEL 3  
 2,909    APEV AONDOVER 4  
    566 EMMANUEL AKYA 1 MAKURDI 
   7,902  AGBUM AVINE A. 2  
PDP-ELECTED  42,300   BARR. PIUS CHAGU 3  
 3,608    JOHN A. AKOMBO 4  
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PARTY AND SCORE NAME OF CANDIDATE  S/NO LGA 
LP UNPP PDP ANPP AD    
    NIL - 1 OBI 
   NIL  - 2  
PDP-ELECTED  26,479   REV. PINOT OGBAJI 3  
 47    ODE AGEH JOHN 4  
    NIL - 1 OGBADIBO 
   NIL  - 2  
PDP-ELECTED  38,648   FABIAN AGADA 3  
 1,697    OKO L. AGADA 4  
    NIL - 1 OHIMINI 
   NIL  - 2  
PDP-ELECTED  10,478   EZEKIEL ADAJI 3  
 6,578    ANTHONY OKOH 4  
    NIL - 1 OJU 
   NIL  - 2  
PDP-ELECTED  53,144   ACHA D. OTIYONGO 3  
 13,802    PETER O. ADIKPE 4  
    NIL - 1 OKPOKWU 
   NIL  - 2  
PDP-ELECTED  36,306   MORO A. PATRICK 3  
 3,186    CHRISTIAN EGBE 4  
    NIL - 1 OTUKPO 
   NIL  - 2  
PDP-ELECTED  19,910   OBLA GODWIN 3  
 10,287    ALEXANDER INEKE 4  
    NIL - 1 TARKAA 
   NIL  - 2  
PDP-ELECTED  28,231   BAVER DZEEMO 3  
 NIL    - 4  
    NIL  1 UKUM  
   10,549  VEREM S. IKUAN 2  
PDP-ELECTED  94,060   TERNGU IORKYAA 3  
 NIL     4  
    NIL - 1 USHONGO 
   NIL  - 2  
PDP-ELECTED  33,530   ENGR. MTU ISAAC 3  
 NIL    - 4  
    NIL - 1 VANDEIKYAA 
   3,619  DR. AGBEDE G.E. PETER  2  
PDP-ELECTED  49,077   STEPHEN MANTA 3  
 2,963    TIMOTHY AONDOAKAA 4  
Source: Benue State Independent Electoral Commission, 2004 
The result of the elections indicates that the PDP won in all the Local Governments 
in the State except Konshisha where the UNPP was declared winner as shown in table 4, 
and Appendix A. Field investigations suggest that UNPP was declared winner to embarrass 
the former National Chairman of PDP, Chief Barnabas Gemade who had irreconcilable 
differences with the then Governor, George Akume. The PDP candidate, Mr. Shangbum 
was alleged to be an ally of Gemade and therefore everything was done to make sure that 
he was not returned. The results were therefore rigged by PDP chieftains in favour of 
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Ahire Joseph of UNPP – a political party that had little followership in the Local 
Government.
25
 
Respondents across the studied Local Governments of Tarka
26
, Kwande
27
, 
Otukpo
28
, and Agatu
30
 have all averred that the elections were hijacked by party thugs and 
the results of the elections were written in the houses of PDP party chieftains. Moreso, 
judging from the results of the elections as declared by BSIEC, it is difficult to accept that 
a diverse and politically consciousState like Benue would vote in unison for one political 
party in a free and fair contest. Mr. James Abata, a Polling Clerk in Wannune during the 
2004 Local Government Elections confessed thus:       
We had no choice but to do what the party chieftains wanted. 
The police which were supposed to provide security for us 
were bought over…so we had no choice but to collect our 
own share and do what they wanted.
31 
 
These revelations suggested that the elections were marred by irregularities. It is 
surprising that the APP which won in seven Local Governments in 1999 would lose in all 
the seven Local Governments barely one year after leaving office in 2003. Election 
tribunals were set up by the Judiciary and petitioners approached the courts for redress but 
none of the results were out turned. Rather, the courts affirmed that the results of the 
elections were a reflection of the wishes of the people. In the particular case of Kwande 
Local Government, the elections were stopped midway when it was obvious that the APP 
was set to win the elections even in the face of electoral malpractices
32
. This development 
met stifle resistance from the people and sparked off political violence on a magnitude 
unheard of since the return to party politics in 1999. In sum, the 2004 Local Government 
Elections organised by BSIEC fell short of popular standards as the entire electoral process 
was characterized by irregularities. 
In December 2007, BSIEC was again saddled with the responsibility of conducting 
elections into Local Governments. Again the preparations for the elections were marred by 
shortage of funds. This lack of funds did not allow room for adequate preparations. Ad hoc 
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staff were not well trained and many had party affiliations. In spite of these hurdles, 
BSIEC conducted the elections on the 29
th
 of December, 2007. The following results were 
declared. 
 
Table 5: Results of Local Government Elections, 2007 
PARTY AND SCORE NAME OF CANDIDATE  S/NO LGA 
REMARK PDP ANPP AC    
    ADIE ONUH 1 ADO 
PDP-ELECTED 52,908   JAMES ABOH EDEH 2  
  3,768  ISRAEL ADANU GODWIN 1 AGATU 
PDP-ELECTED 49,678   EGHIARUWA O. 
ONGBATABO 
2  
    JOHN INALEGWU 3  
    REUBEN O. DAVID 1 APA 
PDP-ELECTED 32,174   CORNELIUS P. ODEJE 2  
    HON. AGBA ABU 3  
    GBENDA AZATEGHTEGH 1 BURUKU 
PDP-ELECTED    ALFRED AHILE AKIGHIR 2  
    NOMIGO LOUIS 1 GBOKO 
PDP-ELECTED    SIMON ABUA YAJIR 2  
  1,083  AGABI CLETUS 1 GUMA 
    ORKAR MATTHEW 2  
    NYIYONGO JOSEPH 3  
    TORPAR K. TITUS 4  
    CHOMBU YANMOM 5  
PDP-ELECTED 74,786   MOM SABASTINE A. 6  
    RAYMOND BEKE 1 GWER- EAST 
PDP-ELECTED 48,371   SIMON IWAR 2  
  5,371  JOSEPH Y. AGAH 3  
  1,293  MTSENGA AVANDE D. 1 GWER- WEST 
PDP-ELECTED 66,087   SAMUEL T. ABAJI 2  
    SABASTINE ATOR 3  
    AONDOAKURA TOR 1 KATSINA-ALA 
  734  KULUGH ATOO ALOYSIUS 2  
PDP-ELECTED 99,669   AVAAN AUGUSTINE O. 3  
  3,301  UGBA TERYILA 1 KONSHISHA 
    TERUNGWA IORYISA 2  
PDP-ELECTED 83,414   TARNONGO SAAWUAN 3  
  11,038  HON. BOKO JOSEPH 1 KWANDE 
    TAR-TERAOR 2  
PDP-ELECTED 99,295   HON. AKPUTU TERLUMUN 3  
    BENJAMIN 1 LOGO 
PDP-ELECTED 54,552   REV. JOSEPH ADULE 2  
  7,699  KPAMOR J.T. ORKAR 1 MAKURDI 
    AKPEN AGEH EDWARD 2  
PDP-ELECTED 68,352   AKAAZA A. JOSEPH 3  
  321  ODEH IKO D. 1 OBI 
PDP-ELECTED 40,986   ODEH AGEH JOHN 2  
    JACKSON OMENKA 3  
    SAMUEL OKORIE 1 OGBADIBO 
   2,270 DR. PATRICK E. AGADA 2  
  6,020  HON. DANIEL ROBERT 3  
PDP-ELECTED 19,357   HON. CLEMENT AGADA 4  
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REMARK PDP ANPP AC NAME OF CANDIDATE  S/NO LGA 
   1,074 MUSA O. ALECHENU 1 OHIMINI 
  447  SADIQ SULE 2  
    JOHN AKOR 3  
    EMMANUEL OKOH 4  
PDP-ELECTED 30,133   LINUS AMEH 5  
  16,852  OGBU ONAH 1 OJU 
PDP-ELECTED 74,923   OCHELLE P.G.E 2  
    GIDEON ODE 3  
PDP-ELECTED 28,257   BARR. JACOB OGWUCHE 1 OKPOKWU 
    MRS. ADA ADOBA 2  
   4,663 BONIFACE ONU U. 3  
  3,360  EMMANUEL ABAKPA 4  
    COL. EGBE ADULUGBA 5  
   8,100 MIKE OKOKO 1 OTUKPO 
PDP-ELECTED 43,204   DR. I.M. ONUH 2  
    JOHN ALOGA 3  
    EDWARD E. ANJA 1 TARKAR 
PDP-ELECTED 24,465   DAJO W. AKOOM AKUME 2  
    SELUMUN ANJA 3  
PDP-ELECTED 105,628   DAVID SEAV 1 UKUM 
    AMAICHIGH TER I. 2  
    DR. ROBERT KUGBER 1 USHONGO 
PDP-ELECTED 76,874   ORYA IORDYE 2  
    PETER AKURA 3  
PDP-ELECTED 68,724   B.M. DOWGO 1 VANDEIKYAA 
    BERNARD K. TONDO 2  
  3,023  AGEMA CHIA 3  
Source: Benue State Independent Electoral Commission, 2007 
Table 5 above shows that the PDP won the elections in all the 23 local government 
areas( see also Appendix B ). However field investigations revealed that the elections like 
the other previous BSIEC elections were characterised by ballot stuffing, snatching, 
rigging, non- supply of materials in some wards and outright writing of results without 
reference to votes cast, etc. Again, the 2007 Local Government Elections fell short of 
popular expectations. In fact, the elections witnessed low voter turnout which is an 
indication of voter apathy. This apathy was stimulated by the lack of confidence in BSIEC 
by the Benue elections. 
Elections were due again in 2010 but for inexplicable reasons, they were not 
conducted; Local Governments were managed by Care-taker Committees. However, Local 
Government Elections were organised by BSIEC in 2012. The elections held high hopes 
given that the Chairman of BSIEC in 2012, Prof. Philip Ahire raised the expectations of 
the people as he promised to conduct free and transparent Local Government Elections. 
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Given his pedigree as an academic and technocrat of immense reputation, and having 
served as Secretary of the Uwais'Committee, his appointment and pronouncements excited 
the political class and the electorates. But these expectations were dashed as the outcome 
of the elections replicated the electoral ills of the old order. 
The elections were characterized by ballot stuffing, non-supply of electoral 
materials to opposition strongholds, outright writing of results without recourse to votes 
cast. James Akpem
33
, EstherAdoom
34
,Inalegwu Ameh
35
 and Agbo Ephraim
36
 all averred 
that they did not even see the electoral materials though they went to the polling unit as 
early as 8am and remained there till 3pm. For Terdoo Agan
37
 and Gboko Augustine
38
, “the 
election materials were supplied to their polling units but without result sheets. In spite of 
these challenges, BSIEC announced the following results: 
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Table 6: Results of Local Government Elections, 2012 
PARTY AND SCORE NAME OF CANDIDATE  S/NO LGA 
REMARK PDP LP CPC ACPN ACN    
     2,261 AZEGWU ABADU 1 
ADO 
PDP-ELECTED 59,600     ALEX OGABA 2 
     8,156 ADEBO SUNDAY 1 
AGATU 
PDP-ELECTED 23,112     DUTSE STEPHEN 2 
     4,358 AKPOKO ULOKO 1 
APA 
PDP-ELECTED 28,846     MAXWELL O. OYI 2 
     8,625 GODWIN IORSUE 1 
BURUKU 
PDP-ELECTED 86,167     JONATHAN V. ABYA 2 
     14,525 FAGA KWAGHGBA 1 
GBOKO 
PDP-ELECTED 823,269     HON. NAHAN ZENDA 2 
     5,987 USUE STEPHEN 1 
GUMA 
PDP-ELECTED 70,151     USA ADI E. TERNA 2 
     9,290 AERNYI KYAN 1 
GWER- EAST  
PDP-ELECTED 26,608     MAOR DAVID 2 
     6,278 JERRY ASHWE 1 
GWER- WEST 
PDP-ELECTED 98,782     MRS EUNICE MBAJWA 2 
     3,722 MARTINS UJO 1 
KATSINA-ALA 
      MARTINS AGIR 2 
     2,794 HON. BARNABAS A. 1 
KONSHISHA 
PDP-ELECTED 64,811     HON. MOSES SHIRSHA 2 
     9,648 MRS HELEN IKPAMBESE 1 
KWANDE 
   6,700   AHURA GIRGI 2 
  19    NEOL C. USOH 3 
PDP-ELECTED 111,839     HON BEM TSEEN 4 
      SAMUEL TERWASE 1 
LOGO 
PDP-ELECTED 78,377     KESTER KYENGE 2 
     10,100 IORKYAA YAKUBU 1 
MAKURDI 
PDP-ELECTED 37,194     DONKO G. MSUEGA 2 
     801 PETER O. IDOKO 1 
OBI 
PDP-ELECTED 31,754     ABI ODE MICHAEL 2 
     5,227 DAN ONJE 1 
OGBADIBO 
PDP-ELECTED 22,452     SUNDAY ADA OJO 2 
      STEPHEN O. IDOTA 1 
OHIMINI 
PDP-ELECTED 11,853     ECHE MARK SUNDAY 2 
     17,656 DANIEL O. ULEGEDE 1 
OJU 
PDP-ELECTED 38,142     BRIGHT I. OGAJI 2 
     3,993 MATTHIAS A. OMIKPA 1 
OKPOKWU 
PDP-ELECTED 38,038     JULIANA OBETTA 2 
     8,320 DICKSON AKOR 1 
OTUKPO 
PDP-ELECTED 32,402     MABA ONUH 2 
     7,590 PHEOBE N. DAJOH 1 
TARKAA 
PDP-ELECTED 26,706     PETER KWAGHFAN 2 
0     2,379 ATOZA TERUNGWA 1 
UKUM 
PDP-ELECTED 101,597     NGUHER T. LEVI 2 
     7,201 ATII CYROUS 1 
USHONGO 
PDP-ELECTED 47,100     ODUEN TERVER 2 
    10  MICHAEL A. ABAKU 1 
VANDEIKYAA       12,296 EMMANUEL O. AKULA 2 
PDP-ELECTED 46,820     BENEDICT KUME 3 
Source: Benue State Independent Electoral Commission, 2012 
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Table 6 above shows that the PDP won the elections in all the 23 Local 
Government Areas( see also Appendix C ). It is indeed surprising that in a State where the 
party in opposition, the ACN won a Senatorial Seat, 3 House of Representative Seats and 
10 House of Assembly Seats in a federal organised elections in 2011 would not win a 
single Chairmanship Seat in the State one year after. It is also surprising that the ACN 
which won elections consistently during the General Elections in Buruku, Gboko and 
Tarka would not win a single Chairmanship seat in 2012 in a BSIEC organised election. It 
suffices to add that in all SIEC organised Local Government Elections in Nigeria, the 
opposition political parties hardly win. It is always a clean sweep for the party in 
government at the State level. This development elicits the interrogation of critical issues 
bothering on the capacity of BSIEC to organise free and transparent Local Government 
Elections. 
 
5.5 Problems with the Management of Local Government Elections by BSIEC 
 
The conduct of Local Government Elections by the Benue State Independent 
Electoral Commission (BSIEC) since its establishment in 2000 has been shrouded in 
controversy. The controversies that arose revolved round the lack of transparency and 
electoral fraud. Often times, the controversies erupted into political violence with 
devastating consequences for the State.This development elicited severe criticisms from 
the general public
39
. 
Conversely, respondents interviewed are of the opinion that BSIEC should be 
scrapped on account of its lack of capacity to conduct free and credible Local Government 
Elections. It is, therefore, pertinent to isolate and analyse specific challenges that 
undermined the credibility of elections at the Local Government level especially those 
conducted by BSIEC. 
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5.5.1 The Lack of Functional Autonomy  
The Benue State Independent Electoral Commission (BSIEC) like other State 
Independent Electoral Commissions, though recognised by the 1999 Constitution is a 
creation of the State Government. It is the Governor that appoints members of the 
Commission and also funds the Commission. The State House of Assembly also performed 
oversight functions over the Commission. The Commission therefore lacked functional 
Independence and was not even on the first line charge. The implication of this 
development for the conduct of free, fair and transparent elections meant that the 
credibility of the electoral process was tied to the integrity of the Governor and the 
Executive Council. In a situation where the Governor was not disposed to free and fair 
elections, the elections were grossly fraudulent. Indeed, the State Government blew the 
whistle before elections were conducted. 
 
5.5.2 Funding Problems 
Funding is very central in the preparations for elections. This has become an 
impediment to the conduct of Local Government Elections in the State as funds were 
released few months to elections and in fragments. For instance, in 2007, N407,882,780.00 
was released to the Commission in bits and the total amount released fell short of the 
N500, 000,000 budgeted for the elections. Again, in 2012, N1,030,098,316.00 was 
approved for the Commission for the conduct of the 2012 Elections. However, the actual 
releases were less than the budgetary allocation. BSIEC relied on the State Government for 
funds to conduct Local Government Elections but elections are capital-intensive and 
therefore systematic planning over a long period of time is required. The funding challenge 
was serious because the Commission was not on first line charge and relied on the State 
Government for funds. A corollary implication of relying on the State Government for 
funds provided the government the opportunity to influence the decisions of the 
Commission. This has been the experience since the formation of BSIEC. Another 
129 
 
implication of underfunding or delayed funding was that it undermined adequate 
preparations for elections. 
 
5.5.3 Institutional and Capacity Building Problem 
 Benue State Independent Electoral Commission lacks institutional and capacity 
building programme from its inception. From 2000 to 2007, members and staff of the 
Commission did not receive training in electoral duties from local or international 
organisations. This had adverse effects on the performance of members and staff in the 
conduct of elections. The haphazard training of ad-hoc staff only few days to elections had 
negative effects on the conduct of Local Government Elections. In fact, the appointment of 
adhoc staff was influenced by both government and party officials. In most cases, the 
actual trainees were not the ones brought in to oversee the election. Rather, Ruling Party 
agents who were not trained were often brought in to oversee the election. This was a 
common feature during the 2004 Local Government Elections. 
 
5.5.4 The Role of Security Agents     
 The importance of security of the electoral process cannot be overemphasised. The 
socio-political environment of Benue State was bedevilled with numerous social vices 
which politicians manipulated to perpetuate electoral fraud. The success or failure of any 
election depends on stakeholders performing their duties (INEC, Political Parties, Election 
Observers, Media and Security Agencies) Security agents are therefore charged with the 
responsibility of checking security threats that constitute stumbling blocks to smooth 
electoral processes. However, the experience in 1999, 2004, 2007 and 2012 Local 
Government Elections in the State showed that these security agents connived with 
politicians to perpetuate electoral fraud. 
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5.5.5 The Role of Political Parties          
 The centrality of political parties in facilitating a smooth electoral process is one 
that cannot be wished away. It is the political parties that appoint agents to observe the 
electoral process, therefore their role in making or undermining the electoral process is one 
that needs emphasis. The desperation to win at all cost drove these political parties to 
employ all sorts of strategies to manipulate the electoral process. Some of these strategies 
included false propaganda, ballot snatching, stuffing, thuggery, buying of votes, etc. It is 
the totality of these unholy activities that ignited electoral and political violence. 
 
5.5.6 The Relationship between INEC and SIECs     
 There are constitutional provisions which establish relationship between INEC and 
SIECs. The two major areas are: 
a. Registration of Voters: INEC is charged with the responsibility of voter registration. 
The Voter Register is then passed to SIECs for the purpose of Local Government 
Election. 
b. INEC is also charged with the delimitation of constituencies. Local Government 
Elections are conducted within constituencies of which the wards are a strategic 
component. This constitutional provision notwithstanding, on many occasions 
conflict of interest emerges between the two bodies. For instance, the non-conduct of 
Local Government Elections in Benue State in 2002 when elections were due was 
blamed by BSIEC on the non-release of voters register by INEC. 
On the whole, the interplay of these challenges worked together to undermine the electoral 
process. Thus, flawed Local Government Elections were caused by a plethora of daunting 
challenges most of which were beyond the control of BSIEC. 
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5.6 The Nigerian Police and the Security of Local Government Elections in Benue 
State 
 
 The protection of human life, voters, electoral materials and officials and the 
observation of lawful and orderly electoral processes are necessary for credible, free and 
fair elections. Therefore, it is important to isolate and analyse the specific role the Nigerian 
Police played in the conduct of Local Government Elections in Benue State. This is 
important because without adequate security, there cannot be credible, free and fair 
elections. BSIEC in 2004, 2007 and 2012 solicited the support of the Nigerian Police to 
help secure electoral materials and also provide security for the entire electoral process. 
But the Police required funds for logistics and allowances for officers deployed for election 
purposes. Security votes were provided by BSIEC to the Police. However, BSIEC had no 
control over the Police in terms of control of officers and deployment. It was the 
Commissioner of Police that deployed and controlled officers on election duty. Field 
investigations revealed that political parties budgeted monies for security which was given 
to the Police though this was done unofficially. These security votes by political parties 
and influential party men were given to Police Officers deployed for election purposes. 
Consequently, Police Officers deployed for election duties compromised their 
original roles and became security agents of their paymasters. Thus, rather than ensure the 
security of the ballot box and the electoral process, the Police largely became a tool for 
election rigging and manipulation. For example, during the 2007 Local Government 
Elections in Gboko Local Government, some police officers were seen providing security 
at the house of a party chieftain, Mr.AnengeUkpi, where election results were alleged to be 
doctored. Similarly, Mr.MathaisByuan a staunch member of the PDP and a close ally of 
Governor Gabriel Suswam was given police protection while he toured Konshisha Local 
Government intimidating and inducing voters financially on the day of elections. In fact, 
there were similar reports across the Local Governments.  The flaws that characterised the 
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2004, 2007 and 2012 Local Government Elections were largely exacerbated by the 
comprising attitude of the Police. 
 Another way the Police aided politicians to perpetuate electoral fraud as 
exemplified during the 2004, 2007 and 2012 Local Government Elections was by 
providing cover to politicians in areas that were considered “Victory Deciding Areas”. 
This strategy allowed party chieftains in collaboration with their political thugs to hijack 
and manipulate the process to their advantage. In fact, this strategy also placed electoral 
officers at risk and encouraged compromises. 
 More importantly, the Police wereused by influential politicians to intimidate 
voters, scare them away from polling centres and dissuade them from monitoring votes. It 
is important to reiterate here that BSIEC was handicap in curbing this problem as the 
Commission could only report to the Commissioner of police. During the 2012 Local 
Government Elections, the general complain about the Police was that, the Police provided 
cover for influential members of the Ruling Party to manipulate election results. 
 Nevertheless, the Nigerian police also played commendable roles in mitigating 
electoral violence. However, corrupt practices among officers of the force damaged the 
public image of the Police. The point, therefore is that the police helped in undermining the 
credibility of elections conducted by BSIEC. This fact also reinforces the point made 
earlier that the credibility of the electoral process depends largely on security agents. But 
the control of these security agents was outside the control of BSIEC. What this means in 
effect is that, beyond preparations made by the Commission, the success of elections 
depended on other stakeholders like security agents and the political parties. 
 
5.7 Conclusion     
 The analyses in this chapter have clearly shown that credible elections can only be 
achieved when BSIEC is freed from the control of the State government. The autonomy of 
BSIEC should be ensured through a separate budgetary allocation. This is to avoid a 
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situation whereby officials of the Commission rely on party officials and election 
candidates for financial assistance during elections. Also, the appointment of BSIEC 
Chairperson and Commissioners should not be handled by the State government. It should 
be done through an independent body established by law. Members of this body should be 
drawn from Retired Civil Servants and Civil Societal Organisations and before their 
appointment they should be properly screened with regards to their conduct, experience 
and qualifications. The training of BSIEC officials should be properly planned. It should 
be on both short term and long term basis, and during elections, only those properly trained 
should be allowed to handle elections. This can however be feasible only with a truly 
Independent Electoral Commission whose members are not the appointees of the Ruling 
Party or the State government. Until proper adequate measures are adopted, local 
Government Elections will continue to be a mirage. BSIEC should be made up of men of 
integrity and high moral standing. Where these standards are compromised, those found 
culpable should be removed from office and persecuted. Funding and autonomy for the 
Electoral Commission are critical issues which should be addressed with the seriousness 
they deserve andOrganizationslike BSIEC should not be tied to the apron-string of the 
Executive arm of government. It must be liberated from its strangle-hold through better 
funding and institutional autonomy to enable it run its affairs effectively and efficiently. 
  
134 
 
Endnotes 
1. Benue State Independent Electoral Commission Law 2000, Benue State of Nigeria 
Gazette, No. 43, Makurdi, 26
th
 October, 2000. 
 
2. The 1999 Constitution, Federal Republic of Nigeria, Abuja. 
 
3. Benue State Independent Electoral Commission Law... 
 
4. B. Clive, “Electoral Laws, Electoral Behaviour and Electoral Outcomes, Journal of 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 1997, P. 57. 
 
5. The 1999 Constitution... 
 
6. M. Amaza, “Should we Scrap SIECs?” http://Nigerianstalk.org. 2013/02/21. 
 
7. Benue State Independent Electoral Commission Law... 
8. The 1999 Constitution... 
9. The 1999 Constitution... 
10. Benue State Independent Electoral Commission, Newsletter, November 2000. 
 
11. Benue State Independent Electoral Commission... June 2007. 
12. Benue State Independent Electoral Commission... 2012. 
13. The 1999 Constitution... 
14. The 1999 Constitution... 
15. The 1999 Constitution... 
16. The 1999 Constitution... 
17. The 1999 Constitution... 
18. The 1999 Constitution... 
19. The 1999 Constitution... 
20. The 1999 Constitution... 
21. The 1999 Constitution... 
22. Benue State Independent Electoral Commission... 2000. 
23. O.U. Eme, “2007-2008 Local Government Elections in Nigeria: History, 
Controversies and Challenges Ahead” in Onyeshi, T.(ed.) Key Issues in Local 
Government and Development: A Nigerian Perspective, Enugu: Praise House 
Publishers, 2011. P.4. 
135 
 
24. Oral Interview, Aba Nathaniel, 46yrs, Otukpo, 20/2/2013. Oral Interview, Ngusha 
Akor, 48yrs, Gboko, 28/4/2013. 
 
25. Oral Interview, Barnabas Kyegh, 54yrs, Konshisha, 16/2/2013. 
26. Oral Interview, Mker Mathias, 45yrs, Wannune, 26/4/2013. 
27. Oral Interview, Maagbe Aondona, 43yrs, Adikpo, 5/5/2013. 
28. Oral Interview, Nyiuma Ager, 40yrs, Aliade, 17/3/2013. 
29. Oral Interview, Onoja Oche, 38yrs, Otukpo, 20/2/2013. 
30. Oral Interview, Ameh Oguchei, 58yrs, Agatu, 21/3/2013. 
31. Oral Interview, James Abata, 40yrs, Wannune, 26/4/2013. 
32. Oral Interview, Teghtegh Adzer, 44yrs, Adikpo, 5/5/2013. 
33. Oral Interview, James Akpen, 38yrs, Konshisha, 17/2/2013. 
34. Oral Interview, Esther Adoom, 40yrs, Gboko, 5/4/2013. 
35. Oral Interview, Inalegwu Ameh, 55yrs, Otukpo, 20/2/2013. 
36. Oral Interview, Ephraim Agatu, 42yrs, Agatu, 5/5/2013. 
37. Oral Interview, Terdoo Agan, 34yrs, Wannune, 26/4/2013. 
38. Oral Interview, Gboko Augustine, 50yrs, Gboko, 5/4/2013. 
39. J.O. Aluko, “Local Government Elections and the Challenges of Democratic 
Governance in Nigeria” File//C:/Users/Documents/Local govtelections.html. 
26/4/2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
136 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
INCIDENTS OF ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN SELECTED LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS IN BENUE STATE 
 
6.1 Introduction   
This chapter examines specific incidents that ignited violent protests as a 
consequence of Local Government Elections. Local governments that have been most 
volatile and experienced electoral and political violence on a frightening scale have been 
selected and examined. The Local Governments include; Tarka, Kwande, Otukpo and 
Agatu. This is not to suggest that violent acts occurred only in the four Local Governments 
but to inseminate that the scale of violence in the examined local governments were 
scaring and exposed the dangers of ill-managed elections. The irregularities stated in the 
four local governments applied in equal measure in all the Local Governments in Benue 
State where Local Government Elections were conducted. However, the slide to violence 
depended in large measure on the level of political consciousness and level of the 
manipulation.  
 
6.2 The Character of Electoral Politics and Electoral Violence in the Benue 
Environment Before 1999 
 
Electoral violence in Benue State has a chequered history that need be recounted. 
This is pertinent because the Benue environment, even before the creation of the State was 
an area susceptible to political violence. Therefore, it is imperative to analyse overtime the 
people’s reaction to political developments they found repressive and intolerable. This will 
assist in measuring the level of political consciousness as well as the people’s attitude to 
undemocratic tenets. Indeed, incidences of electoral violence in Benue State are not just 
ignited by Local Government Elections but by political actions that are considered 
unpopularly. 
Thus, the history of political violence of which electoral violence is an integral part 
in the Benue area could conveniently be traced to the 1959 Federal Elections. The elections 
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presented high stakes as the political parties and their candidates saw the contest as a “do” 
or “die” affair. The NPC and the UMBC were the two prominent political parties in the 
Benue area and therefore the main actors in the theatre of political violence. The first phase 
of violence began in 1960 in Yandev near Gboko. The clan head of Yandev, Mr. Ako, a 
strong NPC supporter was accused of making uncomplimentary remarks against Tarka, the 
leader of the popular UMBC while addressing market men and women
1
. Consequently, he 
was shouted down by the UMBC supporters.  The clan head returned on the next market 
day accompanied by some NA policemen and ordered the closure of the market. However, 
the policemen were overpowered and driven out by the people.
2
In response to the crisis, 
the Tor Tiv escorted by some police men went to Yandev to again enforce the order of the 
NA to close the market. The Tor Tiv’s action was also resisted.  The crisis got to a head on 
25
th
 August, 1960 when a complete riot squad of Tiv NA police, armed with batons and 
shields, were sent to enforce the order closing the market. Again, the police were 
overpowered by an angry mob armed with poisoned bows and arrows; three policemen 
were reportedly wounded
3
. This development marked the beginning of violent resistance in 
the Benue area. 
Once the spark was provided, it was a matter of time for deep seated grievances to 
fuel series of violent conflagrations. The second incident of violence occurred during the 
NPC Convention at Wukari. A convoy of NPC supporters had left Gboko for Wukari for a 
Provincial Party Conference only to be ambushed by an angry mob mainly UMBC 
supporters
4
. It is important to recall that the relationship between NPC and the UMBC 
particularly in Tiv Division was one of hostility. The NPC controlled permits for the 
holding of party meetings and had always denied requests submitted by the UMBC. The 
UMBC were also determined to stop NPC supporters from attending the party conference 
at Wukari.  The NPC lorry retreated to Gboko and sought police protection to make the 
journey. Yet again, the lorry was ambushed and the police had to open fire killing a man 
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named Gbarkigh from Mbalagh clan. This killing sparked off series of violent protests 
targeted at NPC supporters across Tivland. The violence did not follow any discernable 
pattern but at first the burning was carried out without looting. However, it changed as the 
rioters became intoxicated with the mere opportunity of settling a score with their NPC 
oppressors
5
. As Dent reports: 
 
The scale of the burning was so great…that…the police were 
able to do no more than perhaps arrest a tenth of the total 
number of burners involved and temporarily delay the 
burning of certain compounds. As soon as the police convoy 
had passed, the burners resumed their operations
6
.  
The third wave of violence occurred in 1964. This wave of violence was precipitated by 
the underlying causes of the 1959 Federal Elections crises and was fuelled by the harsh 
settlement terms imposed on UMBC supporters in terms of increased tax. Anifowose 
captures the implications of increased tax thus: 
…the imposition meant that many people who did not riot 
were forced to pay. Secondly, the exclusion of the six Tiv 
clans in the Congo area created a feeling of discrimination 
and oppression in the minds of those who were forced to pay 
the special levy…this decision, which was allegedly taken by 
the Northern Region Government on the advice of the Tiv 
NPC leaders, was seen by most people as further evidence of 
political oppression, and therefore as an indirect way of 
punishing the UMBC-AG supporters for rioting and 
damaging the property belonging to NPC supporters.
7
 
However, the percipient event for the third wave of violence was the killing on 12
th
 
Feb. 1964 of Gbargbar, clan head of Mbalagh, and three others. The killing sparked off a 
free-for-all fight between supporters and opponents of the clan head, in effect, it was a 
conflict –between the NPC and UMBC-AG supporters.  The government response to the 
violence was the deployment of the Nigeria Police to the riot scene. However, the Police 
were waylaid by an armed gang and six policemen were killed and several seriously 
wounded while others were declared missing.
8
 This time again, the violence spread to 
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other parts of Tiv Division. Tiv resort to violence as a mechanism to force redress appears 
to conform with Echen’s postulation that: 
Those without access to the corridors of powers may find that 
the only way to make the authorities aware of their desperate 
straits is to create disorder and nuisance since only such 
manifestations of dissent are listened to.
9
 
The foregoing analyses lay a historical background for the appreciation of the 
forms and patterns of discontentment of the Benue people to unpopular political actions. It 
also suggests that it was the advent of party politics and its contradictions that provided the 
fuel for violent demonstrations. The attempt to force the Tiv to join the NPC as against 
their preferred UMBC was the precipitating factor.    
The emphasis on the Tiv here is to drum the fact that at the dawn of party politics, 
the Tiv area was the main theatre of violence. Therefore, a number of inferences could be 
drawn from the inducements for violence. This historical anchorage is important because it 
provides the yardstick to measure the changes and continuities in the pattern of violent 
conflicts in contemporary times.The resort to violence by the Tiv was largely influenced 
by a poor understanding of party politics.  The UMBC which majority of Tiv belonged to 
indoctrinated their followers with political ideas that saw politics as an avenue for power 
and wealth. Thus, the political campaigns that characterized the 1959 General Elections 
were lacking in issues, the showering of abuses on opponents took centre stage. Jibo 
explains that:  
Rather than go to campaigns to learn about the programmes 
of the contending parties, they went there to be “entertained” 
with the abuse of opponents – Tiv singers were employed to 
emphasize and to popularize the abuse of the individuals in 
focus.
10
 
Similarly, Hagher states that the political campaigns were characterized by dances of 
derision.  He stresses emphatically that: 
 
140 
 
The significance of the campaigns was the way each of the 
parties employed the services of dance and song to serve and 
advance their political cause. The cultural attitude of the Tiv 
versus that of Hausa/Fulani to dance became the crucial 
factor in winning party followership. All kinds of dances and 
songs were employed, but since the UMBC employed ethnic 
nationalism to attack the NPC any form of the traditional 
current Tiv dances were appropriated by them. The Tiv NPC 
supporters were referred to a Baja, a pre-colonial slave when 
his slave master freed all the slaves had crawled back to the 
master to demand (for) further enslavement. This loss of 
identity caused the NPC to turn to popular theatre to form a 
new identity. As if to reflect the contempt that the Moslem 
Hausa/Fulani elite had for dancing, the Tiv NPC members 
chose a dramatic anti-Tiv style. Instead of dancing from left 
to right – the Tiv dance formulation – they danced 
clockwise.
11
 
Thus, frivolity and abuses provided the fuel for mobilization during the campaigns. 
These techniques were also visible during the Second Republic. At this time, the contest 
was between the NPP and the NPN. Vulgar abuse of opponents was the hallmark of the 
campaigns. The violence that occurred during this time was stimulated by politics of 
sentiments, rather than issues.  It presented politics as a do or die affair. Jibo presents the 
scenario during the 1983 campaigns thus: 
The tragedy of it was that the political campaigns of the two 
leading parties were led by some of Tivland’s best educated 
sons – Aper Aku and Paul Unongo. A thousand pities that 
they could not improve on the crude election methods of the 
1950s, in place of issues, the voters were served violence and 
abuse and they relished both.
12
 
The political tension that the campaigns generated came to a boiling point when the 
results of the elections were announced in favour of the NPN. The NPP rejected the results 
but the party’s gubernatorial candidate, Mr. Paul Unongo opted for the courts. This show 
of maturity averted what would have been a major disaster comparable to the Tiv riots 
during the First Republic. Though tension was still high amid uncertainties, the military 
coup led by Ibrahim Babangida ended the Second Republic and doused political tension 
remarkably. 
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The Rebirth of Democratic Governance and Electoral Violence  
The military interregnum (1983-1999) did not allow room for democratic 
institutions at the grassroots. Local Government Councils were manned by appointed Sole 
Administrators and Management Committee. However, by 1999, there was a rebirth of 
democratic governance in the country. A new Constitution was also enacted for the 
country. The 1999 Constitution recognized Local Governments as democratic institutions 
and therefore provided for their existence as such.  The various State governments were 
mandated to make laws for their institutionalization as democratic institutions.  The 
Constitution also empowered the various State governments to establish State Independent 
Electoral Commissions for the purpose of conducting periodic Local Government 
Elections. In Benue State, the Benue State Independent Electoral Commission was 
established as earlier stated to midwife Local Government Elections. 
However, almost all the elections conducted by the Commission were fraught with 
various forms of electoral malpractices and were also accompanied with doses of electoral 
and political violence. To better underscore the severity of violence acts and the 
implications for democratic sustenance, Local Governments worst hit by Local 
Government Electionsinduced violence have been isolated for emphasis.   
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Fig. 1: Map of Benue State showing the shaded areas as Local Governments affected by 
Electoral violence within the study period. 
 
6.2.1 Electoral Violence in Tarka Local Government Area 
Tarka Local Government was created in 1996.It is headquartered in Wannune. It 
has an area of 371km
2
 and a population of 79,494 inhabitants.
13
The indigenous population 
are of Tiv ethnic extraction of Jemgbagh parental lineage. Tarka Local Government is 
divided into three districts namely; Mbajir, Mbalahan and Mbachoughul. These districts 
are further subdivided into 10 Council wards of Shitile, Mbaajirakaa, Mbaayo, 
Mbanyagber, Mbargba, Mbaikyaa, Mbaichaveikondo, Ikyolyina, Mbakwaken and 
Tongov.
14
 The distribution of political appointments are based on these political enclaves. 
It suffices to note that amongst the Tiv, the principle of ya naangbian (eat and give to your 
brother) provides the anchorage for distributing political appointments and offices. A 
breach in implementing this philosophy, if not well managed results in conflict. In fact, 
most of the violent reactions that have trailed Local Government Elections particularly in 
Tarka Local Government are in part traceable to breaches in this understanding. 
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Political violence broke out in Wannune in 2003 following the build up to the 
Local Government Elections( see Appendix D and E).  This form of violence could be 
described as pre-election violence. It was fuelled by breaches in the “ya naangbian” Tiv 
political philosophy. Sequel to the return to democratic governance in 1999, Mr. Baver 
Dzeremo was elected under the platform of PDP. He chaired the Local Government as 
from 1999-2002. Attempts by Mr. Dzeremo to re-contest the chairmanship position opened 
the provoked agitations, resistance and indeed violence. The agitators argued that it was 
the turn of Mbalahan going by the “ya na angbian” philosophy to be allocated the 
chairmanship slot. Mr. Baver Dzeremo enjoyed the support of Mr. George Akume, the 
then Governor of the State who hailed from Mbalahan District of the Local Government 
against the wishes of majority of his Mbalahan kinsmen. Mr. Samuel Atsuku from 
Mbalahan District contested the elections along-side Mr. Baver Dzeremo on the platform 
of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). However Mr. Samuel Atsuku was disqualified by 
the PDP for questionable reasons and in turn Mr. Baver Dzeremo was returned as PDP 
candidate.
15
 This development forced Mr. Samuel Atsuku to cross-carpet to the newly 
formed United Nigeria Peoples Party (UNPP) on which platform he filed papers to contest 
the chairmanship position. Again, Mr. Samuel Atsuku was disqualified by BSIEC in 
questionable circumstances. The disqualification of Atsuku heightened tension and the 
tearing of PDP flag in Wannune provided the spark for violence. Many buildings and 
infrastructures were torched leading to a complete breakdown of law and order.
16
 Indeed, 
the 2003 and 2004 Wannune political violence ushered an era of terror in Tarka Local 
Government political history.Table 7 contains a list of persons and properties affected by 
electoral violence in 2003 – 2004. 
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Table 7: Victims of Tarkaa Local Government Electoral Violence in 2003-2004 
S/NO  NAMES OF AFFECTED PERSONS PROPERTY/INJURY/DEAD 
1. Hon. Baver Dzeremo (PDP) Idam-Kende Plaza destroyed 
2. Emmanuel Dzer (PDP Chairman Tarkaa LGA) House burnt 
3. Akor Ian (PDP) Compound burnt 
4. Iorvihi Ngyuran  (UNPP) Compound burnt 
5. Samuel T. Atsuilu (UNPP) House burnt 
6. Anyor Adzua (UNPP) Killed 
7. Richard Adaa (UNPP) Killed 
8. Nyiyongo Aondofa (student) Killed 
9. Iorvihishima Chi (UNPP) Killed 
10. Iornenge Aba (UNPP) Injured (TBT Hospital, Gboko) 
11. Bob Nongo (UNPP) Injured 
12. Jimmy Ikyo (UNPP) Injured 
13. Shi-Aondo Tarka (UNPP) Injured 
14. Orsongu(UNPP) Injured 
Source: The Alternative. May 2-8, 2003 (Local Newspaper) 
 Table 7 above provides some clue to the extent of violence. A close study of the 
table also indicates that majority of the victims were from the United Nigerian People’s 
Party (UNPP). It is instructive that majority of the members of the UNPP were former PDP 
members who felt dissatisfied with the zoning arrangement that saw Baver Dzeremo 
emerging as Chairman in breach of the Tiv philosophy of “eat and give your brother”. This 
group decamped alongside Mr Samuel Atsuku to the UNPP – a party that provided the 
political platform for the correction of the alleged flaws in the zoning of the Chairmanship 
position.  
 The response of the Nigerian Police to the Tarkaa mayhem was disappointing. 
Though the Police claimed some people were arrested, nobody was reported convicted on 
account of these violent acts. In fact, the Police stood by the side lines hopelessly as almost 
everybody opposed to the candidature of Mr Dzeremo was virtually chased out of the 
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Local Government. Mr Dzeremo who was nicknamed “The Last Don” was said to have 
floated a private guard of armed thugs. It was this army of thugs that was used to unleash 
terror on perceived enemies. The opposition UNPP also allegedly organized a resistant 
army of thugs and the Local Government soon became a theatre of war. There were also 
reports of people thrown alive in deep wells among other heinous forms of violence. These 
violent acts gave vent to the validity of the Political Institutions and Actors theoretical 
model which argues that patrimonial elites rely on privatized violence, channelled through 
personal patronage networks, to reinforce control. When elites are less constrained by 
formal legal and institutional checks, they are more likely to use violent methods to secure 
or achieve power
17
. Thus, the March 27
th
, 2004 Local Government Election was conducted 
under a hostile environment of intimidation and violence. Appendix A shows that Mr 
Baver Dzeremo of the PDP got 28, 231 votes while no vote was recorded for the UNPP, 
suggesting that the party did not participate in the elections. Table 8 provides evidence for 
violence few days to the March 27
th
, 2004 election day.       
The role of BSIEC in the Wannune political violence is worth noting. The 
Commission acted in a manner that raised questions regarding its independence.  BSIEC 
disqualified Mr. Samuel Atsuku even when there was evidence that the subject of 
disqualification was before a court of law.
18
 BSIEC’s action ignited a perception crisis 
around its avowed independence and led to a loss of faith in the Commission and the 
elections conducted under its watch. 
The 2012 Election Violence in Tarkaa Local Government Area   
 The 2012 Local Government Elections in Benue State also witnessed some form of 
violence. However, the scale of violence was relatively less when compared to the 2004 
Local Government Elections. The plausible explanation for the reduction in the scale and 
intensity of violence could be located in the fact that the opposition political parties in the 
State were weak and lacked the resources to sustain resistance against the PDP. This 
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perhaps explains why it was only in Tarkaa Local Government where a “political bigwig” 
in the name of George Akume who decamped from the PDP to the Action Congress of 
Nigeria (ACN) was able to put forth some sort of resistance to the PDP. The ACN, though 
dissatisfied with the conduct of the elections across the Local Governments, it was only in 
Tarkaa local government that ACN's discontent with the electoral process resulted into a 
violent clash. The crisis in Tarkaa Local Government was pre-election violence. 
 Trouble began when the chairmanship candidate of Action Congress of Nigeria 
(ACN), Mrs Phoebe N. Dajoh, a relative of Senator George Akume went to Asukunya to 
campaign for the March 24, 2012 elections. PDP supporters disrupted the campaign and 
attacked the campaign team. The ACN campaign team retreated to Wannunue and 
mobilized members for a reprisal attack on PDP members in Asukunya and Wannune, the 
Headquarters of the Local Government. Table 8 below shows the list of PDP members 
affected by Electoral violence in 2012. 
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Table 8: List of PDP Members Affected by the Electoral Violence in 2012 
S/NO  NAMES OF AFFECTED PERSONS PROPERTY/INJURY 
1. PDP Secretariat, Tarka Local Government  Burnt 
2. Mrs. Hembadoon Ijir Toyota car, four motorcycles and 
many cartons of beer 
3. Hon. Mercy Ngbegha Household properties destroyed 
4. Hon. B.K. Vembe House burnt 
5. Hon. Kwaghbo Zika House burnt 
6. Hon. Aleva Gbegba House burnt 
7. Hon. Vincent Kwaghtsa Four bedroom flat burnt 
8. Mr. Aondona Tsaha Household properties destroyed 
9. Amb. Dennis Ukume Pilot Jeep vandalized 
10. Iche Akange House burnt 
11. P.I. Foga Old bus and television destroyed 
12. Dooden Adugu Motorcycle burnt 
13. Yandev Gyura Injured 
14. Jimmy Ikyo Injured 
15. Aondoakaa Yayough Injured 
16. Bem Iviinga Motorcycle burnt 
17. Joe Atom Household properties destroyed 
18. Yange Ibav Beaten 
19. Kumaga Avom Beaten 
Source:  Tarka Local Government Council, Wannune, 2012 
Attached below are pictures of some of the buildings destroyed during the 2012 mayhem.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Fig. 2: Aleva Gbegbe, Burnt by ACN thugs at Wannune during 2012 Local Government 
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Elections 
Source: Field Work, 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 3: P.I. Faga’s Household properties destroyed by ACN thugs in Wannune during the 
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2012 Local Government Elections 
Source: Field Work, 2015 
 
 
 
 Fig. 4: A tent destroyed by PDP thugs at Asukunya in an Election Campaign for the 2012 
 
 It is important to explain further that since 1999, sequel to the return to party 
politics, Tarkaa Local Government remained the stronghold of George Akume. Akume’s 
party and candidates never lost any e
Akume decamped from the PDP to the ACN following disagreements with the then 
Governor Gabriel Suswam. The PDP government in the State led by Gabriel Suswam was 
bent on humiliating Mr George Akume in his h
the overwhelming support Mr Akume enjoyed in his Local Government, it was difficult to 
defeat him in Tarkaa in a free, fair and transparent election. The PDP government in the 
State therefore resorted to rigging to out
 On the day of election, March 24, 2012, election materials were allegedly diverted 
to unknown destinations for thumb
150 
Local Government Elections 
Source: Field Work, 2015 
lection in Tarkaa Local Government. In 2011, George 
ome Local Government of Tarkaa. Given 
smart Mr Akume’s candidate.
-printing of ballots. Majority of the electorates in the 
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Local Government were denied the right to vote as they did not see electoral materials on 
the day of the elections. Surprisingly, election results for all the polling units were 
announced in favour of the PDP, the party in government at the State. Appendix C contains 
the results of the elections as released by BSIEC. Mr Peter Kwaghfan of the PDP was 
declared winner with 26,706 votes.  
 The electoral drama that played out in Tarkaa Local Government was replicated 
across the 23 Local Governments in the State. The doctoring of election results by BSIEC 
was not a new development but a familiar practice common with BSIEC organised 
elections. Under BSIEC, opposition political parties were not allowed a level playing field 
that would pave the way for election victory. It started under George Akume’s watch as 
governor (1999-2007) and continued during the reign of Gabriel Suswam’s administration 
(2007-2015). 
 Little wonder, Mr George Akume’s new party (ACN) did not violently protest the 
results of the elections. The electoral scenario in Tarkaa Local Government also gives vent 
to the theoretical assertions of the Electoral Processes model that “increased competition 
raises the stakes for political players and increases the incentives to use violence”. The 
ACN in Tarkaa Local Government at the time of the 2012 Local Government Elections 
was strategically weak and stood to lose more in any violent clash with the PDP which 
enjoyed the support of BSIEC, the police and the State government. This explains why 
though the elections were massively rigged, no violent acts were reported. Indeed, electoral 
violence is instigated by political actors.    
 
6.2.2 Electoral Violence in Kwande Local Government Area 
Kwande Local Government is one of the largest Local Government Councils in 
Benue State. It covers a landmass area of about 2975.00 square kilometers.
19
The Local 
Government is composed of four clans namely: Ikyurav-ya, Turan, Shangev-ya and Nanev. 
The Kwande area, since the return of party politics in 1999 has been a turbulent area in 
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terms of violent political acts. The raging violence in Kwande is attributable to the struggle 
for power by the leading political parties in the area (ANPP and PDP) as well as 
disagreement by leading political actors in Kwande.
20
 
Oral sources suggest that Paul Unongo’s personality was a precipitating factor in 
igniting violence in Kwande.
21
 It has been argued that Paul Unongo, who at the time was 
the leader of ANPP in the State felt Kwande was his political empire and therefore 
perceived the PDP challenge in Kwande as political assault that must be resisted at all cost. 
The PDP, on the other hand deployed all instruments of cohesion, legal and illegal to rattle 
the ANPP out of Kwande through electorate defeat. Kwande Local Government was 
therefore delineated as a theatre of political war ( see Appendix G,Iand J ). It was under 
this ferment that the Benue State Independent Electoral Commission (BSIEC) conducted 
the March 27, 2004 Local Government Elections.   
On the day of the election, electoral materials were reportedly snatched from 
electoral officers, imaginary results returned as valid votes even in areas where elections 
were not conducted.
22
 Amid this confusion, Mr. Tersuur Yachiga of the ANPP was 
announced as the winner of the chairmanship election in Kwande with 20,438 votes 
followed by Mr. Philip Igba of the PDP who had 8,217 votes while Mr. OrjirGbande of 
UNPP had 4,324 votes.
23
 However, these results were cancelled by BSIEC at their 
Headquarters in Makurdi on grounds of wide spread violence and irregularities. The ANPP 
in Kwande instituted a case at the Adikpo High Court compelling BSIEC to declare the 
results of Kwande Local Government. When the matter came up for hearing on 23
rd
 April, 
2004, the presiding judge, Justice Kpam Baaki struck out the case on the account of 
incompetent jurisdiction.
24
This judgement sparked off violence throughout Kwande. 
ANPP youths allegedly burnt down the house of Ter Kwande, His Royal Highness (HRH) 
Zaki James Adzakpe in both Adikpo and Manyam.The residential house of the District 
Head of Mbayoo, Chief Shagher Chula was also torched. They were alleged to be 
153 
 
supporters of the PDP.
25
In fact, ANPP youths chased out everybody suspected to be a PDP 
sympathizer in both Jato-Aka and Adikpo. The PDP in Kwande responded by raising a 
militia group which embarked on reprisal attacks
25
; within weeks, Kwande presented a 
gory tale of corpses and torched houses worth millions of Naira. It is worth noting that 
BSIEC demonstrated great incompetence in managing the Kwande elections. From all 
indications, the Commission was overwhelmed by overzealous government officials who 
manipulated decisions of the Commission. The outbreak of violence was therefore a 
function of lack of independence on the part of the Commission and interference in the 
activities of the body by the PDP, the party in government at the time.  
Below is a list of those affected in the PDP secretariat attack: 
 
Table 9: Victims of PDP Secretariat Attack in Kwande Local Government Election 
Violence 
S/NO. NAMES OF AFFECTED PERSONS  PROPERTY/INJURY/KILLED 
1.  Tersoo Sule Alias Orphoto Killed  
2.  Iorshe Nyam - Former supervisory 
councillor 
Killed  
3.  Dooeren Chula Killed  
4.  Terungwa Abela Killed  
5.  Terseer Boayali Alia Awonder 
Injured-Hospitalized in Adikpo 
General Hospital and later 
transferred to Federal Medical 
Centre, Makurdi  
6.  Terlumun Zomun 
Injured-Hospitalized in Adikpo 
General Hospital 
7.  Michael Juku 
Injured-Hospitalized in Adikpo 
General Hospital 
8.  Orhemba Dogo Junior Injured 
9.  Akpen Jenkwe Injured 
10.  Terwase Ayila Injured 
11.  Terhile Iorchir Beaten 
12.  Aondowasw Bigica Beaten 
13.  Aondona Orbunde  Beaten 
14.  Terdoo Tarkir Beaten 
15.  Aondona Ahar Beaten 
16.  Sesugn Beev Beaten 
Source: Solomon Akputu, 2015 
154 
 
On the day of election, electoral materials were alleged to have been snatched from 
ad-hoc staff of the Commission. In a report to BSIEC Chairman, the Electoral Officer of 
Kwande Local Government Area, Maxwell N. Kaai reported thus; 
As early as 8:00am, the Benue State Independent Electoral 
Commission (BSIEC) Ad-hoc Staff who were conveying 
electoral materials were ambushed and electoral materials 
were snatched away including the Ballot papers and boxes 
throughout the local government area. As about 10:00am, 
tension heightened in the local government area and so many 
people were killed. At least seven (7) were killed among 
whom is one Orduen Igba, an ad-hoc staff of the commission. 
Even with the presence of law enforcement agents, they 
could not help matters because the thugs had outnumbered 
the law enforcement agents sent to the local government 
area.
26
 
 
The electoral officer further posited that: 
In view of the foregoing, I urge you to use your good office 
to cancel or reschedule another local government election in 
Kwande Local Government area and provide all the 
necessary security measures for free and fair local 
government elections in Kwande Local Government Area, 
please.
27
 
 
Based on this report sent to the commission on the 27
th
 March, 2004 on Kwande 
Local Government elections, the Commission met and suspended the elections. The 
Chairman of the Commission, Hon. James Audu Ikye in a press release on 29
th
 March, 
2004 announced the commission’s decision thus: 
Consequent to the foregoing, the elections in Kwande Local 
Government Area are hereby postponed indefinitely until 
such a time that Benue State Independent Electoral 
Commission is convinced that elections can hold there in free 
and fair atmosphere.
28
 
 
The suspension of the election in the Local Government sparked off violence that 
destabilized political and socio-economic activities in the area for a long period. However, 
a fundamental questionthat thus agitates the mind, was the reason given by the Electoral 
Officer and accepted by the Commission cogent enough for the cancellation or suspension 
of Kwande Local Government Election? Clearly, the Commission acted the script of the 
PDP government. It is inconceivable that an Electoral Commission would cancel the 
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election of an entire Local Government on the basis of a mere report by an Electoral 
Officer without verifiable facts.  
 In a memoranda submitted to the Judicial Commission of Inquiry on the Political 
Crisis in Kwande and Ukum Local Government Areas by the Movement for the 
Restoration of Democracy in Kwande Local Government Area of Benue State, the 
organisation held the cancellation of the Local Government Elections as  the immediate 
cause of the crisis in Kwande Local Government Area.
29  
They submitted further that 
elections were peaceful in Kwande except in one of the fifteen (15) Council wards 
(Mbadura), where it was reported that both PDP and ANPP thugs disrupted polls leading to 
violent clash between two parties that killed one Mr. Orduen Igba, the immediate younger 
brother to Hon. Philip Igba, the PDP chairmanship candidate for the Local Government 
Election. Mr. Orduen Igba was a student of the University of Calabar and was also an 
adhoc supervisor in the election in Mbadura ward.
30
 
It suffices to make the point that the crisis in Kwande was aggravated by BSIEC, as 
the reason advanced for the cancellation was trivial. BSIEC waited until when results were 
collated before the cancellation. Collation of results for the chairmanship election of the 
March 27, 2004 started on 28
th
 March, 2004 at Adikpo, the Local Government Collation 
Centre. Meanwhile, results for the councillorship candidates were declared by the 
Returning Officers of the various wards at the Ward Headquarters. The results,as captured 
in table 10 shows that ANPP won the councillorship election in all the fourteen (14) 
Council Wards namely; Adikpo Township, Mbayoo, Usar, Mbagba/Mbaikyan, Tondov I, 
Mbaketsa, Tondov II, Menev, Live I, Kumakwagh, Yaav, Live II, Moon and Mbaikyor 
with the exception of Mbadura where election was disrupted by thugs of both parties.
31
 
Table 10 contains a list of ANPP councillorship candidates declared elected before 
the cancellation of the election: 
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Table 10: Kwande Local Government Election Results for 
Councillorship Candidates                
RETURNING OFFICERS FORM 
EC8B(1) 
UNPP PDP ANPP WARD S/No. 
Jumpa Emmanuel  000064 216 243 2461 Adikpo Township 1.  
Uza Alfred Asemakaha 000268 543 058 3713 Kumakwagh 2.  
Shima Simon Atenger 000271 466 1083 2696 Mbagba/Mbakyaan 3.  
Terngu Yaapera 000272 055 255 570 Mbayoo 4.  
Apine, F.A. Apine 000270 498 1139 1801 Mbaketsa 5.  
Agber Michael Makir 000275 797 1659 2415 Tondov II 6.  
Adzuah Gabriel Tile Samuel 000274 814 1078 1490 Tondov I 7.  
Linus Tyoor 000273 684 758 1436 Usar 8.  
Terver Emmanuel 000061 110 1305 1951 Menev 9.  
Inja Akaazua 000269 028 364 5864 Yaav 10.  
Adis Dagba 000266 006 618 4731 Moon 11.  
T. Akende - 324 1066 8306 Mbakyor 12.  
Daniel Ager - 1156 972 2238 Live I 13.  
     Live II 14.  
Source: Lazarus Timin, 2004 
  
As for the chairmanship result, only eleven (11) wards were actually collated by the 
combined team of BSIEC officials, party agents, security personnel and NOA. However, 
when it was night, the collation centre was moved to the Police Station, Adikpo where the 
collation was completed and Mr. Joshua Yachiga was declared the duly elected chairman 
by the Returning Officer, Mr. J.T. Yaga. The result was without four wards namely; Live I, 
Mbaikyor, and Live II because results came late and Mbadura ward was cancelled because 
of the violent clashes there
32
. Table 11 contains the chairmanship results as collated: 
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Table 11: Kwande Local Government Election Result for Councillorship Candidates  
RETURNING OFFICERS FORM 
EC8B(1) 
UNPP PDP ANPP WARD S/No. 
Jumpa Emmanuel  000154 340 203 2604 Adikpo Township 1.  
Uza Alfred Asemakaha 000123 021 245 4059 Kumakwagh 2.  
Shima Simon Atenger 000116 547 1439 3087 Mbagba/Mbakyaan 3.  
Terngu Yaapera 000117 051 259 569 Mbayoo 4.  
Apine, F.A. Apine 000125 462 1146 1853 Mbaketsa 5.  
Adzua Shaapera 000119 768 1714 2453 Tondov II 6.  
Agber Michael Makir 000120 852 1078 1511 Tondov I 7.  
Adzuah Gabriel Tile Samuel 000118 1104 568 1156 Usar 8.  
Linus Tyoor 000151 105 1171 1792 Menev 9.  
Terve, Emmanuel 000124 016 003 6244 Yaav 10.  
Inja Akaazua 000121 008 346 5050 Moon 11.  
  4,324 8,217 30,438 Total  
Source: Lazarus Timin, 2004 
 
 The massive support ANPP received in the 2004 Local Government Elections was 
not surprising as Kwande was the traditional seat of ANPP. ANPP in April/May 2003 
General Elections received massive political support from Kwande people. The Local 
Government during the period produced two House of Assembly members from Kwande, 
a member of House of Representatives for Kwande/Ushongo Federal Constituency and 
Kwande contributed substantially in producing Prof. Daniel Saror as the Senator 
representing Benue North Senatorial District on ANPP platform as shown in table 12. 
Table 12contains theresults of the elections as conducted by INEC in April/May 2003 
General Elections: 
Table 12: Results of the April/May 2003 Elections in Kwande 
UNPP PDP ANPP TYPE OF ELECTION S/No. 
6,562 13,311 78,085 Presidential Election 1. 
8,238 13,311 79,985 Gubernatorial Election 2. 
13,104 13,171 58,236 Senatorial Election 3. 
13,143 13,071 58,326 House of Representatives  Election 4. 
 Source: INEC Benue State - 2003 
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 Thus, the March 27
th
, 2004 Local Government Elections which saw ANPP getting 
massive support from the people was a consistent trend in this Local Government Area. 
The cancellation of the results in Kwande ushered in a period of lawlessness and anarchy. 
Kwande Local Government became a theatre of war and a scene of gory tales. ANPP 
youths on 29
th
 March, 2004 mobilized and attacked the house of Ter-Kwande, Chief James 
Azakpe along Adikpo Post Office way and some PDP members and supporters were 
manhandled.  This situation led to the intervention of the military men from Makurdi to 
bring the situation under control. The youths resisted and in the process, their leader, one 
Terfa Uju was killed and this sparked off wanton destruction of properties. Table 13 
contains a list of some persons affected:    
Table 13: Victims of Kwande Local Government Election Violence 
PROPERTY/INJURY/KILLED NAMES OF AFFECTED PERSONS S/No. 
House attacked by ANPP Youths Chief James Adzakpe – Ter Kwande 1. 
Killed by Soldiers Terfa Uju – ANPP 2. 
House Burnt Chief Ason Bur –  Former Deputy Governor 
(PDP) 
3. 
House Burnt Col. Basil Akerigba Kwembe (PDP) 4. 
House Burnt Chief Hilary Ikima (PDP) 5. 
House Burnt Chief Ashaa Igungu (PDP) 6. 
House Burnt Hon. Samuel Ajon (PDP) 7. 
House Burnt Hon. Terlumun Akputu (PDP) 8. 
House Burnt Hon. Sughnen Idyu (PDP) 9. 
House Burnt Hon. Azua Ashongu (PDP) 10. 
House Burnt Hon. Samuel Igulen – Assembly Contestant 
(PDP) 
11. 
House Burnt Esther Jato – PDP Women Leader 12. 
Mercedes 230 car was burnt  Chief Mrs. Margaret Gom. PDP 13. 
House Burnt John Pever 14. 
House Burnt Zaki Iorshaer Chula  15. 
House Burnt Zaki Atumbu Tyondo 16. 
House Burnt Zank Gbagema Atamo 17. 
Source: SolomonAkputu, 2015 
  
The ANPP in Kwande instituted a case at the Adikpo High Court compelling BSIEC 
to declare the results of Kwande Local Government. When the matter came up for hearing 
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on 23
rd
 April, 2004, the presiding judge, Justice Kpam Baaki struck out the case on the 
account of incompetent jurisdiction. The judgment sparked off violence throughout 
Kwande. ANPP youths allegedly burnt down the house of Ter Kwande, Chief James 
Adzakpe in both Adikpo and Manyam, the residential house of the District Head of 
Mbayoo Chief, Shagher Chula was also touched
33
. They were alleged to be supporters of 
PDP. ANPP youths chased out everybody suspected to be PDP supporters or sympathizers 
in both Jato-Aka and Adikpo until PDP formed their militia for a reprisal.The office of the 
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) at Adikpo was burnt and properties 
destroyed. Thugs also forced open, BSIEC office at Adikpo and burnt all electoral 
materials like voters register, ballot boxes, stamp pads, ink and unused ballot papers. This 
violence was well organized and coordinated as it quickly spread to other parts of Kwande 
Local Government Area.   
In Jato-Aka town, properties belonging to traditional rulers and PDP members and 
supporters especially residential houses were destroyed
34
. About twelve (12) houses were 
destroyed and below are names of affected persons: 
1. Chief Inguran Kperansho 
2. Chief Agbo 
3. Chief A.K. Atum 
4. Gbenda Lukera JP 
5. Gbior Atser 
6. Nabative Samuel 
7. Mwuese Najime 
8. Tor Nguvan Ugo 
9. Anjir Aki 
10. Mbakindev M. 
11. America Doff 
12. Mbateren Kuna 
Source: Maxwell M. Kaai – Electoral Officer, Kwande LGA, 2004 
 
The level of violence was unprecedented as properties and many lives were lost. 
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The terror and devastation that PDP members witnessed in the hands of ANPP 
youths necessitated the formation of a counter militia group by PDP to defend its members 
and ascertain control over Kwande. It was alleged that the State Government hired fighters 
to prosecute the conflict. Dressed in military uniform, PDP militias arrived Adikpo in the 
morning of April 30, 2004 and gunshots were fired to forewarn people that the situation 
was at the time under the control of PDP and not ANPP again. Within few days, the PDP 
established their vantage position by overpowering the existing ANPP militia in Adikpo 
and mounted their flag. ANPP chieftains and supporters were terrorized and their 
properties destroyed while others died
35
. Table 13 contains a list of persons affected by 
PDP reprisal attack in Adikpo:  
 
Table 14: Victims of Adikpo Election Violence 
PROPERTY/INJURY/KILLED NAMES OF AFFECTED PERSONS S/No. 
House burnt down Mr. Yaakwan Demekaa – ANPP Chairman  
(ANPP) 
1.  
House burnt down Vincent Ishium Makar – ANPP 2.  
House burnt down Alphonsis Mfoo  3.  
House burnt down Tsavnande Asham – ANPP 4.  
House burnt down Thaddeus Gbatse – ANPP 5.  
House burnt down John Abi – ANPP 6.  
House burnt down Pius Iluum – ANPP  7.  
House burnt down Tony Damkor – ANPP  8.  
House burnt down Paul Unongo – ANPP 9.  
Killed  Tersoo Ibyovungu – ANPP 10.  
Killed  Denen Ahenakaa – ANPP 11.  
Killed  Ayina Torkwaor 12.  
Source: SolomonAkputu, 2015. 
 
After the attack and destruction of ANPP members’ properties in Adikpo, the stage 
became set for PDP militia to avenge the devastation meted out to PDP members and 
supporters in Jato-Aka axis. The first attempt to attack Jato-Aka through the Ugbema area 
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wasfrustrated by ANPP militia at Mama Alakari's residence. After a tactical review of their 
first attempt, PDP militia strategized and launched the second attempt from the same 
direction with superior firepower and burning houses of Agulesha where the signpost 
"Welcome to Jato-Aka" was located; from there they got to Manyam, where they destroyed 
houses, and then to Azaibyo where they were resisted by ANPP militias. The combatants 
in the Kwande fiasco were ANPP and PDP militias. Below is a list some of the people 
whose properties were seriously destroyed. 
Table 15: Victims of Property Destruction in Kwande Local Government Election 
(Jato Aka) Violence 
 
PROPERTY/INJURY/KILLED NAMES OF AFFECTED 
PERSONS 
S/No. 
House burnt  Tersugh Yachiga 1. 
House burnt  Samuel Agogo 2. 
House burnt  Col. Benjamin Aboho (Rtd) 3. 
 
House burnt  
Ucha (P.A. to Tersugh Yachiga) 4. 
Vandalized  Juladaco Hotel 5. 
Vandalized  First Lady Beer Parlour 6. 
Destroyed   Shops in Jato-Aka Main motor park 7. 
House vandalized  Paul Unongo 8. 
Source: SolomonAkputu, 2015. 
Below are snapshots of some of the properties torched. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 5: INEC Office Burnt Down in Adikpo 
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– Kwande on 23
Source: Field Work, 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
rd
 April, 2004. 
  
Fig. 6: Wantaregh Paul Unongo’s House destroyed in 
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Adikpo – Kwande on 30
2004. 
Source: Field Work, 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
th
 April, 
 Fig. 7: Chief Basil Kwembe’s House destroyed in 
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Adikpo – Kwande on 23
Source: Field Work, 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
rd
 April, 2004. 
 Fig. 8: Chief Akase Ikyenge’s Housedestroyed in 
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Adikpo – Kwande on 27
Source: Field Work, 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
th
 April, 2004. 
 Fig. 9: Chief Ason Bur’s House vandalized in 
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Adikpo – Kwande on 27
Source: Field Work, 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
th
 April, 2004 
 Fig. 10: Hon. Ajon's
6.2.3 Electoral Violence in Otukpo Local Government
 Otukpo Local Government is the nucleus of the former Idoma and Otukpo Native 
Authority. The present Otukpo Local 
of 1.298 with a population of 261, 666 and the Headquarters of the Local Government 
Area is Otukpo town and it is the seat of the Och’Idoma, The paramount ruler of the Idoma 
kingdom
36
. The Local Governme
is, therefore a centre of political activities in Zone C. The Local Government in 2004 
witnessed protest and electoral violence. This violence was precipitated by inconsistencies 
and manipulation of electoral rules by BSIEC and PDP party officials( see Appendix L,  M 
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 (Former Vice ChairmanKwande) house destroyed in 
Kwande on 27
th
 April, 2004. 
Source: Field Work, 2015. 
 
 Area 
Government has thirteen districts. It has a landmass 
nt is also the Headquarters of the Senatorial Zone. Otukpo 
 
Adikpo – 
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and N ). In fact in most cases, results were out-rightly written and announced in favour of 
PDP candidates. This development was resisted by the opposition party prominent in the 
Local Government, the UNPP. It suffices to sketch the specific developments that ignited 
violent protests. The 2004 Local Government Elections in Benue State was organized and 
supervised by BSIEC. Preparations for the elections were shoddy and in fact marred by 
disqualification of Opposition Party Candidates. For instance, Alexander Ineke was 
disqualified by BSIEC on ground of tax clearance but was cleared by Makurdi High 
Court.
37
 Ineke’s victory at the High Court was an attestation to the fact that political 
interference by overzealous government officials had influence in the electoral process. 
Candidates who were perceived as threats to a PDP candidate’s victory were disqualified 
for flimsy reasons. Ineke’s case is one of such. Before the actual conduct of the election, 
the political environment in Otukpo was already tense. 
 The pre-election activities embarked upon by BSIEC towards the 27
th
 March, 2004 
elections created an atmosphere of contradiction and apprehension that undermined a 
credible, free, fair and transparent Local Government Elections in Otukpo Local 
Government Area. It created an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust that planted the seed 
of confusion, conflict and violence. The Commission in the course of its activities 
disqualified all Councillorship candidates of UNPP in Otukpo township wards namely; 
Joseph Acha, Otukpo Town East (Ward I), Charles Ameh, Otukpo Town West (Ward II) 
and Owoicho Benson, Otukpo Town Central (Ward III). Consequently, BSIEC declared all 
PDP candidates in the township ward unopposed. Abechi Ogbo of Otukpo Town East, 
Gabriel Inalegwu of Otukpo Town West (Ward II) and Godwin Eyikwodani emerged 
unopposed.
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 Despite the court judgments obtained by the disqualified UNPP 
Councillorship candidates nullifying their disqualifications, BSIEC, on the day of the 
election insisted and refused to make Councillorship ballot papers available to electorates. 
This triggered protest by electorals and most of the Presiding Officers were forced to move 
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electoral materials back to BSIEC office in Otukpo at about 11:00am with election taking 
place. However, PDP candidates emerged as the duly elected Councillors of Otukpo 
township wards.  
 The tension in Otukpo town almost escalated as the Chairmanship candidate of 
UNPP, Hon Alex Ogoh Ineke, who was initially disqualified by BSIEC but cleared by a 
Makurdi High Court could not be voted for in Otukpo township as a result of protest and 
clash between UNPP and PDP supporters. This led to the destruction of electoral materials 
while some were taken back to BSIEC office in Otukpo by electoral officials. Despite the 
non-conduct in the three township wards, results for the wards were announced and PDP 
candidate, Obla was declared the winner. The results were however nullified by 
Chairmanship Election Tribunal in Otukpo on 14-04-2015.
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The following electoral 
materials were destroyed on the day of the elections in Otukpo township.    
 
Otukpo Town Central (Ward III) 
S/No. POLLING UNIT CODE NO MATERIAL 
1. Local Government Secretarial main gate 001 Ballot box-ballot papers 
2. Och’Idoma square 002 Ballot box-ballot papers 
3. Near Och’Idoma Square shade water tank 003 Ballot box-ballot papers 
4. Opposite First Bank Open Space 009 Ballot box-ballot papers 
5. Near Queen’s Hotel Open Space 010 Ballot box-ballot papers 
6. Atakpa II Open Space 012 Ballot box-ballot papers 
7. Paul Odeh Rice Mill Open Space 016 Ballot box-ballot papers 
Source: Solomon Ogom, Otukpo Local Government Electoral Officer, 2004 
 In Akpa District of the Local Government Area, the conduct of the election was 
marred by militacy. The UNPP agent at Methodist Primary School III with Polling Unit 
Code 003 testified at the Local Government Chairmanship Election Tribunal that voting in 
their polling station was in progress when some people dressed in mobile police uniform 
came to the polling station and started shooting in the air. The agents, voters, Presiding 
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Officer and Poll Clerks ran away for their lives and so also did the Security Officer 
attached to the Polling Station. Electoral materials were taken away by the attackers. The 
Collation Officer or Agent for UNPP also testified at the tribunal that at about 4:30pm, 
armed police men came into the collation centre shooting in the air and removed the ballot 
boxes with results.
40
 Otobi was a stronghold of UNPP chairmanship candidate, Alex Ineke 
as his Vice-chairman was from Otobi town. The following electoral materials were taken 
away from the collation centre by armed men.  
S/NO POLLING UNIT CODE NO MATERIAL 
1. Ijami Playground I 004 Ballot box and results 
2. Ijami Playground II 005 Ballot box and results 
3. Otobi Camp 006 Ballot box and results 
4. Ogodumu Playground 007 Ballot box and results 
5. Adankali Open Space 008 Ballot box and results 
6. Adankali Open Space II 009 Ballot box and results 
7. Aturukpo Playground 010 Ballot box and results 
8. Omebe Playground  011 Ballot box and results 
Source: Solomon Ogom, Otukpo Local Government Electoral Officer, 2004. 
 With the confusion in Otobi ward, results of the chairmanship election was 
announced in favour of Hon. Godwin Obla, the PDP candidate as the winner of Otobi 
ward. The Chairmanship Election Tribunal however nullified the election in this ward as a 
result of violent activities. 
 
Allan Ward   
 The election in Allan Ward of Akpa District was also characterised by violent 
activities. Political thugs and armed police men were used in the course of the election. 
Investigation revealed that at Allan Primary School I, Allan Primary School II, Adim, 
Akpa Primary School I, Adim Primary School II, Adim Primary School III, a group of 
armed men in mobile police uniform in a company of a top government official from the 
area attacked these polling units shooting, and carried away electoral materials.
41
 At the 
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end of the day, the result was announced and PDP chairmanship candidate won in the 
ward. The Chairmanship Election Tribunal also nullified the chairmanship election in the 
ward for violent conduct. The following materials were taken away from the polling units: 
S/NO POLLING UNIT CODE NO MATERIAL 
1.  Allan Primary School Compound I 001 Ballot box and ballot papers 
2.  Allan Primary School Compound II 002 Ballot box and ballot papers 
3.  Adim Primary School Compound I 003 Ballot box and ballot papers 
4.  Adim Primary School Compound I 004 Ballot box and ballot papers 
5.  Adim Primary School Compound I 005 Ballot box and ballot papers 
Source: BSIEC Headquarters Office, Makurdi 
 
Ugboju Ehaje 
 The situation in Ugboju Ehaje was not better. Activities leading to the election 
created apprehension, fear and confusion. Both chairmanship candidates had biological or 
sociological link to this ward. While Alex Ineke of the UNPP is an indigene of Ugboju, 
Hon. Godwin Obla has an Ugboju Ehaje woman as his wife and also the Local 
Government PDP party Chairman, Major Lawrence Ugbo (Rtd), an uncle to his wife as his 
in-law. Thus the battle for victory at all cost became inevitable. Pre-election conflict and 
violence manifested constantly between Major Lawrence Ugbo group of the PDP and 
Sunday Atayi group of the UNPP who was a chieftain of UNPP and strong sponsor of 
Alex Ineke. It was therefore not a surprise that on the day of the election (27
th
 March, 
2004), lawlessness and violence became the order of the day. 
 On the day of the election, electoral materials arrived at the four polling stations at 
about 8:00am for the process to commence. However, political thugs disrupted electoral 
process in four polling units, namely; Ogobia Primary School I, Ogobia Primary School II, 
Ogobia West Open Space I and Ogobia West Open Space II. The ward Returning Officer, 
Adakole, A.C. and Hon. Edward Agbo, Councillor Ugboju Ehaje in a complaint letter to 
the Local Government Electoral Officer, Mr. Solomon Agom dated 28
th
 March, 2004 on 
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wilful and deliberate destruction of electoral materials during the 27
th
 March, 2004 Local 
Government Election stated that: 
On the date in question, members of the UNPP led by Sunday 
Audu Alias “Oba”, armed with dangerous weapons (knives, 
guns and sticks) at about 8:30am, attacked one of the four 
polling units in Ogobia-Ugboju (Unit 002). They beat up the 
Presiding Officer, Christian Ogah, the Polling Clerk, Ada 
Onoja and the PDP Agents. The same bandits overpowered 
the security agents (Police) and made away with electoral 
materials (ballot boxes and ballot papers) which they later 
destroyed.
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The remaining polling units in Ogobia (3) were also attacked and electoral 
materials taken away by political thugs. The climax of the violence in Ogobia was the 
siege laid on Major Lawrence Ugbo (Rtd) who was the PDP chairman of Otukpo Local 
Government Area. According to a UNPP chieftain, Sunday Atayi, Major Lawrence Ugbo’s 
house came under siege by UNPP party loyalists because materials for Ondo Ipepe 
Primary School, Ondo-Emichi Primary School, Akpachi Primary School, Igaruwa Open 
Space, Ologu Open Space, Obo/Ojomo Open Space, Akpachi Primary School were 
diverted to his house for electoral irregularities in favour of the PDP candidate.
43
 In the 
course of the siege, a violent clash was ignited which led to the death of one Pius 
Inalegwu, a UNPP member. 
 Because of the tensed situation, Mrs. Judith Obla, wife of the PDP candidate and 
his brothers and entourage who came for the election had to be taken into protective police 
custody in Ogobia Police Station for onward evacuation to Otukpo. The Police Station was 
attacked by UNPP supporters and vandalized, but not for the prompt reinforcement from 
Otukpo, the situation should have escalated further. Even with the tensed situation, results 
for the election was announced in Otukpo in favour of Hon. Godwin Obla of the PDP. 
 
Ugboju Ehaje 2007    
 Events preceding 2007 Local Government Elections in Ugboju-Ehaje ward pointed 
to the fact that a violent electoral process was inevitable especially for the councillorship 
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election. The PDP Councillorship Primary in the ward was marked by lack of internal 
democracy. An attempt by the then State PDP chairman, Major Lawrence Ugbo (Rtd) to 
impose an aspirant created faction within the PDP.  
The PDP Primary was contested between Adogbole Ejeh and Paul Okoh. The 
community preferred Paul Okoh while Major Lawrence supported Adogbole Ejeh. In the 
process, Major Lawrence Ugbo, the then State PDP chairman insisted on Adogbole even 
when it was obvious that Paul Okoh was the preferred aspirant. Subsequently, Adogbole 
Ejeh was imposed on the party members as the councillorship candidate of Ugboju-Ehaje 
ward. Aggrieved members of the party like Hon. Adakole Adanu, Hon. Mike Audu and 
Ijachi Udeh advised Paul Okoh to decamp to ACN which he did. The battle was between 
PDP and PDP as the rest of Paul Okoh’s supporters remained in PDP and worked for his 
success. On the day of the election, it became clear that Paul Okoh was going to win the 
election. At the collation centre, the Returning Officer, Benjamin Udeh attempted to alter 
the result in favour of Adogbole Ejeh which was violently resisted by supporters of Paul 
Okoh who were PDP members. The result was destroyed and BSIEC declared the election 
inconclusive. The Returning Officer suffered injuries along with some loyalist to Adogbole 
Ejeh.
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The point to note in the foregoing narrative is that the elections in Otukpo Local 
Government Area were characterised by irregularities and BSIEC lost control of the 
electoral process. A climate of violence was created right from pre-election activities of 
BSIEC. Local Government Elections Tribunal voided some elections in the Local 
Government Area. The Chairmanship Local Government Elections Tribunal nullified the 
elections of Hon. Godwin Obla which was challenged by Hon. Alex O. Ineke. The 
Election Petition Tribunal sitting in Otukpo ruled as follows:  
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In the final analysis, the totality of our findings in all the 
wards show that the petitioner has successfully faulted or 
impeached the election in at least eight local government... 
we come to the inevitable conclusion in the circumstance that 
the chairmanship election conducted at Otukpo local 
government on 27
th
 March, 2004 and return of the last 
respondents be voided, we hereby declare the election null 
and void.
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 Hon. Moses Okoh and Momoh Uji reclaimed their mandates from Local 
Government Election Tribunal. They scored the highest number of lawful votes but PDP 
councillorship Candidates, Nathaniel Musa and Baba Odeh were declared as winners. It 
must be said that though people protested the conduct of the election the judiciary was 
adequately explored to seek redress, this explains the low magnitude of violence compared 
to other areas in the State. 
Below is the snapshot of an Electoral Violence victim in Otukpo Local Government Area. 
 
Fig. 11: Elaigwu Inalegwu injured during Electoral violence in Otukpo 
 
Source: Field Work, 2015 
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6.2.4 Electoral Violence in Agatu Local Government Area 
Agatu Local Government Area was created in 1996 with Obagaji as the 
Headquarters. The Local Government is of the Idoma extraction in Benue State. The local 
government shares boundaries with Apa and Gwer-West Local Government in Benue State 
as well as Omala Local Government in Kogi state and Keana in Nassarawa State.
46
 The 
River Benue flows through this Local Government, making the residents fishermen. The 
resident populations are predominantly farmers. Agatu Local Government is one of the 
nine Local Government Areas in Benue South Senatorial District (Zone C).   
Agatu witnessed the worst political violence in her history in 2004 sequel to the 
2004 Local Government Elections (see Appendix O). The violence was propelled by 
irregularities in the elections.  Field investigations suggest that the chairmanship election 
was hotly contested between Michael Umoru Inalegwu of the UNPP and Danjuma Sule of 
the PDP.
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 Michael Umoru was the preferred candidate going by the fact that he had been 
chairman from 1999-2004 and had created for himself an effective political structure 
capable of winning elections in Agatu. Inalegwu’s rising political profile created 
apprehension in the PDP and plans were put in place to scuttle his ambition. The Benue 
State Independent Electoral Commission (BSIEC) played the PDP card and the electoral 
process was manipulated to favour the PDP candidate, Danjuma Sule.  
 The 2004 Local Government Elections in Agatu Local Government Area was 
characterized by electoral conflict and violence as a result of intolerance by political 
actors. It is important to note that Hon. Mike Inalegwu of the ANPP won the December, 
1999 Local Government Elections. Thus PDP that was the Ruling Party in Benue State saw 
it as a challenge and was determined to wrestle power from him at all cost. This made pre-
election activities tense with grave consequences. Before 2004 Local Government 
Elections, lives and properties were destroyed as a result of violent clashes between PDP 
and UNPP supporters. The PDP saw Hon. Mike Inalegwu, the UNPP chairmanship 
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candidate as a direct threat because of his rising profile due to his performance in office. It 
was determined to checkmate him effectively.  
At a campaign in 2003 at Obagaji, the Headquarters of Agatu Local Government by 
UNPP, supporters of PDP attacked and disrupted the campaign. Properties belonging to 
UNPP supporters were destroyed and also several persons sustained injuries. According to 
Hon. Mohammed Haruna
48
 whose Mercedes Benz was burnt, a bus hired for the campaign 
rally and a Mazda car owned by one Mr. Adakole Adoka were burnt. One week after this 
incident, members of UNPP went to Ogbaulu, Agatu on campaign trip and on their way to 
Oshugbulu through Atakpa had their convoy attacked. The chairmanship candidate of 
UNPP was beaten to the stage of coma. This attack was masterminded by one Mr. Idaba, a 
onetime PDP ward chairman.  
On the day of 2004 elections, Ogwule Kaduna ward witnessed electoral violence 
that led to the death of two persons namely; Mr. Ojotu Audu and Mr. Aminu Oshugwu. 
They were shot when they attempted to snatch ballot boxes in Ogwule Kaduna.
49
   In 2007, 
prior to the PDP primary in Okokolo ward, there was internal conflict due to the principle 
of internal democracy; a PDP chieftain, Alhaji Zakari Musa wanted to impose on the party 
faithful his preferred candidate.  This was resisted and in the course of the violence that 
erupted, one Mr. Idoko Ukpokwu Sabo was stabbed to death.
48
 
Post election violence was witnessed in Agatu. Immediately after the 2007 election, 
the former chairman of PDP in the Local Government, Mr. Aladan Alowo was attacked 
and his home was set ablaze with properties worth millions of naira destroyed. It was 
alleged that the mastermind of this action was one Hon. Agbo Moses.
50
 Below is a list of 
lives and properties destroyed in the course of the 2004 and 2007 elections in Agatu Local 
Government Area. 
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PDP attacked UNPP at Obagaji – 2004 Pre-Local Government Election Violence, 
February, 2003  
PROPERTY/PERSON NAMES OF AFFECTED PERSONS S/No. 
Mercedes Benz Hon. Mohammed Haruna 1.  
A bus hired for campaign  Hon. Mohammed Haruna 2.  
Mazda Mr. Adakole Adoka  3.  
From Ogbaulu Agatu rally on their way to Oshugbulu through Atakpa  
Beaten seriously close to Atakpa 
village in a clash with PDP 
supporters 
Hon. Mike Inalegwu 4.  
Egba  
Abducted from Egba and his body 
was found close to Agatu local 
government secretariat  
Yusuf Abdul   
2007  
Klled in Okokolo ward in a 2007 
pre-local government elections 
Mr. Idoko Ukpokwu Sabo  
On Local Government Election day, 2007, Ogwule – Kaduna 
Ballot box snatching    
Killed  Mr. Ojotu Andu 1.  
Killed  Mr. Aminu Oshugwu 2.  
Post-Election Violence, 2007 
House was set ablaze and destroyed 
with properties 
Mr. Aladan Alowo  
Source: BSIEC-Agatu Electoral Office, 2015. 
 
On the day of election, electoral materials were selectively distributed to polling 
stations. Polling units that were perceived to be strong holds of the UNPP were denied 
electoral materials. In fact, Michael Inalegwu reportedly waited for electoral materials to 
arrive his polling unit for him to vote to no avail. He later travelled to Obagaji, the 
Headquarters of the Local Government only to learn that elections had been concluded and 
results declared in favour of the PDP.
51
 BSIEC announced the PDP winner of the elections 
even when it was clear that elections did not take place in most of the electoral wards. 
BSIEC declared imaginary results of 20,607 votes for Danjuma Sule of the PDP and 
Michael Inalegwu of the UNPP was said to have scored only 1,113 votes.
52
This 
development could be likened to day-light robbery and it sparked off violent protest in 
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Agatu. Properties were destroyed but no life was lost surprisingly. BSIEC office in 
Ngbede’s family compound made it easier for the PDP to manipulate the electoral process 
in favour of Danjuma Sule. 
 
 
Polling Stations That Did Not Receive Electoral Materials – 2004  
S/NO NAME OF POLLING UNIT P.U CODE REMARKS 
1. Aila Primary School 001 No Satellite Unit Created 
2. Aila Market Square I 002  
3. Aila Market Square II 003  
4. Egba Playground 004  
5. Egba Primary School 005  
6. Edeje Primary School 006  
7. Omukwidi Primary School 007  
8. Adagbo Market Square 008  
9. Abugbe Primary School 009  
10. Abugbe Playground 010  
11. Inminyi Primary School 011  
12. Adana Primary School 012  
13. Olegede Playground 013  
  13  
S/NO NAME OF POLLING UNIT P.U CODE REMARKS 
1. Enugba Primary School 001 Two Satellite Units Created 
2. Enugba Playground  002  
3. Ogbangede Playground 003  
4. Onisha Playground 004  
5. Engila Playground 005  
6. Ello Playground 006  
7. Ichogologwu 007  
Enuegba Primary School (B) 001 (B)  
Ogbangede (B) 003 (B)  
  7  
S/NO NAME OF POLLING UNIT P.U CODE REMARKS 
1. Odugbeho Primary School 001 One Satellite Unit Created 
2. Odugbeho Market Square 002  
3. Ugboju Primary School 003  
4. Odeju Playground 004  
5. Odugbeho Market Square (B) 002 (B)  
 5  
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S/NO NAME OF POLLING UNIT P.U CODE REMARKS 
1. Ogbaulu Playground  001 No satellite Units Created 
2. Ogbaulu Primary School 002  
3. Ogbaulu Market Square 003  
4. Olegabulu Playground 004  
5. Okepegwa Playground 005  
  5  
S/NO NAME OF POLLING UNIT P.U CODE REMARKS 
1. Ogwule Kaduna  Playground  001 Two Satellite Units Created 
2. Ogwule Kaduna  Playground II 002  
3. Ogwule Ugbokpo Playground 003  
4. Kpaichemi Primary School 004  
5. Akele Playground 005  
6. Ekno/Okadu Playground 006  
 002 (B)  
 004 (B)  
  6  
OGWULE OGBAULU 
S/NO NAME OF POLLING UNIT P.U CODE REMARKS 
1. Ogwule Ogbaulu Primary School I 001 One Satellite Unit Created 
2. Ogwule Ogbaulu Primary School II 002  
3. Ogwule Ankpa Primary School  003  
4. Okpagabi Primary School  004  
5. Ibado Primary School 005  
6. Egwuma Primary School 006  
7. Ajomachi Playground 007  
8. Olegagbane Primary School 008  
9. Okwutanobe Market Square 009  
10. Ogbuogba Playground 010  
11. Ogwule Ogbaulu Primary School II 011  
Egwuma Primary School (B) 006 (B)  
  11  
OKOKOLO 
S/NO NAME OF POLLING UNIT P.U CODE REMARKS 
1. Okokolo Primary School 001 Two Satellite Units Created 
2. Okokolo Primary School II 002  
3. Okokolo Market Square 003  
4. Akwu Primary School 004  
5. Akwu Playground 005  
6. Akpeko 006  
  6  
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OGBAULU 
S/NO NAME OF POLLING UNIT P.U CODE REMARKS 
1. Ogbaulu Playground 001 No Satellite Units Created 
2. Ogbaulu Primary School 002  
3. Ogbaulu Market Square 003  
4. Olegbaulu Playground 004  
5. Okepegwa Playground 005  
6. Akpeko 006  
7. Ocholanya Primary School 007  
8. Banzu Open Space 008  
  8  
OSHIGBUDU 
S/NO NAME OF POLLING UNIT P.U CODE REMARKS 
1. Oshigbudu Primary School 001 One Satellite Unit Created 
2. Oshigbudu Primary School II 002  
3. Ayele Primary School 003  
4. Ogwumogbo Primary School 004  
5. Ikpele Primary School 005  
6. Ogwufa Playground 006  
7. Oweto Playground 007  
8. Utogwugwu Primary School 008  
9. Ebete Primary School 009  
10. Iga-Gushu Playground 010  
11. Ogam Playground 011  
12. Warri Playground 012  
Ikpele Primary School (B) 005 (B)  
  12  
Source: INEC Directory of Polling Units, 2015 
 The voters waited patiently from the early hours of the morning for the arrival of 
the Presiding Officers and the electoral materials for the commencement of the election but 
to no avail as the officers and the materials never arrived and thus, no voting in any form 
took place in the affected stations/units. It was evident that BSIEC had perfected plans 
with the Ruling Party to manipulate the election in their favour. Despite complaints from 
 UNPP to BSIEC about 
with the exception of Obagaji town, nothing was done. Obagaji was saturated with the 
security men to ensure a successful execution of the manipulation. Members of UNPP 
coming from the other wards were not allowed to enter Obagaji town. The coast was clear 
for PDP to use State apparatus to achieve their dubious aim of subjugating the will of the 
people. It was impossible for a man who won the 1999 Local Government Election in 
Agatu Local Government to suddenly become unpopular despite his performance in office 
to score only 1,113 votes in 2004 Local Government Election. This was a clear case of 
manipulation by PDP and BSIEC.
Below are snapshots ofa victim of Electoral Violence and a house 
Local Government Area.
Fig. 12: Mr. Mr. Idoko Ukpokwu Sabo 
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the non-availability of electoral materials in all the polling units 
 
 
– Killed in Okokolo in 2007 during pre
PDP primary Electoral violence. 
Source: Field Work, 2015 
destroyed in Agatu 
 
-election 
 Fig. 13: Mr. Aladan Alowo's house set ablaze and destroyed with prope
6.3 The Implications of Electoral Violence 
Elections are in every sense an integral part of representative democracy. Every 
modern vision of representative democracy entails the notion of elections as the primary 
means of selection of political decision makers. This is why elections are sometimes 
described as the “hallmark of democracy” and as the “heart of democratic order’. Without 
credible elections, the edifice of democracy would come down crumpling. Indeed, 
elections are a fundamental pillar of democracy that cannot be uprooted in any democrati
political setting. It suffices therefore that electoral violence threatens the sustenance of 
representative democracy especially at the grassroots. 
Electoral violence at the grassroots is fostered through the use of political thugs to 
unleash terror on opponents. This illegal interference with the electoral process no doubt is 
electoral fraud, and it is criminal and has severe consequences for democratic stability as 
well as human security. 
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Source: Field Work, 2015 
 
 
 
The zeal to organize and execute electoral violence for selfish 
 
rties 
c 
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interest has stimulated the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW). These 
SALW range from pump actions, pistols of all types, short guns and the popular AK 47 
rifles. Politicians have elevated violence to the level of political ideology where individuals 
and groups have formed political relevance particularly during election period. 
It is worth stating that electoral violence at whatever level of governance raises 
national security concerns. Indeed, security is one of the greatest concerns of every nation 
of the world.  Electoral violence forges an environment for all forms of criminality. Arms 
used for political thuggery are soon used by robbers and the society pays dearly for it. 
Delivering a paper on electoral violence and national security, Tafa Balogun asserts thus: 
 
…electoral violence could in conjunction with other 
prevailing factors lead to anarchy and ultimately to political 
instability. Our experience in the recently concluded elections 
indicates there is unbridled flagrancy in the smuggling and 
use of arms and ammunition by political thugs and party 
supporters. The result has been that political opponents are 
either intimidated or out-rightly killed or injured.
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It is clear from the above assertion of former Inspector General of Police that 
electoral violence creates an environment where illegal arms get into the hands of 
unauthorized persons who use them for criminal activities. Resources, which ordinarily 
would have been spent on development projects are spent combating such crimes or 
repairing damages caused by these hoodlums.  
 Furthermore, electoral violence has worsened the security challenge in the State. 
Armed thugs easily convert to armed robbers and kidnappers after elections. This 
development often time creates serious problems for security agents as political godfathers 
to these thugs impede their arrest and prosecution. The escalating scale of cultism in the 
State is also a fallout of this development. 
There was the disruption of social and economic life in Kwande after the 2003 
general elections and the 2004 Local Government Election as a result of electoral violence. 
The breakdown of law and order and the high level of insecurity which characterized the 
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violence and state government inability to arrest the situation escalated it. This situation 
created uncertainty and insecurity, which affected citizens who sought refuge in other local 
governments for fear of attack and even after the situation was relatively brought under 
control refused to return for the fear of the unknown.   
According to Lyam Anongo
54
, many sophisticated weapons were still in the hands 
of the militia gangs who constituted themselves into law enforcement officers, prosecutors 
and adjudicators at the same time. Their activities were directed against opposition 
members. Their penalties for offenders ranged from severe beating of the whole family to 
the burning of the whole village and even death irrespective of the nature of the offence. 
This situation made it difficult for opponents who fled to return home and start new life 
even after appeals from government.   
In Tarka Local Government, many citizens left the area because of insecurity after 
the 2003 election and pre-election activities for 2004 Local Government Elections. Armed 
thugs were moving from house to house terrorizing the people. The leaders of these gangs 
were well known. Some were even notorious armed robbers who had been on wanted list 
of security agents. Many people were killed and also injured by political thugs who were 
well armed. Properties worth millions of naira were also destroyed. The violence was 
perpetrated by the Ruling Party PDP supporters against mostly ANPP supporters. Electoral 
violence breeds insecurity as it is often characterized by loss of lives and properties as 
epitomized in the Tarka electoral violence of 2003, 2004 and 2012.  
Otukpo Local Government experienced long insecurity as a result of electoral 
violence. Political thugs were equipped with sophisticated weapons to perpetrate electoral 
violence. The PDP that was the Ruling Party and ANPP clashed in the course of the 2004 
Local Government Election which left traits of sorrow and blood. Lives were lost and 
properties worth millions of naira destroyed. In 2012 pre-election activities, a PDP 
chairmanship aspirant Hon. Alexander Ineke was attacked by his opponent's thugs in PDP 
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and in the process, his vehicle was destroyed. The situation created fear, suspicion and lack 
of trust in the system.   
Insecurity characterized Agatu local government elections in 2004 and 2007. The 
ruling party was determined to hold on to power while the opposition was resolute to 
defeat the party in power. The outcome was violence which created insecurity and 
destruction of lives and properties. The implication of violence is that it creates atmosphere 
of destruction and instability. A former chairman, Hon. Michael Inalegwu almost lost his 
life in 2003 preparatory to the 2004 local government election as a result of violent attack. 
More so, electoral violence instils fear and causes low turnout or participation by 
eligible voters. Flowing from that, it thus casts doubt on the credibility of the purported 
elected leaders before the eyes of the local and community. This in the final analyses 
delinks the people from governance arising from the fact that majority of the people are 
denied the right of choice which elections provide. Similarly, electoral violence could 
affect respect from the governed and this could further affect the general acceptability of 
popularity of the government. It as well diminishes good governance and dashes the 
people’s hopes and expectations.Again, electoral violence also affects adversely voter 
participation in election at the grassroots. The fear of attacks by party thugs prevents would 
be voters from participation in the electoral process. Thus, denying the people the 
opportunity of electing those who will govern them. 
Electoral violence creates political instability at the Local Government levels. 
Electoral violence has grave consequences as it is capable of truncating the dreams of 
millions of citizens residing in Local Government Areas that wish to have a stable and 
developed polity. The centrality of free and fair election can never be overemphasized 
bearing in mind what its opposite could do to a developing democratic system. Electoral 
violence is incapable of institutionizing strong, efficient and virile democratic 
representative governance at the grassroots which is expected to be the bedrock of 
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democracy. The core objective of electoral violence is to impose leaders onto the people 
through physical and psychological instruments. The consequence of this process is the 
production of incompetent leaders that are alienated from the people who are ideally 
suppose to choose their leaders through the ballot box. This has constituted a serious 
impediment on the development of a viable and strong democratic institution that will 
guarantee good governance. Wrong leadership is an obstacle to fundamental development 
of our society.         
 Electoral violence which is usually characterized by destruction of lives and 
properties results in the disruption of socio-economic activities such as farming, education, 
trading etc. Development cannot occur in the absence of peace and security. This 
displacement of people in this process creates economic backwardness. In Kwande for 
example, the popular Adikpo market which was centre of economic activities was disserted 
for a long time as a result of violence. Militia took over the collection of revenue and only 
people approved by them operated business in the market. Because of fear, a lot of people 
left Adikpo thus crippling economic activities. Also, agriculture suffered setback as youths 
who mostly provided labour were engaged in the violence while women and the elderly 
ones flee the town. Agricultural production and productivity declined for reasons of 
insecurity. The impact of violence also affected food security as farm produce were looted, 
destroyed or otherwise left unharvested as villagers were too afraid to go to many farms. It 
must be stated that investors relocated their businesses because of fear of attack.  
 In the specific case of Benue State, electoral violence has compounded the 
infrastructural deficit in the State. Adikpo, a commercial town soon became a ghost town 
following the 2004 election mayhem. The crisis also drove away businessmen and 
investors away from the area. A similar implication played out in Tarkaa Local 
Government. The persistence of electoral violence discourages investment in these areas 
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by the political class. This perhaps explains why the political class seldom invests in their 
localities despite access to huge capital outlay. 
 Electoral violence propels educational backwardness. This is because parents are 
often scared to send their children to schools during such activities. In some cases, 
educational infrastructures are destroyed in the course of the violence thus rendering 
students with no alternative than to stay at home. Teachers are forced to take refuge for 
safety thus staying away from their jobs. 
The use of armed political thugs in electoral violence has helped in the 
galvanization of circle of violence at the grassroots. It is a fact that most restive youths in 
the country who have perpetrated violence are products of electoral violence. Children who 
grow up in a violent environment are easily influenced by such situations and subsequently 
become violent. 
The implication for social relations is also serious. Community bases where 
competing political parties enjoy support from are frequently harassed, intimidated and 
attacked. This development often escalates into communal conflicts with concomitant 
consequences for the development of the State. In fact, resources that would have been 
used for developmental activities are expended on avoidable violence.More importantly, 
the persistence of electoral violence has contributed greatly to voter apathy in the State 
especially during Local Government Elections. Eligible voters are scared of going out to 
perform their civic responsibility for fear of being attacked. This plausibly explains why 
BSIEC organized elections witness low voter turnout. Electoral violence is therefore 
antithetical to democratic governance and development 
 
6.4 Conclusion  
Incidents of electoral violence resulting from the conduct of Local Government 
Elections in Benue State have placed very serious political and economic costs on the 
grassroots. The outbreak of violence as noted above sprang out of electoral irregularities. 
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The management of the electoral process by BSIEC, as observed, has often times being 
influenced by state officials with partisan interest. This development has largely affected 
the credibility of the electoral process.  BSIEC, as observed above, has not been able to 
wade off interferences in the electoral process by the PDP, the party in government during 
the period of study. Given that Electoral Commissioners of BSIEC are nominated by the 
Governor who happens to be an interested party in Local Government Elections, the 
tendency for State Commissioners of BSIEC to be amenable to PDP influences is great and 
has been the bane of the Commission. The violence that has accompanied the electoral 
irregularities has largely been defined by the level of political consciousness and intensity 
of the manipulations in those Local Governments. This explains why there has not been 
very serious violence in some Local Governments in spite of the irregularities in the 
electoral process.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
7.1 Summary  
This study attempted a documentation as well as explanation of the causes of 
electoral violence during Local Government Elections in Benue State. The work also 
interrogated the operational challenges of Benue State Independent Electoral Commission 
(BSIEC) as it relates to the management of Local Government Elections in Benue State. 
The scale of violence that accompanies a democratic exercise that ought to be peacefully 
organized elicited intellectual scrutiny and formed a critical component of the 
investigations carried out. Specifically, the work in chapter one dealt with methodological 
issues and explained how the research was conducted. It also x-rayed the problematic 
under investigation and stressed the significance of the work. The chapter demonstrated the 
intellectual worth of a study that seeks to explain why the conduct of Local Government 
Elections by a State Constituted Electoral Commission has been fraught with inefficiencies 
leading to electoral violence. 
Chapter two reviewed existing literatures on Local Government Election and 
electoral violence using a thematic approach. The reviewed exposed the gap in existing 
literature on Local Government Elections and electoral violence particularly in Benue 
State. The gap provided ample justification for this current endeavour. 
In chapter three, the study provided a geographical description of the area of study 
to foster a clearer appreciation of the particular character of the Benue environment. In 
order to explain better the culture of electoral violence in Nigeria generally so as to provide 
some historical footing for the prevalence of a culture of electoral violence in Benue State, 
specific developments that shaped and entrenched electoral violence in the body polity 
have been examined. The chapter notes that the absence of ideological politics and the 
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prevalence of primordial tendencies like ethnicity and corruption sowed the seeds of 
electoral violence in the political landscape of Nigerian politics. 
Chapter four explains the institutionalization of Local Government Elections sequel 
to the 1976 Local Government Reforms recognition of Local Governments as a tier of 
government. The elections conducted during this period have also been examined. The 
chapter notes that though elections during this period were sporadically organized and 
were supervised by Federal Electoral Commission, the results largely reflected the strength 
of the political parties that participated in those elections. 
Chapter five zeroed in on the Benue State Independent Electoral Commission 
(BSIEC). The chapter explained that BSIEC is a creation of the 1999 Constitution 
following the return to democratic governance. It notes further that as from 1999, elections 
into Local Government Councils have been much more regular if compared to the period 
before it. However, the conduct of elections by BSIEC has been fraught with irregularities 
owing largely to the lack of independence of the Commission. The chapter identified and 
explained the specific operational challenges that adversely affected the credibility of 
elections supervised by BSIEC in the State.   
Chapter six explored specific incidences of electoral violence sparked off as a 
consequence of ill managed elections. Four key local governments where the scale of 
violence has been very high were isolated and interrogated. The chapter posits that 
electoral violence has had dire consequences on grassroots democracy and threatens 
political stability. It also argued that BSIEC as well as the other State Independent 
Electoral Commissions can only deliver credible elections if their independence is 
guaranteed.  Interference by State government officials are largely responsible for much of 
the irregularities. 
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7.2 Conclusion  
The strategic importance of the grassroots to the sustenance of democracy cannot 
be wished away. Indeed for democratic values to be firmly rooted, there must evolve from 
the grassroots where majority of the populace reside.  Thus, the conduct of elections into 
Local Government Councils must be managed so as to entrench cherished democratic 
values at the grassroots. However, regular elections were not held at the Local Government 
Councils before 1999 due partly to the military interregnum that defined the history of the 
period. This development did not assist the entrenchment of democratic values at the 
grassroots. The Rebirth of a democratic order in 1999 raised high hopes for grassroots 
democracy. But the experience with SIECs conducted elections seems to dim such 
expectations. Though BSIEC is theoretically said to be independent, her operations as it 
relates to managing Local Government Elections suggests that it operated like a 
department of the State government. This explains why officials of the State government 
with partisan interests easily influence the operations and indeed the electoral process at 
the grassroots. Opposition political parties are crudely rigged out and results are declared 
hundred per cent for the party in government. The resultant consequence of this 
development has often times been electoral violence.  
To curb this trend and entrench participatory democracy at the grassroots, the 
amendment of the 1999 Constitution as (amended) to give States Independent Electoral 
Commissions (SIECs) greater autonomy in its operationability and funding is central in the 
realisation of a credible and violence-free election. The issue of eligibility, tenure, funding, 
appointment and unilateral dissolution by governors should be clearly enshrined in the 
Constitution. More independence for the electoral agency will enhance its impartiality in 
mediating between competing political claims; its better funding will lead to improvements 
in logistics and handling of elections. The strength of any institution guarantees its 
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efficiency, credibility and productivity. The Legislature should ensure a proper legal 
framework for BSIEC so that Executive strangulation will be eliminated. 
Electoral systems are one square of an interrelated patchwork of government 
systems, rules and points to access to power. Successful Electoral Systems Design comes 
from looking at the framework of political institution as a whole. Local Governments in 
the country urgently need a constitutional reform to properly position them for service 
delivery. Since the constitution guarantees a democratically elected system, an amendment 
should be done by the Legislature to remove the lacuna that was generally exploited by 
State governors to appoint the so-called "Caretaker Committees" or "Sole Administrators" 
to run Local Governments as a stop gap arrangement pending the conduct of elections. The 
tenure of council members and financial autonomy should be enshrined in the 
Constitution; this will eliminate the undemocratic action of governors perpetrated against 
Local Government Councils for their political interest. This amendment will ensure that 
Benue State Independent Electoral Commission (BSIEC) carry their constitutional roles of 
conducting Local Government Elections regularly without undue interference by State 
governors. 
Staffing and capacity building should be a priority as a way of strengthening these 
institutions. The major impediment to credible elections conducted by BSIEC has been its 
human resource incapacity and their consequential reliance on adhoc staff who may have 
divided loyalty and over whom disciplinary actions cannot be taken against. There is need 
to create an electoral institute to establish a permanent pool of well trained and qualified 
electoral trainers to undertake continuous training of BSIEC staff. For ad-hoc staff to be 
accountable, BSIEC should use National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) members and 
students in higher institutions as ways of checks and balances in the course of their duties. 
To achieve credible Local Government Elections, BSIEC should work 
collaboratively with donor agencies in capacity building. This includes poll workers 
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training, voter education implementation strategy, training on gender mainstreaming in the 
electoral process and training of elected local government officials on good governance.                
BSIEC can also seek financial support from donor agencies to hold periodic 
stakeholders meetings. This will ensure adequate communication with them to enhance the 
credibility of the electoral management bodies. 
Political parties are major electoral machineries which propel elections to success 
or tranticate them. Parties are special purpose organizations for the political competition 
that takes over the votes from the citizens. Political Parties present candidates to the voters 
a spectrum of choices as which issues to address, how, by who and with what results. 
Consequently, a true democratic system will therefore not be possible without political 
parties. However, the lack of internal party democracy negates a credible and free elections 
as godfathers who imposed their godsons during party primaries go extra miles to deliver 
them during elections using illegal means. The electoral law should be amended to 
empower BSIEC to monitor party primaries and where the rules are not complied with 
such primaries should be cancelled. This will introduce sanity in the process. 
Political parties should also play observatory roles during Local Government 
Elections. Transparency is central in the determination of election credibility. 
Transparency in terms of processes, procedures, conducts, etc. Therefore transparency 
must not only be done but must also be seen to be done. Election observation should not be 
done only by Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and other neutral bodies but also by 
political parties who are key stakeholders in elections. Political parties should properly 
educate their members especially those nominated as party agents at all levels of the 
election process and also to counter sign results on behalf of their parties. This can 
effectively discourage electoral violence as it allows party agents to observe election and 
once they have disagreement about any aspect can activate grievance mechanisms instead 
of resorting to violence. 
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The role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) is very crucial in the realization of 
credible and transparent Local Government Elections. Nigerian Civil Society 
Organizations have come a long way in the democratization project of the country. Poll 
observation as a global concept with many CEOs has been accredited by BSIEC to observe 
their Local Government Area polls in order to enhance electoral transparency and 
accountability. The central question here is who funds such observation missions? The 
global practice is that CSOs fund their observation mission in order to achieve 
transparency and objectivity in their report. This has not been so as Benue State 
Government and BSIEC funded observations missions of CSOs in 2004, 2007 and 2012. 
This totally negates the essence and should be discarded in future elections. 
A code of conduct should be issued to security agents involved in election duties. 
Compliance should be monitored by a team consisting of members of Civil Society 
Organization and violation of the code should be sanctioned. 
The nature and character of the State breeds the Ruling Class that operates the 
feature of the State. The nature and character of the Ruling Class is central in the formation 
of rules and the process of political competition or election. In most cases, rules are made 
by the Ruling Class to their advantage and to the detriment of the majority of the populace. 
There is need for new orientation and attitudinal change on the part of the ruling class that 
will recognize the fact that sovereignty belongs to the people. It is only when the rules are 
made centrally in the interest of the people that Local Government Elections will be 
planned and conducted transparently. The Legislature must forget self-centeredness and 
embrace patriotism as servants to the people.  
BSIEC must be released from the stranglehold of State control and made truly 
independent. Like INEC they must enjoy funding from the first line charge. The 
appointment process of Electoral Commissioners must also be done credibly so that only 
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men and women of integrity are so appointed. It is a considered view in this study that 
these measures will enhance the conduct of credible elections at the grassroots. 
 
7.3 Main Contribution to Knowledge  
In broad strokes, this study enriches the historiography on Local Government 
Elections and electoral violence. It provides data on a neglected theme in Local 
Government Administration. In specific terms, the study has demonstrated that Benue 
State Independent Electoral Commission (BSIEC) though independent in name, lacks 
functional independence. The finances of the Commission are controlled by the State 
government. Some staff of the Commission are civil servants seconded to the Commission. 
Thus, as the saying goes, he who pays the piper dictates its tune. This development has 
largely eroded the independence of the Commission. 
Secondly, the study has also shown that all the elections conducted by BSIEC have 
been marred by serious irregularities. These irregularities have been masterminded by the 
party in government in cohort with BSIEC officials.  
Thirdly, the work has explained that incidences of electoral violence resulting from 
Local Government Elections in the State were propelled by electoral irregularities. Though 
these irregularities occurred in all the twenty three local government councils, the scale of 
violence was dictated largely by the level of political consciousness and intensity of the 
manipulations. 
Fourthly, the study has argued the fact that democracy and its values can only be 
sustained in Nigeria if they evolve from the grassroots where majority of the populace 
reside. Democracy sustained from above cannot stand the test of time.  
Fifthly and more importantly, the study has documented for posterity the 
inefficiencies of SIECs in Nigeria and thereby making a modest contribution to the 
question of the continuous relevance of State Independent Electoral Commissions. In this 
connection too, the work makes a contribution to the search for solutions. It is hoped that 
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this study will go a long way in assisting policy makers couch appropriate reforms for 
restructuring and re-invigorating SIECs towards conducting credible Local Government 
polls. The study therefore recommends that retired Judges, retired Civil Servants of 
impeccable character as well as representatives of credible Civil Societies should be the 
ones appointed to serve as members of State Independent Electoral Commissions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
200 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Primary Sources 
Oral Sources 
S/N Name of informant  Age Occupation Place Date of 
Interview 
1. Ameh Oguche 58yrs Farmer Agatu 21/3/2013 
2. Terwase Aker 42yrs Civil servant Makurdi 12/11/2012 
3. Abagi Abraham 40yrs Farmer Makurdi 12/11/2012 
4. Terfa Agber 38yrs Trader Makurdi 13/12/2012 
5. Gabriel Otakwu 52yrs Businessman Otukpo 22/1/2012 
6. Aba Nathaniel 46yrs Businessman Otukpo 22/1/2012 
7. Ephraim Agatu 42yrs Businessman Agatu 5/5/2013 
8. Ngusha Akor 48yrs Politician Gboko 28/4/2014 
9. Barnabas Kyegh 54yrs Farmer Konshisha 16/2/2013 
10. Mker Mathais 45yrs Civil servant Wannune 26/4/2013 
11. Maagbe Aondona 43yrs Politician Adikpo 5/5/2013 
12. Nyiuma Ager 40yrs Politician Aliade 17/3/2013 
13. Onoja Oche 38yrs Civil servant Otukpo 20/2/2013 
14. James Abata 40yrs Civil servant Wannune 26/4/2013 
15. Teghtegh Adzer 44yrs Farmer Adikpo 5/5/2013 
16. James Akpen 38yrs Farmer Konshisha 17/2/2013 
17. Esther Adoom 40yrs Trader Gboko 5/4/2013 
18. Inalegwu Ameh 55yrs Civil servant Otukpo 20/2/2013 
19. Terdoo Agan 34yrs Civil servant Wannune 26/4/2013 
20. Gboko Augustine 50yrs Politician Gboko 5/4/2013 
21. Odeje victor 38yrs Politician Obagaji 10/4/2015 
22. Ameh Ageh 52yrs Civil servant Makurdi 15/4/2015 
23. Solomon Akputu 54yrs  Farming/politician Adikpo 22/05/2015 
24. Michael inalegwu 56yrs Politician Makurdi 15/4/2015 
25. Odeh Peter 36yrs Farming Otukpo 8/4/2015 
26. Abouno Samuel 42yrs Politician Otukpo 8/4/2015 
27. Agba Atime 54yrs Farmer Wannune 10/2/2014 
28. Orbunde Toryem 42yrs Politician Wannune 10/2/2014 
29. Abagonye Peter 40yrs Civil servant Otukpo 8/4/2015 
30. Alex Ineke 56yrs Trader Otukpo 8/4/2015 
31. Solomon Akputut 48yrs Businessman Adikpo 24/08/2015 
32. Abraham Ukor 45yrs Businessman Adikpo 24/08/2015 
33. Ngunan Lanshima 40yrs Trader Adikpo 24/08/2015 
34. Akperashi Aondogu 53yrs Farmer Adikpo 24/08/2015 
35. Lazarus Timin 48yrs Civil Servant Makurdi 4/09/2015 
36. Agbo Faith  45yrs Civil Servant Makurdi 4/09/2015 
37. Boayali Mnena 50yrs Trader Makurdi 4/09/2015 
38. Aondona Ahar 47yrs Civil Servant Makurdi 4/09/2015 
39. Terlumun Zomun 46yrs Trader Makurdi 6/09/2015 
40. Terwase Ayila 44yrs Trader Makurdi 6/09/2015 
41. Ode Ene 52yrs  Civil Servant Makurdi 6/09/2015 
42. Ikwue Adama 40yrs Business Man Otukpo 8/4/2015 
43. Ekeh Agbo 42yrs Business Man  Otukpo 8/4/2015 
44. Abu Jafaru 38yrs Civil Servant Otukpo 8/4/2015 
201 
 
45. Isalu Agada 41yrs Politician Otukpo 8/4/2015 
46. Barry Idoka 58yrs Farmer Otukpo 9/4/2015 
47. Inalegwu Okopi 46yrs Farmer Otukpo 9/4/2015 
48. Baby Alakpa 40yrs Politician Otukpo 9/4/2015 
49. Baba Odeh 50yrs Farmer Otukpo 9/4/2015 
50. Okoh Iklaga 62yrs Farmer Otukpo 9/4/2015 
51. Adoka Adaji 55yrs Farmer Otukpo 9/4/2015 
52. Bartholomew Aboje  60yrs Farmer Agatu 12/4/2015 
53. Adetu Eigege 42yrs Politician Agatu 12/4/2015 
54. Amedu Ichakpa 42yrs Politician Agatu 12/4/2015 
55. Nathaniel Musa 68yrs Farmer Agatu 12/4/2015 
56. Moses Okoh 42yrs Civil Servant Agatu 12/4/2015 
57. Aucha Clement 52yrs Civil Servant Agatu 12/4/2015 
 
Government Publications/Reports 
1. Guidelines for Local Government Reforms, Federal Government Printer, Kaduna, 
1976. 
 
2. The 1979 Constitution, Federal Republic of Nigeria, Lagos. 
3. The 1999 Constitution, Federal Republic of Nigeria, Abuja. 
4. Benue State Independent Electoral Commission Law 2000, Benue State of Nigeria 
Gazette, No. 43, Makurdi, 26
th
 October, 2000. 
 
5. Benue State Independent Electoral Commission, Newsletter, November 2000. 
 
6. Handbook on Tarka Local Government Council 2004. 
7. Kwande Local Government Handbook 2002. 
8. BSIEC Report on Otukpo Local Government 2004. 
9. BSIEC Report on Agatu Local Government, 2004. 
10. Benue State Independent Electoral Commission Report on Kwande Elections, 2004. 
 
11. Results of Local Government Elections,2004, Benue State Independent Electoral 
Commission(BSIEC). 
 
12. Results of Local Government Elections,2007, Benue State Independent Electoral 
Commission(BSIEC). 
 
13. Results of Local Government Elections,2012, Benue State Independent Electoral 
Commission(BSIEC). 
 
14.  Report of Parliamentary Presidential and States Elections in Nigeria. 
 
15.  Manual for Election Observers. INEC, Abuja 2003. 
 
16.  INEC, Report of Activities (August 1998 – December 1999), 2000. 
202 
 
 
17.  Memoranda Submitted to Judicial Commission of Inquiry on the Political Crisis in 
Kwande and Ukum Local Government Areas of Benue State,19
th
 July,2014. 
 
18.  BSIEC Press Release by the Chairman, Hon Audu Ikye on 29
th
 March 2004 on 
Kwande Local Government Elections. 
 
Newspapers 
1. News Mate Magazine, 22
nd
 November, 2004. 
2. New Times Newspaper, 29
th
 August, 2002. 
3. The Voice Newspaper, 17
th
 March 2007. 
4. The Alternative Newspaper 20
th
 September, 2015. 
5. Daily Champion Newspaper,18
th
 February, 2015. 
6. The Guardian, 13
th
 August 2003. 
7. Power Newsletter, 15
th
 June, 2004. 
8. Daily Monitor, September 5, 1997, 
 
Secondary Sources 
Books  
Achebe, C.,The Trouble with Nigeria,Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1985). 
Adamolekun, et al eds, Local Government in West Africa Since Independence, (Lagos: 
University Press, 1988) 
Ake, C.,Democracy and Development in Africa,Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd, 2001. 
Akinboye, E., Democracy Consolidation in Africa, London; Cambridge University Press, 
2003. 
Akinboye, E., Democracy Consolidation in Africa, London; Cambridge University Press, 
2003. 
Akinwumi, O., et al (eds) Historical Perspectives on Nigeria’s Post-Colonial 
Conflicts.Historical Society of Nigeria 2007. 
Aniekwe, C., & Kushie, J., Electoral Violence Situational Analysis: Identifying Hot-Spots 
in the 2011 General Elections in Nigeria, Abuja; NAPEN, 2011. 
Anifowose, R. and Babawale, T. eds., Elections and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria, 
Lagos: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2003. 
 Anifowose, R., Violence and Politics in Nigeria: The Tiv and Yoruba Experience, Enugu: 
Nok Publishers, 1982. 
Awopeju, A., “Election Rigging and the Problem of Electoral Act in Nigeria” Afro-Asian 
Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 2, No. 2.4 Quarter IV. 2011. 
Ayandele, E. A.,The Educated Elite in the Nigerian Society, (Ibadan: University Press, 
1974). 
203 
 
Azikiwe, N.,The Development of Political Parties in Nigeria, London: Faber and Faber, 
1957 
Bagaji, Y.A.S., “Political Thugs and Political Violence: Causes and Prevention” Journal of 
Economics and Management Studies, Vol. 1 No. 1 2003, pp. 92-99. 
Campbell, J., Electoral Violence in Nigeria, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 
2010. 
Clive, B., “Electoral Laws, Electoral Behaviour and Electoral Outcomes, Journal of 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 1997. 
Colemann, J.S.,Nigeria: Background to Nationalism,California University Press, 1958 
Ekumankama, D.U., The Law and the Development of Local Government in Nigeria, 
Enugu: Otusun Nigerian Limited, 1966. 
Dark, M.I., and Okoli, F.C., eds Local Government in Nigeria: Current Problems and 
Future Challenges (Lagos: Mangrove publications, 1998). 
Dauda, O., and Avidime, O., “Towards a Sustainable Democratic Governance in Nigeria’s 
Fourth Republic, in Millennium Journal of International Studies, 2007. 
Elaigwu, J. I.,Nigeria, Yesterday and Today for Tomorrow, Essays in Government and 
Society Jos: Aha publishing house, 2005. 
Elton, M., “Psychology of Aggression” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 3. (September 
1959). 
Emezi, B., “Local Government in Historical Perspectives” Nigerian Journal of Public 
Administration and Local Government, 1984. 
Fischer, J., Electoral Conflict and Violence, IFES, Washington DC, 2002. 
Gana, A.T., and Egwu, S.G., edsFederalism in Africa: The Imperative of Democratic 
Development, Entrea: African Centre for Democratic Governance, 2003. 
Gboyega, A.,Political Values and Local Government in Nigeria, Lagos: Malthouse Pres, 
1987. 
Gyuse, T.,et aleds Conflicts in the Benue Valley (Benue State University Press Makurdi, 
2006). 
Ikime, O., History, The Historian and the Nation: The Voice of a Nigerian Historian, 
Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books, 2006. 
 Joseph, R. A.,Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria,Ibadan:Spectrum Books 
Limited, 1991. 
Kurfi, A.,The Nigerian General Elections, 1959 and 1979,Lagos: Macmillan Publishers 
Ltd. 
Lindberg, S., Democracy and Elections in Africa, Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 
2006. 
Lugman, S., “Electoral Institution and the Management of the Democratization Process: 
The Nigeria Expedience” Journal of Social Science 21(1) 59-65, 2009. 
204 
 
Mackintosh, J.P.,Nigerian Government and Politics, London: Allen and Unwin, 1966 
PP.434. 
Marx, K., Capital, Moscow; Progress publishers, Vol. 2 1980. 
Nwosu, H., Laying the Foundation for Nigeria’s Democracy: My Account of JUNE 12, 
1993 Presidential Election and its Annulment, Lagos: Macmillan Publishers 2008 
Odey, J.O., This Madness called Elections 2003, Enugu: Snaap press Ltd, 2003. 
Olowu, O., “Local Government and Rural Development in Nigeria” The Nigerian Journal 
of Local Government Studies, Vol. 1.No. 1.(Department of Public Administration, 
University of Ife. 1983). 
Olusanya, G. O.,The Second World War and Politics in Nigeria 1939-1953, (Lagos: Evans 
Brother ltd, 1973). 
Onuoha, B and Fadakinle, M. Transition Politics in Nigeria 1970-1999 (Lagos: Matthouse 
Press, 2002). 
Onwudiwe, E. & Berwind, C., Breaking the Cycle of Electoral Violence in Nigeria, 
Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2010. 
Orewa, G. O. and Adewumi, J.B.,Local Government in Nigeria: The Changing Scene, 
Benin: Ethiope Publishing Corporation, 1983. 
Osuala, C.E.,Introduction to Research Methodology Onitsha: Africana-Feb Publishers Ltd, 
1982. 
Post, J.W.,The Nigerian Federal Elections 1959 London: Oxford University Press, 1963 
Powell, G. B., Elections as instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional 
Visions, New Haven: Yale University Press 2000. 
 
Published Articles 
Schedler, Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Un-free Competition, Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 2002. 
 
Shaminja, S.T.,Political Change and Governance in Benue State, (Makurdi: Aboki 
Publishers, 2010). 
 
Suberu, R. T., State and Local Government Reorganization in Nigeria, (Ibadan: IFRA, 
1991). 
 
Tamuno, T. O.,The Evolution of the Nigerian State: the Southern Phase, (London: 
Longman Publishers, 1972). 
 
Ujo, A.,Understanding Elections in Nigeria Kaduna: Joyce Publishers, 2012). 
 
Usman, Y. B. and Abba, A.,Election Violence 1952-2002Zaria: Abdulahi Smith Centre for 
Historical Research, 2002. 
 
205 
 
Unpublished Papers 
Abbas, I.M., “Electoral Violence in Nigeria and the Problem of Democratic Politics” Paper 
Presented at the 27
th
 Annual Conference, Nigerian Political Science Association on 
Electoral Reform, Political Succession and Democratization in Africa held at 
Benue State University, Makurdi 16
th
-19
th
 November, 2008. 
Amupitan, J., “The Role of the Courts in Strengthening Democracy at the Local 
Government Level in Nigeria. Unpublished Paper. 
Jega, A., “Democracy in Nigeria: Conceptions, Representations and Expectations” 
Presented at the International Workshop on the Nigerian Democratization Process 
and the European Union, Bordeaux, France, 1996). 
Last, M., “Governance and the Public at the Local Level: from revenue raising to benign 
Neglects, 1960-2010, paper presented at the 50
th
Independence Anniversary 
Conference organized by the Department of history, University of Abuja, 25
th
 – 
28
th
 September, 2010. 
Lyayi, F., “The conduct of Elections and Electoral Practices in Nigeria” paper delivered at 
the MBA conference in Abuja on 24
th
 August, 2004. 
Okpeh, O., “Explaining Why Violence Persists in Nigeria’s Election” A Research Paper 
for the National Assembly Database Research Group Abuja, September 2007. 
Sebella, O., “Post-Election Violence and the Failure of Intelligence” Unpublished paper. 
Sorkaa, A.P., “Presidential or Parliamentary System of Local Government: Towards 
Reviewing the Present Status of Local Governments in Nigerian Constitution” 
Paper for Workshop for all Local Government Councillors, Tuesday 15
th
 -17
th
 
February, 2000, Tarka Foundation, Makurdi. 
Yahaya, A.P., “The Idea of Local Government in Nigeria” Unpublished Paper. P.55. 
 
Unpublished Theses 
Aghayere, V.O. “Strategies for Achieving increased Performance in Nigeria Local 
Government: The Case of Bendel State” unpublished PhD Thesis, University of 
Benin, Benin City. 
 
Ahokegh, A., “Communal Conflict in Nigeria 1960-2004: A Study of the Tiv Experience” 
PhD Thesis, Department of History, Benue State University, Makurdi, 2008. 
 
Azaigba, K., “A History of Local Government Administration and Rural Development in 
Selected Local Governments in Benue State, 1976-2010. Ph.D Thesis, Department 
of History, Benue State University, Makurdi, 2012. 
 
206 
 
APPENDICES 
Appendix A  - Results of 2004 Chairmanship Election.  P.205 
Appendix B  - Results of 2007 Chairmanship Election. P.207 
Appendix C  - Results of 2012 Chairmanship Election.P.209 
Appendix D  - Security Report on Tarkaa Local Government. P.211 
Appendix E  - The Alternative, March 2-8, 2003: The Reign of Terror in 
Tarkaa.P.213 
 
Appendix F  - Press Statement by the Chairman, BSIEC. P.214 
 
Appendix G  - Memo Submitted to the Judicial Commission 
   of Inquiry on the Political Crisis in Kwande 
and Ukum Local Government Areas. P.217 
 
Appendix H  - Memorandum by BSIEC on Kwande Local 
Government.P.`230 
 
Appendix I  -  Memorandum of 21
st
 July, 2004 and 11
th
 August, 2004 by 
Chief Col. B.I. Aboho (Rtd.). P.237 
 
Appendix J  - The Alternative: Jato-Aka Madness, March 5-11, 2003. 
P.338 
 
Appendix K  - Judgment in the Court of Appeal, Jos Judicial Division 
Holdeneat Jos on 14
th
 July, 2005.P.240 
 
Appendix L  - Report on Otukpo Local Government Elections, March 27, 
2004. P.278  `  ` ` 
 
Appendix M  - Complaint on Wilful and Deliberate Destruction on Electoral 
Materials during the 27
th
 March, 2004 Local Government 
Elections. P.307 
 
Appendix N  - Judgement on Otukpo Election Petition. P.308 
Appendix O  - Report on Election Violence in Agatu LGA. P.338  
Appendix P  - Agatu Election Petition.P.339 
Appendix Q  - Memorandum by Independent National 
Electoral Commission (INEC) Benue State on 
Election Violence. P.351 
 
 
207 
 
APENDIX A
 
208 
 
APPENDIX B 
BENUE STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION 
DECLARATION OF 2007 LOCAL GOVERNMENT CHAIRMANSHIP 
RESULTS 
 
PARTY AND SCORE NAME OF CANDIDATE  S/NO LGA 
REMARK PDP ANPP AC    
    ADIE ONUH 1 ADO 
PDP-ELECTED 52,908   JAMES ABOH EDEH 2  
  3,768  ISRAEL ADANU GODWIN 1 AGATU 
PDP-ELECTED 49,678   EGHIARUWA O. ONGBATABO 2  
    JOHN INALEGWU 3  
    REUBEN O. DAVID 1 APA 
PDP-ELECTED 32,174   CORNELIUS P. ODEJE 2  
    HON. AGBA ABU 3  
    GBENDA AZATEGHTEGH 1 BURUKU 
PDP-ELECTED    ALFRED AHILE AKIGHIR 2  
    NOMIGO LOUIS 1 GBOKO 
PDP-ELECTED    SIMON ABUA YAJIR 2  
  1,083  AGABI CLETUS 1 GUMA 
    ORKAR MATTHEW 2  
    NYIYONGO JOSEPH 3  
    TORPAR K. TITUS 4  
    CHOMBU YANMOM 5  
PDP-ELECTED 74,786   MOM SABASTINE A. 6  
    RAYMOND BEKE 1 GWER- EAST 
PDP-ELECTED 48,371   SIMON IWAR 2  
  5,371  JOSEPH Y. AGAH 3  
  1,293  MTSENGA AVANDE D. 1 GWER- WEST 
PDP-ELECTED 66,087   SAMUEL T. ABAJI 2  
    SABASTINE ATOR 3  
    AONDOAKURA TOR 1 KATSINA-ALA 
  734  KULUGH ATOO ALOYSIUS 2  
PDP-ELECTED 99,669   AVAAN AUGUSTINE O. 3  
  3,301  UGBA TERYILA 1 KONSHISHA 
    TERUNGWA IORYISA 2  
PDP-ELECTED 83,414   TARNONGO SAAWUAN 3  
  11,038  HON. BOKO JOSEPH 1 KWANDE 
    TAR-TERAOR 2  
PDP-ELECTED 99,295   HON. AKPUTU TERLUMUN 3  
    BENJAMIN 1 LOGO 
PDP-ELECTED 54,552   REV. JOSEPH ADULE 2  
  7,699  KPAMOR J.T. ORKAR 1 MAKURDI 
    AKPEN AGEH EDWARD 2  
PDP-ELECTED 68,352   AKAAZA A. JOSEPH 3  
  321  ODEH IKO D. 1 OBI 
PDP-ELECTED 40,986   ODEH AGEH JOHN 2  
    JACKSON OMENKA 3  
    SAMUEL OKORIE 1 OGBADIBO 
   2,270 DR. PATRICK E. AGADA 2  
  6,020  HON. DANIEL ROBERT 3  
PDP-ELECTED 19,357   HON. CLEMENT AGADA 4  
   1,074 MUSA O. ALECHENU 1 OHIMINI 
  447  SADIQ SULE 2  
    JOHN AKOR 3  
    EMMANUEL OKOH 4  
PDP-ELECTED 30,133   LINUS AMEH 5  
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PARTY AND SCORE NAME OF CANDIDATE  S/NO LGA 
  16,852  OGBU ONAH 1 OJU 
PDP-ELECTED 74,923   OCHELLE P.G.E 2  
    GIDEON ODE 3  
PDP-ELECTED 28,257   BARR. JACOB OGWUCHE 1 OKPOKWU 
    MRS. ADA ADOBA 2  
   4,663 BONIFACE ONU U. 3  
  3,360  EMMANUEL ABAKPA 4  
    COL. EGBE ADULUGBA 5  
   8,100 MIKE OKOKO 1 OTUKPO 
PDP-ELECTED 43,204   DR. I.M. ONUH 2  
    JOHN ALOGA 3  
    EDWARD E. ANJA 1 TARKAR 
PDP-ELECTED 24,465   DAJO W. AKOOM AKUME 2  
    SELUMUN ANJA 3  
PDP-ELECTED 105,628   DAVID SEAV 1 UKUM 
    AMAICHIGH TER I. 2  
    DR. ROBERT KUGBER 1 USHONGO 
PDP-ELECTED 76,874   ORYA IORDYE 2  
    PETER AKURA 3  
PDP-ELECTED 68,724   B.M. DOWGO 1 VANDEIKYAA 
    BERNARD K. TONDO 2  
  3,023  AGEMA CHIA 3  
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